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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers the implementation of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976, which was passed as a response to the 
inadequacy of rape law and to public outcry following a number of 
controversial rape cases and their treatment by the legal system. 
The main intention of Parliament in passing this Act was to ease 
the burden of the rape victim in court. It proposed that she should 
generally be granted anonymity, and that certain safeguards should 
be adopted with regard to admitting evidence of her sexual history. 
The legislation also contains a statutory definition of rape and a 
provision granting anonymity to the defendant before conviction.
The legislation is essentially discretionary, and its 
implementation is up to trial judges who are not given clear 
guidelines on how the law should be applied. This is of crucial 
significance particularly as far as evidence of sexual history is 
concerned. The study reviews existing literature on rape, and goes 
on to outline the history of the law in England and the background 
of current legislation. It also describes the research methods used 
in the present study, together with the main hypotheses. It then 
considers the practical application of the 1976 Act. It deals with 
the way in which its section relevant to prior sexual history is 
implemented, and considers the criteria judges use in interpreting 
the legislation. It goes on to consider ways in which the 
complainant's credibility may be discredited with reference to 
aspects of her sexual behaviour which are not covered by the 1976 
Act. It then discusses how far the complainant's overall behaviour 
continues to be a central focus of rape trials, and to what extent 
it is effectively her behaviour that determines the jury's verdict.
It also considers the impact of the Act on the reporting and 
disposition of rape offences. Various models of rape law reform and 
their impact in other jurisdictions are examined. Finally, future 
rape law reform in this country is discussed, both in the light of 
the present findings and of recent developments.
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INTRODUCTION
A new law dealing with some aspects of rape offences was introduced 
in this country in 1976. This was based principally on the 
recommendations of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape appointed 
in the previous year to consider and report on aspects of rape law 
which were in need of urgent reform (1).
The Advisory Group on the Law of Rape were concerned "with the
vital and fundamental rights of an accused person to have a fair
trial", but they also intended to "rectify any balance of
unfairness to the alleged victim" (2). Those concerns are at least 
partially reflected in the new Act, which provides for the first 
time a statutory definition of rape stressing that the crucial 
element in the offence is lack of consent rather than violence;
"A man commits rape if
a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at 
the time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and
b) at that time he knows that she does not consent to the 
intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she consents 
to it". (3)
The Act also gives anonymity to both complainants and defendants in 
rape trials. The anonymity restriction on the complainant may be 
lifted by the judge before the trial in some limited circumstances, 
and on the defendant, if he is convicted of a rape offence at a 
trial before a Crown Court.
The most important provision of the new Act undoubtedly is the 
restriction it places on the admissibility of evidence relating to 
the complainant’s previous sexual experience;
"Except with the leave of the judge, no evidence and no 
question in cross-examination shall be adduced or asked 
at the trial by or on behalf of any defendant at the 
trial about any sexual experience of a complainant with a 
person other than the defendant" (4)
Applications for leave to introduce such evidence are to be made to
the judge in the absence of the jury and the judge is to give leave
"if and only if he is satisfied that it would be unfair 
to that defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be 
adduced or the question to be asked" (5),
Although the Act received wide support from interested
organisations and the general public, the ultimate test of its
effectiveness is in its practical application. The aim of this
study is to investigate empirically the operation of the Act,
particularly with regard to judicial discretion in admitting
evidence relating to the complainant's sexual experience and in
lifting restrictions on anonymity. The impact of the Act on the
trial of rape offences in more general terms will also be assessed,
and information on the main features and results of such trials
will be presented. Clearly, both the definition and the
administration of the law are inextricably bound up with the values
and norms of the society within which it operates, and this study
will also emphasize the social, as distinct from the legal,
definitions of rape which emerge in court.
Part I, divided into three chapters, introduces and describes the 
background of the study. The Chapter One reviews the existing 
literature on the phenomenon of rape, and outlines the central 
ideas and theories relating to the subject. This is intended as a 
background to the discussion and analysis of current thinking and 
policy making on rape. It will be argued that, despite radical
changes in rape theories in recent years, the social definition 
which emerges from the legal process is still profoundly influenced 
by early psychoanalytical views which label the rapist as a sexual 
psychopath, and define rape as a violent, impulsive sexual 
encounter, fundamentally different from what society accepts as 
normal sexual relations. Equally, despite considerable changes 
during the course of this century in the social position of women, 
the social definition of rape still has strong overtones of 
Victorian morality which requires entirely different norms of 
sexual behaviour from men and from women. Chapter Two sketches the 
history of the law of rape in this country, as well as the 
literature pertaining to it. It points out the peculiar position 
that rape occupies within the body of the criminal law, and 
discusses the various special rules which apply to it. The 
background of the appointment of the Advisory Croup on the Law of 
Rape, its Report and subsequent legislative change will be given 
particular attention in this context. Chapter Three discusses the 
background assumptions and main hypotheses of the study. It also 
describes the research design and procedure and considers the 
methodology used in the empirical test of the hypotheses. Finally, 
the chapter presents findings relating to the principal 
characteristics of the sample including the offences charged, pleas 
and findings of guilt.
Part II, also in three chapters, presents the substantive findings 
of the study. Chapter Four considers the admissibility of sexual 
history evidence before and after the 1976 Act. It discusses the 
assumptions implicit in pre-1976 case law regarding the relevance 
and admissibility of such evidence, and goes on to examine
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applications under Section 2 of the new Act. Findings are presented 
that such applications are frequent and usually successful. It is 
argued that the Act has had little impact in this sense, since its 
application is governed by judicial discretion. Judges frequently 
disregard it, or interpret it with reference to earlier case law 
rather than to the spirit of the 1976 Act. Chapter Five goes on to 
describe how complainants in rape trials are discredited with 
regard to their sexual behaviour and reputation in ways not covered 
by the Act. In particular, their prior relationship with the 
accused, their behaviour at the time of the alleged offence, and 
evidence concerning their general lifestyle will be considered 
here. The chapter concludes that defence counsel use a variety of 
strategies to discredit the complainant's sexual reputation outside 
the scope of Section 2, and argues that this is another reflection 
of the weakness of that legislation. Chapter Six considers whether 
and how far attacks of this sort on the complainant's sexual or 
general reputation influence the outcome of the trial. The various 
hypotheses put forward in Chapter Three are tested and the findings 
presented that the victim's character and behaviour are important 
determinants of the outcome of trials.
Part III considers the overall impact of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976. Chapter Seven discusses the workings of the 
anonymity provisions and of the statutory definition of rape which 
incorporates the controversial Morgan ruling that led to the 
appointment of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape. It also 
considers the impact of law reform on reporting and prosecution, 
findings of guilt and sentencing. It argues that there is no 
evidence of change in any of these areas which can be attributed to
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the legislation.
Part IV puts the findings of the study in a broader perspective. 
Chapter Eight looks at rape law reform in other jurisdictions and 
concludes that discretionary schemes similar to the 1976 
legislation have been unsuccessful elsewhere too. Only reforms 
which firmly limit the scope of judicial discretion have been found 
to bring about any significant improvement in the lot of rape 
victims. Finally, Chapter Nine considers what further reforms are 
needed in this country in the light of findings presented here, and 
of the Criminal Law Revision Committee's 1984 Report on Sexual 
Offences. It concludes that while there are limits to what can be 
achieved by law reform alone, that limit is far from having been 
reached in this country. Further reforms along the lines described 
in the last chapter are urgently needed if the commitment to the 
fair treatment of women reporting rape is to be realised.
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(4) Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, s.2(1)
(5) ibid. s.2(2)
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PART I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
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CHAPTER ONE. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Until relatively recently, academic literature on rape has been 
scanty. One commentator observes that
"it is a subject which has received little serious 
scrutiny and remains shrouded in myths, denied the status 
of a ’real' problem. The academic community has remained 
strangely silent about rape. Criminologists, 
psychologists and sociologists have ignored it or 
accorded it only cursory recognition of a kind which 
tends to reinforce rather than challenge the myths, 
basing their analyses on the folk-knowledge they share 
with the layman." (1)
The extensive literature on the criminology and sociology of
deviant behaviour gives little more than passing notice to rape.
Such classics as Sutherland and Cressey’s Principles of Criminology
(2) hardly mention it, while Cressey and Ward's Delinquency, Crime
and Social Process (3) contains only one chapter on sexual
aggression against adult females, which includes some reference to
rape. A guide to the use of criminological literature published in
1973 (4) contains but two references to rape; one of these is to an
article on the psychological classification of rapists (5) and the
other concerns the notion of "alcoholised situations" where both
rapist and victim are under the influence of alcohol (6),
Tennent has noted that as far as sexual offences in general are 
concerned.
"some of the most important contributions in the last 20
years have been advances in knowledge of normal sexual
practices." (7)
Such studies, however, also fail to throw any light on the
phenomenon of rape. For example, Kinsey's only reference to it is
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in the context of a discussion of impotence among older men where 
he concludes that
"not a few older men serve time in penal institutions for 
attempting to engage in a sexual act which at their age
would not interest most of them, and of which many of
them are undoubtedly incapable." (8)
Studies which focus on deviant sexual behaviour tend to ignore rape
altogether and to concentrate instead on the subjects of
homosexuality and prostitution (9). It has been noted that
"volumes on human sexuality, often exhaustive in their 
coverage of other forms of sexual deviation, rarely 
mention it. The word "rape" is curiously absent from 
their indexes, and where present, refers us to a passage 
on the symbolic significance of rape, the supposed 
masochistic fantasies of adolescent girls, or defloration 
rituals in primitive tribes, and not to the act of rape 
in the context of contemporary society." (10)
Psychology and psychoanalysis
Such early academic literature as exists tends to draw heavily on 
the disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis, and views rape as 
a predominantly explosive act of sexual aggression, and the rapist, 
as a sexual psychopath. Krafft-Ebing, who is generally regarded as 
one of the pioneers in the study of sexual disorders, saw rape as a 
result of "a temporary, powerful excitation of sexual desire 
induced by alcohol or by some other condition", and thought it 
highly improbable that "a man morally intact would commit this 
brutal crime." (11) Indeed, he argued that signs of degeneracy had 
been found in many men who committed rape and concluded that rape 
was "very often the act of degenerate male imbeciles" (12).
Krafft-Ebing felt that "voluntary subjection to the opposite sex"
16
was a physiological phenomenon in women, and consequently regarded 
masochism as a "pathological growth of specific feminine mental 
elements" (13), although, somewhat curiously, he did not relate 
this to rape. Some years later, the notion of inherent female 
masochism was taken up and expanded by Freud and his followers. 
Nevertheless, in all his works, Freud failed to consider the 
phenomenon of rape or to shed any light on the psychology of 
rapists. His main contribution to the subject was to lay the 
foundations for subsequent studies on female fantasies of rape 
which he saw "as a subconscious wish to be sexually overcome" (14).
In his early writings Freud reported that a disproportionately high 
number of his female hysterical patients had, in their childhood, 
been "seduced" by adults, particularly their fathers or older 
children (15). He argued that each of the major neuroses had, as 
its immediate cause, "one particular disturbance of the economics 
of the nervous system" and that these pathological changes "have as 
their common source the subject’s sexual life" (16). From the 
experience of his patients, Freud concluded that a passive sexual 
experience before puberty was the specific aetiology of hysteria.
Some years later, Freud rejected his early theory. He wrote that he 
had made a mistake in accepting as true his patients’ accounts of 
childhood seduction by their father, and he reinterpreted these as 
false memories which were in fact wishful fantasies, pointing to 
the existence of the Oedipus complex. Freud attributed his initial 
"mistake" to his lack of experience;
"At that time, I was not yet able to distinguish between 
my patients’ phantasies about their childhood years and
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their recollections." (17)
The notion that women fantasize about rape, and indeed are unable 
to distinguish between reality and fantasy in this respect, 
developed together with the idea that rape was something that women 
actually desired. Freud was the first to write in any depth of the 
"essential character of feminine masochism", which he saw as the 
"final genital stage", the ultimate in sexual maturity, and closely 
linked to the "situation characteristic of womanhood, 
i.e....playing the passive part in coitus or...giving birth" (18).
These views were later expanded by post-Freudians, particularly by 
Helene Deutsch (19) and Karen Horney (20), both of whom developed 
Freud's basic theory of feminine masochism. It should be noted here 
that Horney moved away from Freud's ideas in one important respect, 
in that she added a cultural dimension to the earlier narrow 
biological model:
"The problem of feminine masochism cannot be related to 
factors inherent in the anatomical, physiological, 
psychic characteristics of woman alone, but must be 
considered as importantly conditioned by the culture 
complex or social organisation in which the particular 
masochistic woman has developed" (21).
While Freud and his immediate followers confined their interest in
rape to elaborating theories on women's unconscious rape wish and
inherent masochism, a number of criminologists of Freudian
orientation began to discuss rape within general works on sexual
offences (22). These writers tended to heighten the image of the
rapist as "a psychopathic personality (with) pathological
personality" (23), viewed him as "powerless before the onslaught of
forces within himself" (24), and described his actions as "an
explosive expression of pent-up sexual impulse" (25).
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The idea that most sexual offences are committed by sexual 
degenerates and fiends who can be accurately diagnosed as such by 
any psychiatrist led to the view that such offenders should be 
confined until they were permanently cured of their condition. In 
the U.S.A., between 1937 and 1950, some thirteen States passed what 
have been termed "sexual psychopath laws" which define the sexual 
psychopath, and establish administrative procedures for his 
custody, treatment, and release. Although such legislation has 
attracted heavy criticism (26) its introduction illustrates the 
weight given to psychological theories on sexual offenders in 
general, which led to their classification in a separate category, 
somewhere between the criminal and the mentally ill (27).
Abrahamsen's work represents one of the best examples of Freudian 
psychology applied to this field of criminology, insofar as it is 
characterized by the use of an intuitive approach based largely on 
idiosyncratic case studies (28).
Abrahamsen viewed the sexual offender as
"the most emotionally and mentally disturbed of all 
criminals, because his problem reaches the roots of his 
most basic and primitive impulses" (29).
His research covered 102 sexual offenders, including some convicted
rapists, and found that they all suffered from mental or emotional
disorders ranging from neurotic conditions to character disorders
and psychoses. Although all of Abrahamsen’s sample of offenders
were "sexually deviated", he found that in contrast to popular
belief, sex offenders tended to be "undersexed" and "emotionally
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fixed at a pregenital level" (30).
Within the scope of their studies on the psychology of the 
offender, Abrahamsen and his associates investigated the role 
played by women in the aetiology of sex offences. Together with 
various other studies (31), they paid particular attention to the 
relationship of the offender and his mother. They found that many 
sexual offenders had come from insecure homes, and that their 
mothers were often stern or sadistic:
"Because sadistic aggressions were frequently common 
occurrences in their homes, these boys grew up with the 
idea that women had to be taken by force" (32).
Abrahamsen also apportioned much of the blame to the wives of
rapists. On the basis of a psychological study of eight such wives,
he found that they showed a "masculine and aggressive orientation",
and tended to "compete with men and to negate their femininity"
(33). They were the type of women whose sexual attitudes invite
aggression, which is then encountered with rejection:
"There can be no doubt that the sexual frustration which 
the wives caused is one of the factors motivating the 
rape which might tentatively be described as a displaced 
attempt to force a seductive but rejecting mother (sic) 
into submission" (34).
Finally, Abrahamsen joined the ranks of the Freudians in blaming
the victims of sexual offences. They may unconsciously tempt the
offender, since women often wish to be taken by force. Their
seductive inclination takes the form of
"seeking out rather dangerous or unusual spots where they 
can be picked up, thus exposing themselves more or less 
unconsciously to sexual attacks" (35).
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The 1950s and early 1960s saw a gradual emergence of an awareness 
among psychoanalytically oriented criminologists that not all 
rapists were psychopaths and that other, more "normal" types of 
offenders also existed. One study found that 53 out of a sample of 
250 sex offenders did not show any psychiatric abnormalities (36). 
Another writer reported that almost half of his sample of sex 
offenders suffered from only relatively mild conditions such as 
neuroses and character disorders (37). Guttmacher found that 
"apparently sexually well-adjusted youthful offenders" might commit 
rape in the course of burglaries, "just as another act of plunder" 
(38). Using the Rorschach test, Pascal and Herzberg found that a 
comparison of heterosexual behaviour among rapists and a control 
group failed to reveal any significant differences (39).
Much of the evidence regarding the non-psychopathic rapist at that 
time came from a study by Gebhard and others from the Kinsey 
Institute. On the basis of an extensive study of various types of 
sex offenders, they concluded that rapists most frequently behave 
with unnecessary violence:
"It seems that sexual activity alone is insufficient and 
that in order for it to be maximally gratifying, it must 
be accompanied by physical violence or by serious threat"
(40).
Gebhard and his colleagues classified rapists into seven broad 
categories and found that the behaviour of most of them included 
some element of hostility towards women, although only "a few of 
them may be recognized as clear cases of mental defectives and a 
few others as unquestionable psychotics" (41). Two groups of 
rapists identified in Gebhard's typology deserve particular 
mention, namely the "amoral" and the "double standard" variety.
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"Amoral" delinquents appeared to have no specific hostility against 
women, but tended to view them solely as objects of sexual 
pleasure: if a woman did not wish to fulfill that role the offender 
saw the use of force or threat as entirely legitimate. The men 
classified under the "double standard" heading divided women into 
"good" women to be treated with respect, and "bad" women not 
"entitled to consideration if they become obstinate" (42). This 
group, composed of "rather average males of a lower socio-economic 
background" tended to feel that with provocation, the use of 
moderate force or threat was justifiable when applied to "bad" 
women, whom they judged to be promiscuous (43).
Generally, these seemingly normal rapists did not catch the 
imagination of writers of a Freudian orientation, partly because 
they were not perceived as "treatable" in the traditional sense. It 
was not until the late 1960s, when leadership in the field of 
criminology passed to sociologists, that the Freudian model of 
sexual offences became seriously questioned.
Sociological studies
One of the first sociological critiques of psychological theories 
on sexual offences was published in 1962, Wheeler acknowledged that 
"the major source of ideas about sex offenders stemmed from 
clinical reports on a wide variety of sex deviants" (44), and 
argued that although such case studies may contribute to clinical 
understanding, they are not to be viewed as fact but rather as 
hypotheses requiring testing. He also felt that the findings of 
research carried out under the impetus provided by sexual
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psychopath legislation had called into question earlier clinical 
data and had cast serious doubt on the assertion that all or most 
sexual offenders are highly disturbed.
He concluded that, on the basis of the evidence available, the 
typical aggressive sex offender appeared to be less sick than 
previously assumed, and his background seemed to have "much in 
common with non-sexual offenders who came from crime-inducing 
cultural settings" (45). He further argued that it may be useful to 
view these offences as "part of a broader behaviour system in which 
force may be used to attain goals" (46).
A further criticism of the psychological approach is based on the 
assertion that rape is to be viewed as a product of a social 
situation between at least two actors. Any acknowledgment of the 
victim's role implies that the explanation of sexual offences 
"cannot easily be reduced to a search for the childhood emotional 
disorders of the party who becomes labelled the offender" (47).
The first major sociological study of rape was published by Amir in 
1971 and remains to date one of the most comprehensive empirical 
works on the subject (48). The data it contains give credence to 
Wheeler's view that the psychiatric model of the sick rapist fails 
to explain the behaviour of the large majority of rape offenders,
Amir's orientation in this study was "strictly empirical and the 
method used was that of a phenomenological enquiry" (49), His 
methodology has attracted heavy criticism over the years and this 
will be discussed below. His data were based on the files of the
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Philadelphia Police Department from 1958 to 1960, relating to 646 
cases and 1292 offenders. His emphasis was on the social 
characteristics of the victim and the offender, on their prior 
relationship, and on the circumstances of the rape itself. He tried 
to detect patterns of race, age, marital status, employment, use 
of alcohol, previous arrest records, and the degree of violence 
used in rape. The profile of the typical rapist that emerged from 
his study turned out to be in sharp contrast with the psychological 
model outlined above.
The median age of offenders in Amir's study was 23, and the 15 to 
19 age group was found to be the most likely to commit rape. The 
vast majority belonged to the lower end of the occupational scale; 
26% of white and 16% of black offenders were unemployed, while most 
of the remainder were unskilled and skilled labourers. The only 
other important occupational group was made up of white college 
students who constituted 13% of the sample. Nearly half of the 
offenders had previous police records, usually for such offences as 
burglary, robbery, disorderly conduct and assault. Only 9% of those 
with a police record had previously been arrested for rape.
Amir's study revealed two further important factors which cast 
serious doubt on the notion that rape is the impulsive act of a 
mentally sick man. Firstly, nearly 43% of the rapes in the study 
were committed by two or more men operating together. These 
findings regarding the frequency of group rape have since been 
confirmed by other studies and a number of writers have attempted 
to explain the nature of the phenomenon (50). However, the 
literature on sexual offences before that time had failed to deal
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with the question of group rape altogether.
The second major finding was that 71% of the rapes in Amir's sample 
(51) were planned. Rape was revealed as an elaborately planned and 
arranged event, rather than a spontaneous explosion of sudden 
sexual urges.
According to this study then, the typical Philadelphia rapist was 
an ordinary youth belonging to the lower end of the occupational 
scale, his only real distinguishing mark being a tendency to 
violence. He was found to have no separate identifiable pathology 
apart from the individual personality disorders that might 
characterize any violent offender.
On a theoretical level, Amir placed rape within Wolfgang's theory
of the subculture of violence (52). This theory holds that within
the dominant value system of our culture, there exists a subculture 
formed of the poor, the lower socio-economic classes, and others 
whose values run counter to those of the dominant culture. The 
dominant culture can operate within the laws of civility because it 
has little need to resort to anything else in achieving its aims. 
The subculture, however, inarticulate and frustrated by the 
dominant culture, resorts to violence to the extent that physical 
aggression becomes a way of life, particularly for young males.
Amir saw the rapist as belonging to that subculture. He commented 
that lower class boys learnt overt aggressive behaviour and 
attitudes from their families and peers; aggressive behaviour 
towards women is simply part of the normative system for those who
do not view such behaviour as wrong or deviant.
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Amir’s work has been criticised on several levels. It has been 
argued that his definition of rape as a typical phenomenon of the 
lower class black subculture is a reflection of "built-in bias in 
the statistics" (53), the analysis of which is sometimes "quite 
careless" (54). It has been noted that his reductionist strategy in 
analysing rape implies too narrow a conception, which fails 
explicitly to connect rape with the political economy. Instead, the
"reader is left with the impression that rape merely 
involves psychic urges, individual prejudices, 
situational contingencies, misunderstood intentions and 
provocative female conduct" (55).
Amir is certainly somewhat selective in questioning the
psychological approach. The most important area where he accepts,
and indeed reinforces this approach, is in his analysis of the role
of the rape victim. While his empirical findings and theoretical
model establish the essential "normality" of the offender, they
also emphasize the pathological and deviant behaviour of the victim
of rape. He actually goes so far as to say that "in a way, the
victim is always the cause of the crime" (56).
It must be noted that Amir's interest in the role of the victim 
reflects a general orientation in the criminological literature at 
the time of his writing. Whereas early criminologists focused 
mainly on the offender, their interest later shifted from crime as 
a legal entity to crime as a complex social situation involving the 
interaction between different actors and reflecting cultural norms 
and societal expectations. Consequently, interest also developed in 
the victim as an integral part of the criminal situation;
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"Scholars have begun to see the victim not necessarily 
just as a passive object, as the neuter or innocent point 
of impact of crime into society, but as eventually 
playing an active role or possibly contributing to 
his/her victimization" (57).
The development of the concept of victim precipitation occurred
within this context and the notion had been applied before Amir's
work to the offence of homicide for example (58).
Amir concluded that 19% of the rape cases in his study were victim
precipitated, according to the following definition:
"...rape situations in which the victim actually, or so 
it was deemed, agreed to sexual relations but retracted 
before the actual act or did not react strongly enough 
when the suggestion was made by the offender(s). The term 
applies also to cases in risky situations marred with 
sexuality,'especially when she uses what could be 
interpreted as indecency in language and gestures, or 
constitutes what could be taken as an invitation to 
sexual relations" (59).
According to other writers too a woman’s actions play a primary
role in whether or not she is sexually assaulted. It has been
argued, for example, that women who wear what could be described as
provocative clothing (60) or who go out alone at night (61) are
more likely to be raped than women who are more cautious.
Hitchhiking has also been described as a classic example of victim
precipitation (62).
There is disagreement among those studying victim precipitation in 
rape as to the extent of the phenomenon. Mulvihill and his 
colleagues, who define victim precipitation in very similar terms 
to Amir, found that it was present in only 4.4% of their cases 
(63). The rate was much higher for other offences of violence, 
amounting to 22% for homicide, 14.4% for assault and 10.7% for 
armed robbery. The considerable discrepancies in the empirical
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findings of different studies have led a number of writers to 
question the theoretical basis of the concept of victim 
precipitation.
Silverman has argued that the concept suffers from "being culture-, 
time- and place-bound" (64), that it has become confused and "lost 
much of its utility as an explanatory and empirical tool", and that 
"its empirical use has been predicated on disparate and often 
incompatible operational definitions" (65). He cites Amir as a case 
in point. His definition of victim precipitation cannot be easily 
replicated in other studies, it is argued, as one does not know 
whose perceptions of, for instance, "risky situations" are being 
used. Clearly, different outcomes may result if one uses the 
offender's, the victim's, the police or the researcher's 
perceptions. This may partially explain the discrepancies in the 
findings of Amir and Mulvihill. The main criticism here is that in 
existing studies, the researcher has tended to identify with the 
offender and that this has resulted in distorted and biased 
perceptions. As Silverman commented,
"the measures used in the past have been highly 
unreliable from a methodological point of view because 
they are highly dependent on a researcher's 
interpretation rather than on fixed criteria" (66).
The inadequacy of using the researcher's perceptions in assessing
what constitutes victim precipitation is further underlined by a
recent study which suggests that violent rapists are far more
likely than others to misjudge social situations, and wrongly to
believe that women are offering sexual encouragement (67).
Weis and Borges have also criticised Amir's work (68). They assert
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that the notion of the rape victim which emerges from the study and 
in particular his concept of victim precipitation reflects strong 
bias and is unsupported by the data presented. They argue that 
Amir's identification with the offender in studying an encounter 
between several persons leads to inevitable bias in his 
perspective:
"It is the offender who decides, in his imagination, 
whether the situation was risky, the woman vulnerable, 
her reputation bad, or her behaviour otherwise rape 
precipitating" (69).
They further comment that
"personal bias towards the offender and against the 
victim so permeates the study that the reader is inclined 
to entertain the possibility that the data were ordered 
to fit a preconceived notion' (70).
While recognizing that Amir's data are useful for understanding
certain types of rape, they argue that they are of doubtful value
as a contribution towards the theoretical understanding of rape,
which would require a more rigorous and objective study.
Whereas little had been written on the subject of rape before the 
late 1960s, there since appears to have been a tremendous upsurge 
in public concern and academic interest in it all over the world 
(71), but particularly in the U.S.A. and other common law 
jurisdictions. Amir's book is only one of a mass of scholarly books 
and articles published on the topic of rape since that time. Two 
major bibliographies have been compiled by Chappell, Geis and 
Fogarty (72) and Feild and Barnett (73), each comprising over three 
hundred titles.
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The proliferation of writings on rape in recent years has been 
influenced by an apparently increased incidence and public 
awareness of rape as a social problem, as well as a general concern 
over violent crime in general. The recorded frequency of rape has 
increased since around 1964 both in this country and elsewhere. The 
for example, recorded approximately 55000 rapes and 
attempted rapes in 1974 (74). It may be argued that such a figure 
is relatively low in a population of over 200 million, but a 
comparative perspective reveals that between 1969 and 1974 the 
number of U.S. rapes increased by 49% which represents a greater 
increase than that of any other violent crime (75).
In this country, the number of rapes and attempted rapes known to 
the police doubled between 1964 and 1974, and has steadily 
increased since (76).
TABLE 1. Number of rapes and attempted rapes known to the police in 
England and Wales, 1964 to 1982 (77)
YEAR NUMBER OF RAPES
1964 517
1965 618
1966 644
1967 702
1968 829
1969 869
1970 884
1971 784
1972 893
1973 998
1974 1052
1975 1040
1976 1094
1977 1015
1978 1243
1979 1170
1980 1225
1981 1068
1982 1336
30
It should be noted, first, that the current increase in the number 
of known rapes coincides with a decrease in the total number of 
known sexual offences, as well as with an increase in the number of 
offences of violence against the person. Second, the evidence 
suggests that rape is probably one of the most underreported 
crimes, primarily because of fear and embarrassment on the part of 
the victim (78), While American experience cannot be said to apply 
directly to the English, the literature published there in this 
respect is worth a brief mention. Society's hostility to the 
complainant in a rape case, coupled with the trauma and stigma 
attached to a sexual assault, are thought to lead to considerable 
reluctance in reporting the offence (79). Studies aimed at 
determining the extent of underreporting in the U.S.A. have shown 
that the F.B.I. assumes that about 30% of all rapes are reported to 
the police (80), while other sources suggest that the figure may be 
as low as one in ten (81) or even one in twenty (82).
Feminist writings
Berger has noted that the women's movement in the U.S.A. has been a 
major source of concern over rape:
"Since the law has traditionally defined this crime as an 
act committed by men against women, it is fitting that 
the "rediscovery" of rape should coincide with the growth 
of the women's movement. Prominent feminists and leading 
feminist publications have authored or printed many of 
the relevant writings on the subject. Movement women and 
their sympathizers have organised conferences and 
speak-outs, primarily aimed at lending psychological 
support to victims of rape and enhancing feminine 
consciousness generally. Feminists have been instrumental 
in establishing and running rape crisis centres, 
extending to victims such varied aids as escort services, 
group counselling and referrals to physicians, 
psychiatrists and lawyers. Women have also played a key
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role in lobbying for reforms in the law of rape" (83).
Thus, the definition of rape as a social problem may be seen as a 
by-product of the feminist movement. From that perspective, it has 
been argued that
"rape is a direct result of our culture's differential 
sex role socialization and sexual stratification. For 
example, the association of dominance with the male sex 
role and submission with the female sex role is viewed as 
a significant factor in the persistence of rape as a 
social problem". (84)
A comparison between the two bibliographies mentioned above (72,73)
reveals not only a substantial increase in the number of
publications on rape since the early 1970s, but also a shift in
their focus. The first bibliography contains forty seven titles
under the heading of "Sociology", and the second, one hundred and
ten such titles. Emphasis on the offender seems to be on the
decrease (1974; 53 titles; 1977; 19 titles) while interest in the
victim has increased considerably (1974; 71 titles; 1977; 122
titles). Such changes in the number of publications may not in
themselves be of great significance, but the literature also shows
clear qualitative changes. The early concern with the offender
apears to have been replaced by a desire to protect victims from
what is seen as particularly unfair treatment by the legal system.
From the legal angle, post-1974 literature has tended to reflect
two main concerns: first, the rights of the victim, and second, the
modification of laws concerning rape. In both instances, there
seems to have been a shift away from concern with the legal rights
of the defendant to those of the victim.
Focus on rape victims and on the inadequacies of present 
institutional response to them have, as we shall see below, been a
32
predominant feature of recent rape literature. Such institutional 
response and the treatment of rape victims by the legal system in 
particular clearly reflect societal attitudes;
"The law concerning proof in rape and the way it 
functions both influences and is influenced by existing 
social values. They are indeed a caricature of society's 
attitude towards women. And so long as the laws remain as 
they are at present, they will, in part, enforce the 
continuance of the roles this attitude assumes". (85)
Feminist writers have added a new dimension to the violent element
in rape identified by others;
"Hostility against her and possession £f her may be 
simultaneous motivations, and the hatred for her is 
expressed in the same act that is the attempt to "take" 
her against her will. In one violent crime, rape is an 
act against person and property". (86)
They have also pointed out that despite the seriousness of rape in
one sense, as reflected for example in the potential severity of
the penalties it carries (87), there is still a widespread belief
that it is impossible for sexual intercourse to occur without
mutual consent (88). Furthermore, it has been argued that society
treats with profound suspicion women who allege rape, and that
"the theme of woman as "fabricator" or liar pervades all 
of our attitudes about rape victims".(89)
This is reflected, for instance, in the rules of corroboration of
the complainant's evidence (discussed below in more detail) which
one contemporary legal writer justifies as follows;
"...sexual cases are particularly subject to the danger 
of deliberately false charges, resulting from sexual 
neurosis, phantasy, jealousy, spite, or simply a girl's 
refusal to admit that she consented to an act of which 
she is now ashamed.(90) The distinctive reason for the 
warning is that experience shows that the complainant's
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evidence may be warped by psychological processes which 
are not evident to the eye of common sense". (91)
At the same time, and rather curiously, the traditional notion of
the seriousness of rape is based on the assumption that rape is
essentially different from normal sexual acts. As one commentator
aptly observed,
"There is an element of double-think here; the belief in 
rape as something apart from everyday expressions of 
sexuality exists side by side with the notion that rape 
is impossible, that it does not happen at all, that the 
victim is a woman who has changed her mind afterwards. It 
is simultaneously thought of both as a heinous crime and 
as a normal sexual encounter mislabelled criminal". (92)
Writers who have analysed the rape victim's situation or
contributed to attempts to improve that situation have not, as a
rule, offered an overall theoretical perspective on the problem of
rape. Nevertheless, an analysis of such writings does reveal a
common thread throughout the feminist literature, namely a view of
rape as a phenomenon which is inextricably bound up wih the social
context in which it occurs. This has inevitably involved an
assessment of sexual stratification and of the principal elements
of male and female sexuality in contemporary society. In trying to
place rape in a broader social context, some writers have made
extensive reference to anthropological texts which have been used
to demonstrate a link between rape and culture and to argue that
"sex and sexuality are not features of society that you 
can look at in isolation from their social and economic 
base". (93)
Two studies in particular are frequently mentioned in this context, 
The first is Mead's work on the Arapesh (94) and the second, 
LeVine's study of the Gusii (95).
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The Arapesh are a small, tightly structured community in New Guinea 
and their lifestyle is based on peaceful mutual cooperation. 
Aggression is not seen as a sign of masculinity, and the Arapesh 
treatment of sexuality stems from their non-competitive, 
non-aggressive form of social organisation. Among them, rape is 
virtually unknown;
"Of rape, the Arapesh know nothing beyond the fact that 
it is the unpleasant custom of the Nugum people to the 
southeast of them...Nor do the Arapesh have any 
conception of male nature that might make rape 
understandable to them". (96)
The Kenyan Gusii, on the other hand, have an entirely different
social and economic structure and also differ from the Arapesh in
their attitude to sexuality and aggression. They are fragmented
into a number of hostile clans which, being exogamous, depend on
each other for survival as wives have to be imported. The act of
intercourse is seen as an act of subjugation of the female and as
such, continues to be an important part of the marital
relationship. The high incidence of rape among the Gusii has been
linked to that society's attitudes to sexuality;
"Men and women are traditionally aggressive to each other 
and antagonism is entrenched in their relationship to 
each other". (97)
Similar observations have been made about contemporary Western
society where, it is argued,
"violence and male supremacy have been companions (in
the course of civilization)" (98) and
"male sexuality and violence...seem inseparable" (99).
Consequently, in a society which encourages male aggression and
simultaneously associates female sexuality with passivity and
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submission, the
"basic elements of rape are involved in all heterosexual
relationships". (100)
Jackson has attempted to understand rape in terms of conventional 
sexual behaviour, using as her theoretical framework Gagnon and 
Simon's work on "sexual scripts" (101). This conceptualizes 
sexuality as the outcome of a learning process whereby the 
individual develops a capacity to interpret and enact sexual 
scripts. It is argued that the scripts which underlie normal sexual 
behaviour also provide potential motives for rape, those motives 
being derived from generally accepted cultural norms. Sexual 
scripts are linked to cultural notions of masculinity and 
femininity;
"Sexual relationships are built around sexual 
inequalities, are scripted for actors whose roles have 
been pre-defined as subordinate and superordinate, and 
hence must involve the exercise of power which may be 
manifested in the sexual act itself, as well as in other 
aspects of the relationship. Rape, then, is simply an 
extreme manifestation of our culturally accepted patterns 
of male-female relationships". (102)
Weis and Borges also developed this theme in arguing that
"the rape situation...is societally structured by the 
culturally prescribed norms, rights and obligations which 
define the role expectancies for men and women, and 
establish the rules by which these roles relate to one 
another." (103)
It is in the wake of such ideas that the plight of the rape victim 
became the focus of considerable interest. The expression of that 
interest in academic and popular literature has undoubtedly played 
a part in bringing about legislative changes in a number of 
jurisdictions in the last few years, and as such, deserves some
36
consideration here.
Focus on the victim
Literature on the victim of rape has centered around physical 
injuries sustained during the rape, psychological reactions after 
the rape, as well as institutional response and proposed 
legislative changes destined to improve the rape victim's present 
position in the legal system.
It is usually thought that most victims of rape do not suffer 
serious physical injury. Amir did not consider the physical tra'ica 
caused by rape in the victims of his sample, although he did 
analyse the degree of violence involved in rape events and found 
that some force had been used in 85.1% of the cases he studied. The 
degree of force used ranged from "roughness" (28,5%) to "brutal 
beating" (20.4%) and choking (11.5%), These categories were largely 
defined with reference to the injuries sustained by the victir?; for 
example, victims of "brutal beating" required hospitalisation for 
the treatment of such injuries as severe lacerations, fractures and 
the like.
Another study of 2190 rape victims found that 82 of these sustained 
severe physical injury as a result of the offence; 24 of them 
needed hospitalisation and 53 required major treatment in the 
"emergency room". Hundreds more were treated for minor injuries
(104), Massey found that 51 out of 501 rape victims showed external 
evidence of trauma ranging from small cuts to severe contusions and 
fractures (105), Similarly, Burgess and Holmstro# found that Bé of
37
their sample of 146 women had visible bruises resulting from being 
hit with a weapon or with the assailant’s hand or fist during the 
assault. Gynaecological injury was present in 57 cases (106).
Amir failed to consider the victim's psychological reactions to 
rape. Since his book, however, a number of studies have been 
concerned with this issue (107). Such studies generally 
conceptualize rape as a personal and social crisis, as a result of 
which "stress reactions" are set up. These represent attempts to 
"defend or restitute the personality from disorganisation" (108).
The first clinical study of rape victims was reported in 1970. The 
authors found that a similar sequence of events followed the 
experience of rape among the 13 victims interviewed. The first 
phase was characterized by signs of acute distress, including 
shock, disbelief, emotional breakdown and disruption of normal 
patterns of behaviour. This phase lasted several days and was 
followed by "outward adjustment" which, according to the authors,
"does not represent a final resolution of the traumatic 
event and the feelings it has aroused. Instead, it seems 
to contain a heavy measure of denial or suppression".
(109)
The last phase, during which depression is prominent, is that of 
integration and resolution. Although this phase often goes 
unrecognized, it is a crucial one as it is at this time that the 
victim
"needs to integrate the event with her view of herself 
and to resolve her feelings about her assailant" (110).
Burgess and Holmstrom interviewed 146 women admitted to hospital
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over a one year period with a complaint of a sexual assault. On the 
basis of their analysis of the 92 adult rape victims in the sample, 
they were the first to document the existence of a rape trauma 
syndrome (111), This is described as a two-stage process; there is 
first an immediate, acute response where the victim’s lifestyle is 
completely disrupted by the rape, followed by a long term process 
in which she reorganises her life.
The syndrome includes a wide range of physical, emotional and
behavioural reactions. Emotional responses, in particular, fall 
into two major categories, namely "expressed" and "controlled". The 
"expressed" response during the acute phase is manifested by 
visible evidence of acute anxiety; on the other hand, the
"controlled" victim appears calm and collected, showing little
external evidence of distress - a reaction which may reflect shock 
and disbelief.
The manifestations of response during the second phase are also 
quite variable, and depend on the victim's personality 
characteristics, on the available support system, and on the 
treatment she encounters from others. Burgess and Holmstrom 
describe a "silent reaction" which can alert the doctor to an 
earlier unresolved rape, occurring months or even years earlier 
(112) .
Various external factors may contribute to the intensity and 
complexity of the "normal" reaction that rape victims express.
These include cases where the assailant is a relative or someone in 
a position of trust, or where there exist in the victim
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psychological or serious medical problems prior to the rape.
Various age specific issues may also contribute to the trauma, for 
instance in the case of young, sexually inexperienced victims. In 
such cases, the rape reaction may include severe depression, 
possibly with suicide attempts, alcohol or drug abuse, psychosis or 
significant increase in physical symptomatology.
The documentation of severe psychological trauma in rape victims 
has led to attempts to outline appropriate treatment models for 
such victims as well as for their families and partners (113). The 
immediate emotional state of the victim and the long term 
consequences of rape were considered to be the aspects of victim 
response most inadequately dealt with (114), and it was partly as a 
response to this deficiency that community based rape crisis 
centres were established all over the U.S.A. and more recently, in 
this country. These centres are usually staffed by women, some of 
them victims of rape, and provide assistance and counselling for 
rape victims. Their other functions include attempts to educate the 
public on rape related issues and to cooperate with organisations 
involved in such work (115), and to campaign for law reform as well 
as for the improvement of institutional response to rape victims
(116).
The act of reporting a rape sets in motion a complicated process 
whereby a number of institutions become involved with the victim. 
Most studies on institutional response to rape victims have found 
that such response, far from helping the victim in her recovery, 
contributes to and magnifies the initial trauma precipitated by the 
sexual attack.
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The most comprehensive work on this subject to date was published 
in 1978. The authors considered the victim’s career through the 
police, medical and court systems in the U.S.A. and argued that 
these institutions and groups played an important part in the 
victimization process. The woman became doubly victimized; first, 
by the crime, and secondly, by the societal and institutional 
reactions she encountered (117).
The height of institutional victimization comes with the trial; a 
number of authors have commented on the "rape of the courts" (118), 
where the rape victim not only has to relive her experience in the 
formal setting of a public court, but where her prior sexual life 
may also become exposed to considerable scrutiny by the defence.
Her consent or lack of it is frequently judged not so much on the 
circumstances of the rape itself, but on her character and 
reputation;
"The courts and the police, dominated by white males, 
continue to suspect the rape victim sui generis of 
provoking or asking for her own assault". (119)
"The sexual reputation of the rape victim is considered a 
crucial element of the facts upon which the court must 
decide innocence or guilt". (120)
In effect, the rape victim in a sense has to prove her "innocence" 
and is as much on trial as the defendant (121). Bohmer and Blumberg 
argued that the victim's post-rape adjustment cannot be studied 
without a careful consideration of the effect of the legal system 
as an external factor in that adjustment. They conducted an 
ethnographic study of seventeen rape trials in the U.S.A. and 
tentatively concluded that the
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"extent of the trauma suffered by the victim in her 
contact with the legal system is in large measure due to 
the attitudes and consequent treatment of the victim by 
the law enforcement and court personnel with whom she 
deals". (122)
In another study, forty victims were asked about their reactions to 
court; all of them found being in court extremely stressful and 
most of them showed visible signs of stress during the court 
procedure. For many, this experience was as upsetting as the rape 
itself and the women saw themselves as victimized, again, by the 
legal proceedings (123).
While most of the above literature originates in the U.S.A., the
ordeal of rape victims in court has been acknowledged in England
too. Coote and Gill have argued that where the defence is one of
consent, and where there is little or no independent evidence, the
defence strategy will normally be to discredit the complainant as
this is seen as the most effective way of ensuring an acquittal. In
effect, this puts the woman on trial and she has the difficult task
of establishing her innocence beyond reasonable doubt in order to
prove the man’s guilt;
"Because of the nature of the crime, cross-examination of 
the woman in rape trials tends to take a particularly 
insidious, personal line". (124)
The Heilbron Report made a similar point;
"although in a criminal case, it is the accused who is on 
trial, there is a risk that a rape case may become in 
effect a trial of the alleged victim". ..."whatever the 
outcome, the very fact of having been involved is liable, 
at present, to have embarrassing or even damaging 
consequences for the woman". (125)
It has been argued that the victim of rape occupies a unique role
in the legal system in this respect;
"Raped women are subjected to institutionalised sexism 
that begins with their treatment by the police; continues 
through a male dominated criminal justice system 
influenced by pseudo-scientific notions of victim 
precipitation, and ends with the systematic acquittal of 
many de facto guilty rapists. The codification of sexism
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centers in the legal elements involved in proving guilt 
and obtaining convictions. In effect, the law’s focus on 
corroboration, consent and character has established a 
standard of proof in rape cases that is more stringent 
than ’beyond a reasonable d o u b t (126)
A number of important issues have been raised in recent years with
regard to rape laws, particularly in the U.S.A. Arguments for the
reform of those laws often derive from feminist rape theories and
consequently tend to reflect concern with the rights and protection
of the victim. The uniqueness of rape, insofar as it has
traditionally been defined as a crime committed by men against
women, has been pointed out (127), and it has been argued that the
sex-specific definition of the offence may also explain its
uniqueness in its legal and procedural aspects (128). Much of the
discussion with regard to such legal aspects has focused on the
issue of corroboration (129), on consent standards and definitions
(130), and on the problems relating to the complainant's character
and credibility (131). These issues and their implications for the
history and recent development of the law of rape in England and
Wales will be considered in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO. THE LAW OF RAPE 
History of the law in England
Brownrailler has aptly summarized early English rape law as follows:
"Concepts of rape and punishment in early English law are 
a wondrous maze of contradictory approaches reflecting 
the gradual humanization of jurisprudence in general, and 
in particular, man’s eternal confusion, never quite 
resolved, as to whether the crime was a crime against a 
woman's body or a crime against his own estate," (1)
There was certainly from the earliest times a sexual element in the
offence, in that the very definition of it hinged on the victim's
virginity: it is held in Placita Corone (2) that an appeal of rape
was invalid if it did not specify that the victim had been a virgin
prior to the assault. However, the offence also had a strong
property aspect insofar as rape in Saxon law included abduction as
well as "violentus concubitus". As Pollock and Maitland wrote,
"if it had wronged the woman, it had wronged her kinsmen 
also, and they would have felt themselves seriously 
wronged even if she had given her consent and had, as we 
should say, eloped". (3)
During this period, the woman could by law redeem the offender from
the execution of his sentence by marrying him, provided that the
judge and the families involved agreed (4). If there was no
reconciliation, the penalties imposed varied with the gravity of
the offence, but also with the relative social status of victim and
offender. Compensation was often payable by the offender to the man
whose wife or servant had been sexually assaulted (5). This too
suggests that rape was perceived as a social, rather than sexual
offence, the essence of it being the unlawful use of another man's
property.
$2
Forcible abduction and marriage did not becorae offences in their
own right until the 15th century (6) and there is evidence that
even after Glanvill's time, marriage and abduction remained firmly
associated with the offence. As one commentator observed,
"the sexual element, although inherent in the offence, 
was rapidly losing its significance". (7)
While some writers do not believe that an appeal of rape was
frequently the prelude to marriage (8), most of the authorities
take the view that the
"woman often married her ravisher, to save her good name, 
and a titled but penurious young man sometimes carried 
off an heiress with this in view”. (9)
In Saxon law, according to Bracton, the punishment for rape was
death:
"If, on meeting a woman, a man throws her upon the ground 
against her will, he forfeits the King's grace; if he 
shamelessly disrobes her and places himself upon her, he 
incurs the loss of all his possessions; and if he lies 
with her, he incurs the loss of his life and memhers.”
(10)
The punishment became castration and blinding during the relg# of 
William the Conqueror (11) but such a penalty was only applicable 
where
"there was defloration and the wrman would make mo 
peace". (12)
If the woman herself made no appeal, the ©ffendsr coauM still he 
prosecuted by the Crown, but in this instance, a lesser pmmisbiremt 
of fine and imprisonment was tfoc-cght t® he sufficiermt. There is 
evidence that the fines inflicted im seed ernes were mimimal (13) 
and sithough there is little case law cm rape offerees durirg this 
period, it has been noted that appeals cf rape were rarely 
successful during the 13th certwry (M)).
Major changes iff the law of rape tteel place duurlnF.g the reigm ®f
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Edward I, In 1275, the first Statute of Westminster gave women
forty days to appeal and fixed the punishment of the offender at
two years' imprisonment to be followed by a fine. The legal concept
of rape had by this time broadened to include, at least in
principle, the rape of non virgins. Britton described rape as a
felony committed by violence on the body of a woman "whether she be
a virgin or not" (15), and Bracton further enlarged the definition
of the offence to include, among its potential victims, "married
women, widows, nuns, matrons, concubines and even prostitutes".
(16) The rape of married women and virgins became equally
punishable under Edward I, and the custom of redemption by marriage
was banned. In 1285, the second Statute of Westminster brought back
the death penalty for rape, whether prosecuted by appeal of the
woman or on indictment. To quote Britton,
"Of such felonies, let enquiry be made; and whoever is 
attainted thereof, either at the suit of the woman by 
appeal of felony, or at our suit, shall have the same 
judgment as for the death of a man, whether the woman 
have consented after commission of the felony or not, as 
is contained in our Statutes of Westminster". (17)
It has been argued that the above Statutes intended to protect
women from sexual violation
"in a cursory and absent-minded way...but it was the use 
of rape to force unwilling families to accept 
disadvantageous marriages that was its main 
preoccupation". (18)
The policy of banning redemption through marriage was reinforced
during the reign of Richard 11 when the following was enacted;
"...if a woman afterwards assents to the ravisher, both 
shall lose their inheritance, dower or joint estate after 
the death of the husband or ancestor, and the next in 
blood shall enter; and he or the husband shall have an 
appeal". (19)
Different interpretations have been offered with regard to the 
legislative changes embodied in the Statutes of Westminster. Some
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have argued that despite the small penalty imposed in the first
Statute, the gravity of the offence was not compromised. For the
first time in statute law, the rape of virgins and non virgins was
equally punishable and the policy of Crown prosecution, again for
all rapes, was a clear acknowledgment that
"rape was not just a family misfortune and threat to land 
and property, but an issue of public safety and state 
concern". (20)
The small penalty that was law for ten years was seen in this light
as a way of easing the effect of those major transitions (21). Most
historians, however, have argued that the first Statute reduced the 
status of the offence to a trespass, punishable only by a light
penalty, and that the death penalty was brought back in the second
Statute because it was felt that the lenient attitude of 1275
encouraged the commission of the crime (22).
As a result of the Statutes of Westminster, various laws were later
enacted to deal with forcible abduction and marriage as separate
offences from rape. A new felony was created to this effect during
the 15th century. This punished any person who, against her will
and forcibly, took away any woman
"whether maid, widow or wife, having substance in goods, 
or lands, or being an heir apparent...to marry or defile 
her". (23)
It was during the 17th century that many of the principles that
govern the contemporary law of rape were set forward by Lord Hale,
As the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape commented in 1975,
"the traditional common law definition, derived from a 
17th century writer and still in use, is that rape 
consists in having unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
woman without her consent, by force, fear or fraud". (24)
Since Hale's time, various statutes with relevance for particular
aspects of rape law have been enacted (25). The death penalty for
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rape was abolished in 1841 (26) and a substantial amount of case 
law has built up around specific aspects of the offence (27). 
However, the essential ingredients of the contemporary offence had 
been firmly established by the 18th century and Hale’s influence in 
this context must be considered in some detail.
It has been noted that Hale’s writings have been referred to by 
"virtually every legal writer who has discussed rape" (28), that he 
is "still the most quoted authority on the law of rape" (29), and 
that "the mysogynistic bias that has pervaded law and practice 
concerning...rape" (30) is largely attributable to these. A number 
of matters illustrate this last point, in particular the question 
of marital exemption in rape, the corroboration warning in rape 
trials, and the relevance of the complainant’s character and 
behaviour at the time of the alleged offence.
In contemporary law, a man cannot be convicted as a principal of
rape on his wife, although he may be guilty of the rape of a woman
who was his wife if there is a separation order in force (31), or a
decree nisi (32).The reasoning behind this principle in summarized
in Hale’s work as follows;
"...the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by 
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given up 
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot 
retract". (33)
Hale’s view in this matter has been questioned on numerous
occasions. Various commentators have found it "archaic" (34) and
"patently absurd" (35), and a 19th century judge. Wills J., made
the following observations;
"If intercourse under the circumstances now in question 
constitutes an assault on the part of the man, it must
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constitute rape, unless indeed between married persons 
rape is impossible, a proposition to which I certainly am 
not prepared to assent and for which there seems to me to 
be no sufficient authority" (36).
This question arose during the parliamentary debates of the Sexual
Offences (Amendment) Bill in 1976, and also more recently in 1983,
but no change in the law was made with regard to rape within
marriage, - an indication that members of the House of Commons are
on the whole still prepared to accept Hale as sufficient authority
on this point (37).
Hale’s justification of the marital exemption rule undoubtedly
implies a view of woman as man’s property within the contract of
marriage. As Brownmiller put it,
"compulsory sexual intercourse is not a husband’s right 
in marriage, for such a ’right’ gives the lie to any 
concept of equality and human dignity" (38).
Another of Hale’s statements provides the basis of the
corroboration rule in modern English law;
"(It) must be remembered that (rape) is an accusation 
easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be 
defended by the party accused, though never so innocent".
(39)
It is clear from the amount of concern with the plight of the rape 
victim in recent years that Hale’s dictum is grossly inaccurate; 
rape is not an easy charge to allege, and neither is it difficult 
to rebut. A considerable volume of recent research findings 
illustrate the enormous difficulties facing a complainant in a rape 
case, as well as the greater likelihood of acquittal in these as 
compared to other criminal cases (40). Nevertheless, the cautionary 
rule remains;
"Though corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix 
is not essential in law, it is, in practice, always 
looked for and it is the established practice to warn the 
jury against the danger of acting upon her uncorroborated
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testimony" (41),.
In a recent case, the reason why conviction is thought to be 
dangerous without corroboration was outlined by Lord Justice Salmon 
as follows:
"...human experience has shown that girls and women do 
sometimes tell an entirely false story which is very easy 
to fabricate, but extremely difficult to refute. Such 
stories are fabricated for all sorts of reasons, which I 
need not now enumerate, and sometimes for no reason at 
all" (42).
It must be noted here that the corroboration warning is given not 
only in rape cases, but in all cases of sexual offences, 
irrespective of the complainant’s sex. However, a brief look at the 
relevant criminal statistics (43) indicates that the vast majority 
of indictable sexual offences are committed by men against women or 
children. In 1978, for example, almost 99% of the defendants tried 
at Crown Courts in England and Wales for sexual offences were men, 
and only 18% of these were tried for offences whose victims may 
have been men or women. The overwhelming majority (73.4%), however, 
were tried for offences which, by definition, can only be committed 
against women or children (44).
Another peculiar feature of the law of rape is the rule relating to 
recent complaint. In the trial of a rape offence, the prosecution 
may adduce evidence as to the fact that a complaint was made by the 
victim on the first opportunity which reasonably offered itself 
after the offence (45). Evidence of recent complaint is not of a 
corroborative nature as it does not come from an independent 
source; however, it may indicate consistency in the behaviour of a 
complainant and thus tend to negative her consent.
This rule also seems to stem from the idea that there is some
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essential difference between the victims of rape and those of other
criminal offences. The assumption is that rape is particularly
liable to involve false accusations and that alleged victims ought
therefore to be put to a more stringent test than those of other
crimes. The genuineness of the complaint appears to be judged
primarily with reference to the character and behaviour of the
woman involved, rather than those of the alleged rapist. Again, to
quote Hale, the complainant
"may give evidence upon oath, and is in law a competent 
witness, but the credibility of her testimony, and how 
far forth she is to be believed, must be left to the 
jury, and is more or less credible according to the 
circumstances of fact, that concur in that testimony. For 
instance, if the witness be of good fame, if she 
presently discovered the offence and made pursuit after 
the offender, showed circumstances and signs of the 
injury...if the place, wherein the fact was done was 
remote from people, inhabitants or passengers, if the 
offender fled for it; these and the like are concurring 
evidences to give greater probability to her testimony 
when proved by others as well as herself.
But on the other side, if she concealed the injury for 
any considerable time after she had the opportunity to 
complain, if the place where the fact was supposed to be 
committed were near to inhabitants or common recourse or 
passage of passengers, and she made no outcry when the 
fact was supposed to be done, when and where it is 
probable she might be heard by others; these and the like 
circumstances carry a strong presumption that her 
testimony is false or feigned". (46)
The fear of false accusations is also reflected in the guidelines
given to doctors regarding the medical examination of alleged
victims of rape. One of the main sources of corroboration in modern
rape trials is medical and forensic evidence regarding the identity
of the parties involved, the occurrence of sexual intercourse and
most frequently, the physical injuries sustained by the woman as a
result of the assault. Physical resistance to the attacker is
frequently seen as an essential element of "genuine" rape, while
the absence of bodily injury to substantiate such resistance in a
woman alleging rape is thought to be a good indication that the
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complaint is a false one (47). One distinguished writer in the
field of forensic medicine warns that
"a girl out of her first decade is seldom capable of 
being raped against her will (sic) without mark of 
forcible restraint or injury". (48)
Although textbooks of legal medicine tend to give some
acknowledgment to the possibility of submission through
intimidation and fear, their main concern is with the
interpretation of signs of injury and with the extent to which
injuries are consistent with the woman’s account of what happened.
An assumption is sometimes made that one must expect a greater
degree of resistance in some women than in others:
"in women accustomed to intercourse...it is natural to 
expect more evidence of resistance for they are less 
likely to be terrified into inactivity than a virgin 
would be". (49)
The finding of physical injury alone, however, does not necessarily 
help to substantiate a complainant’s story and the doctor is warned 
that alternative explanations for any injury must always be looked 
for:
"...the supposed victim may lacerate the parts and stain 
the clothes with blood to simulate the 
condition...Occasionally, irritants such as red pepper 
are placed within the vagina to produce an inflammation 
and simulate rape". (50)
Perhaps the most controversial element in the legal treatment of
rape before 1976 was the law of evidence relating to the
admissibility of evidence regarding the character of the
complainant. This situation has been altered, as we shall see
below, by the provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act
1976.
6o
In the trial of a rape offence, the defence could bring in evidence 
that the complainant was "a woman of notoriously bad character for 
want of chastity or common decency" (51) or a prostitute (52). Any 
sexual behaviour with the defendant on previous occasions was 
admissible as evidence (53), as was any immoral behaviour with 
other men (54), Of these types of evidence regarding the 
complainant’s character, the first two (i.e. general bad reputation 
and previous sexual intercourse with the defendant) were regarded 
as relevant to consent, while the last one, relating to the 
complainant’s sexual experience with any third party, was seen as 
affecting her credibility. The law of evidence in this respect 
reflected the rather strange assumption that women were likely to 
be untruthful as a direct result of their sexual "immorality".
Cross-examination directed at showing consent did not involve an 
imputation on the complainant’s character within the meaning of the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898, so that the defendant was safe from 
cross-examination as to his previous convictions or character (55). 
This effectively put rape in a wholly different category to any 
other criminal offence in that it gave the defence what has been 
termed "licence for sexual mud-slinging" (56). In the trial of any 
other criminal offence, attacks on the alleged victim’s character 
would have put the defendant’s character at issue. Furthermore, an 
implicit distinction was created between the complainant and other 
prosecution witnesses in the trial, insofar as an attack on the 
character of those other witnesses would have "let in" the 
character of the accused. The general purpose of introducing 
evidence as to the complainant’s bad reputation was succinctly
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summarized by Robin Corbett M.P, in his introduction of the Sexual
Offences (Amendment) Bill:
"...a woman could often be subjected to hurtful and 
irrelevant cross-examination about her previous sexual 
history, on the seeming assumption that because the woman 
had had, for example, an abortion, or an illegitimate 
baby, or was even held to be promiscuous, that somehow 
excused the rape or, worse, suggested that rape was not 
possible against such a woman". (57)
The basic assumption that women have a tendency to lie and make
false and malicious accusations of rape has been a dominant theme
in legal thinking from the earliest times to the present. That
attitude, and the correspondingly deep suspicion towards women
alleging rape, is reflected in the law of rape which sets the
offence in a unique category within the general body of the
criminal law in several fundamental respects. The Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act 1976 was generally seen as a move forward and away
from old assumptions, as well as a genuine attempt at restoring
some balance between the rights of the complainant and defendant in
a rape trial. The following section discusses the background and
substance of the present law, in order to assess how far the new
Act reflects a radical change in social attitudes and legal
thinking.
DPP V Morgan and others - the rape controversy
The Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape states that the 
Group's
"enquiry originated as a result of widespread public 
concern expressed by the public, the media and in 
Parliament in regard to the decision of the House of 
Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan and 
others". (58)
The trial judge in that case, where the issue was essentially one
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of consent, directed the jury that the defendants should be
acquitted if they honestly believed that the complainant consented,
and if such belief was held on reasonable grounds. The men were
convicted and subsequently appealed against their conviction on the
grounds that the trial judge misdirected the jury and that they
were entitled to an acquittal if the jury found that the victim did
not consent, provided they, the defendants, honestly believed that
she did, whether the grounds for their belief were reasonable or
not. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed the appeals;
nevertheless, it gave the appellants leave to appeal to the House
of Lords, since a point of law of general importance was felt to be
involved in the case, namely
"whether in rape the defendant can properly be convicted 
notwithstanding that he in fact believed that the woman 
consented if such belief was not based on reasonable 
grounds". (59)
Although the convictions of the men in the Morgan case were upheld, 
the majority of the Law Lords who considered the question (60) held 
that a man should be acquitted of rape if he honestly believed that 
the woman consented, even if he did not have reasonable grounds for 
his belief. The rationale for that decision was that the ruling 
merely extended to the crime of rape a well established principle 
of criminal law, namely that "actus reus" as well as "mens rea" 
must be present to constitute a criminal offence. As Mr. Justice 
Cave observed,
"It is a general principle of our criminal law that there 
must be as an essential element in a criminal offence 
some blameworthy condition of the mind. Sometimes it is 
negligence, sometimes malice, sometimes guilty knowledge, 
but as a general rule, there must be something of that 
kind which is designated by the expression mens rea".
(61)
Mens rea is thus seen as some sort of mental nexus between the 
accused person and the unlawful act he is alleged to have
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committed, but it is without doubt a difficult and confused 
concept. The main point of disagreement among the Law Lords in the 
case of DPP v Morgan and others had, at its root, divergent 
interpretations as to what constituted established practice in 
various areas of the criminal law with regard to criteria used to 
determine mens rea.
Much literature has been devoted in this context to the cases of 
DPP V Smith and Hyam v DPP (62). The decisions in these cases turn 
on whether the prosecution must establish that the defendant 
himself had the intent to commit the crime in question, or whether 
it would be sufficient to prove that an average person in a similar 
position would have had that intent. In the case of Smith, the 
House of Lords applied the objective test as to what a reasonable 
man would have foreseen and intended, and the appellant's 
conviction was upheld. Indeed, Viscount Kilmuir LC argued that the 
foreseen and intended consequences were to be treated alike and if 
the defendant should have foreseen the consequences of his actions, 
then he should be guilty of the offence charged.
Following this decision, s.8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 was 
passed, providing that a jury is not bound by law to infer that the 
defendant intended a result of his actions merely because that 
result was a natural and probable consequence of them. This has 
been interpreted as a subjective test, and was applied in the case 
of Hyam where the appellant's conviction was quashed. Lord Hailsham 
held in that case that the consequences of an action which are 
foreseen as a moral certainty are intended ones, whereas those 
consequences which are seen as highly probable should not be
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treated as intended.
A similar line of reasoning was followed in the case of DPP v
Morgan and others by the majority of the Law Lords. This was Lord
Hailsham's argument:
"Once one has accepted, what seems to me abundantly 
clear, that the prohibited act in rape is non-consensual 
sexual intercourse, and that the guilty state of mind is 
an intention to commit it, it seems to me to follow as a 
matter of inexorable logic that there is no room either 
for a "defence" of honest belief or mistake, or of a 
defence of honest and reasonable belief and mistake.
Either the prosecution proves that the accused had the 
requisite intent, or it does not...I am content to rest 
my view of the instant case on the crime of rape by 
saying that it is my opinion that the prohibited act is 
and always has been intercourse without consent of the 
victim and the mental element is and always has been the 
intention to commit that act, or the equivalent intention 
of having intercourse willy nilly, not caring whether the 
victim consents or no. A failure to prove this involves
an acquittal because the intent, an essential ingredient,
is lacking. It matters not why it is lacking if only it 
is not there, and in particular it matters not that the 
intention is lacking only because of a belief not based 
on reasonable grounds". (63)
Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Edmund Davies, the dissenters,
referred to a number of cases where judgments seem to indicate that
in some circumstances at least, the objective test was held to be
the correct one. Indeed, they pointed out that recent statute law
in the area of sexual offences confirmed this view. According to
s.6(3) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 a man is not guilty of
unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 if he
is under the age of 24, has not previously been charged with a
similar offence, believes her to be of the age of 16 or over and
has reasonable cause for the belief. Hence, it was argued, the
"necessary course is to uphold, as being in accordance 
with established law, the direction given in this case by 
the learned trial judge as to the necessity for the 
mistake of fact urged to be based on reasonable grounds".
(64)
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While the other Law Lords approached the Morgan case from the
perspective of the defendant entirely, Lord Simon of Glaisdale took
into account the position of the alleged victim too in coming to
his decision. He interpreted what in his opinion was established
policy as derived from legal concern to strike a fair balance
between the victim and the accused;
"A respectable woman who has been ravished would hardly 
feel that she was vindicated by being told that her 
assailant must go unpunished because he believed, quite 
unreasonably, that she was consenting to sexual 
intercourse with him". (65)
In any event, the Lords' decision provoked considerable public
controversy. Legal opinion was generally in favour of it and
confirmed it as nothing more than the welcome application of
accepted principles of criminal law to the offence of rape:
"The opposing view was that a man could be convicted of a 
rape although he honestly believed that the woman was 
consenting, if he was stupid (unreasonable) in forming 
that belief. To convict the stupid man would be to 
convict him of what lawyers call inadvertent 
negligence...Rape carries a possible sentence of 
imprisonment for life, and it would be wrong to have a 
law of negligent rape". (66)
The National Council for Civil Liverties also supported the
decision (67) and an article in New Society commented that "as a
matter of logic" the ruling was quite right (68).
However, popular opinion and the media in general were fiercely 
opposed to the Morgan ruling. The Sunday Mirror labelled it a 
"Rapists' Charter" (69) and this feeling was reflected in numerous 
articles and readers' letters in most daily newspapers. These 
expressed the fear of "bogus defences" and of men "getting away" 
with rape, which was felt to be the inevitable consequence of the 
ruling:
"The scales of justice have swung heavily in favour of
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rapists...Henceforth, every rapist will declare his 
'belief* that his victim was willing - and expect his 
ticket to freedom...because the principle that a man's 
belief, if he can convince the jury of it, can prevent 
conviction, is now enshrined unassailably in law. (70)
A reconsideration of the law was urgently called for by a number of
individuals and organisations. The National Council of Women of
Great Britain, for example, asked for Parliament to
"take immediate steps to reform the intolerable state of 
this section of the criminal law". (71)
One immediate response to the Lords' ruling was the presentation in
Parliament of a Bill containing three major proposals for the
reform of rape law. It was introduced by Jack Ashley M.P, The first
proposal was aimed at reversing the Law Lords' ruling in the Morgan
case, and at replacing the subjective test adopted in the ruling by
an objective test. The second proposal was to grant anonymity for
victims of rape, except by direction of the court. Thirdly, the
Bill sought to ban the disclosure in court of the complainant's
sexual experience prior to the alleged rape as this was felt to be
irrelevant to her credibility or her consent (72).
Although the Home Secretary initially declined to take emergency
action to reverse the Lords' ruling, he eventually agreed, in the
face of mounting public pressure, to consider the matter further.
He announced that he would be seeking the advice of an independent
group which would consider the controversial judgment in a wider
context. The Advisory Group on the Law of Rape was appointed in
July 1975, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Justice Heilbron, with
the following terms of reference;
"To give consideration to the law of rape in the light of 
recent public concern and to advise the Home Secretary 
whether early changes in the law are desirable" (73).
In appointing the Group, the Home Secretary appeared to have given
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in to public pressure and agitation resulting directly from the Law
Lords’ decision in the case of Morgan. However, it has been noted
that the setting up of the Group was a "very curious intervention"
(74), and that the Morgan decision ought not to have been
considered in relation to the offence of rape alone. It has also
been argued that such an ad hoc approach was inappropriate to law
reform, particularly when sexual offences in general were already
being considered by the Criminal Law Revision Committee. Rape was
felt to be "especially unsuited to instant responses to popular
commotions" particularly when the reasons for those commotions were
not clearly understood:
"why the application to the offence of rape of the 
general principles of the law relating to criminal 
liability...should produce this kind of response is far 
from clear". (75)
However, the Lords' decision was not as straightforward as the
above writer suggests. The mere fact that the Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeals yet gave leave to appeal to the House of
Lords indicates a feeling that the issues involved here were far
from simple. A reading of the House of Lords' judgments reveals
that the main issues in the case were open to a good deal of
interpretation. In particular, there was disagreement regarding the
definition of the "general principles of the law relating to
criminal liability" as well as the application of such principles
to the offence of rape. The Law Lords' inability to reach a
unanimous decision on the matter also underlines the fact that
there was at least some degree of doubt, at that stage, as to the
correctness of the majority view. The confusion surounding the
matter of criminal intent is further acknowledged and discussed in
the Law Commission's 1978 Report on the Mental Element in Crime.
(76) It may be that the public outcry which followed the decision
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was out of proportion and based on a misunderstanding of the full 
implications of the ruling. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to view 
the concern expressed as a totally irrational response to an 
unquestionably correct decision. It must be acknowledged that the 
decision carried more than an element of doubt and to that extent, 
the public controversy which it provoked was, if not wholly 
justified, at least understandable.
In addition to the doubt inherent in the House of Lords' decision, 
a number of points may be made concerning the general social 
climate relating to the offence of rape in 1975. Several factors 
may have contributed to the sudden newsworthiness of rape and these 
may also partially explain what has been described as the public's 
and the media's "thoroughly distorted view of the Morgan ruling"
(77).
It has been argued that a distinction could be made between 
attitudes towards violent crime on the political and personal 
level, relating to concern over rising crime rates and to personal 
fear of crime respectively (78). It should be remembered that as 
far as the "political level" is concerned, the events leading to 
law reform in 1975 took place against a background of unprecedented 
increase in the reported number of rapes. The yearly number known 
to the police more than doubled between 1960 and 1978, and for the 
first time, exceeded the thousand mark in 1974 (79).
The importance of fear as a factor governing public opinion about 
rape has been pointed out elsewhere: in analysing the diffusion of 
sexual psychopath laws in the U.S.A., Sutherland identified a
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typical course of events leading to the enactment of such laws
(80), The first essential ingredient of legislative reform, he 
argued, was a state of fear aroused in the community when a few 
serious sexual crimes have been committed in rapid succession. This 
is usually accompanied by nationwide publicity and considerable 
agitation in the community. While the nature of the laws considered 
in Sutherland’s and in this study is clearly quite different, one 
could argue that public opinion, fuelled in part by a state of 
fear, had an important influence on Government legislative action. 
Whatever the general level of fear of rape in the community at any 
particular point in time, this was substantially increased as a 
result of the activities between September 1974 and May 1975 of the 
man who became labelled as the Cambridge rapist. The case received 
nationwide press publicity and public concern increased as it 
appeared that the rapes were becoming more violent on each 
occasion. Some of the victims suffered considerable injuries 
requiring hospitalisation and even surgical intervention. The local 
community was in a state of panic:
"Talk of the rapes is everywhere...Rumours fly about
wildly...False alarms continue". (81)
By May 1975, the panic and the hunt for the Cambridge rapist had 
reached such proportions that reports of the latest attack, an 
unsuccessful attempt and police efforts to catch the man vied for 
space in the national press with news of the Lords’ judgment in the 
case of Morgan.
The popular view of rape as an extremely serious crime was 
underlined by the Cambridge events, and the Law Lords’ judgment in 
that light may have been erroneously interpreted as a denial of the 
gravity of the offence. It was widely believed that the ease of
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putting up a bogus defence would have the effect of deterring rape 
complaints and that increasing numbers of rapists would go 
undetected and unpunished. A concern with encouraging women to 
report rape was one of the key issues in the proposals for 
providing anonymity to victims of rape; this was initially brought 
up in the House of Commons in 1974, before Jack Ashley's Bill.
Chibnall has argued that one set of rules which governs the press 
reporting of violence stresses the relevance of the sexual 
connotation, "which derives its prominence from the imperative of 
titillation" (82), Thus, rape victims are usually described in the 
press in terms of their marital status, age, physical appearance 
and other personal attributes (83). It has also been noted that 
some papers, particularly after an acquittal, tend to include 
somewhat gratuitous remarks about the private life of the alleged 
victim (84).
Thus, the ordeal for women of giving evidence at the trial and of 
being cross-examined on intimate details of their personal lives 
was in many cases compounded by full scale publicity. A number of 
questions were asked in the House of Commons in 1974 regarding the 
possible provision of anonymity for complainants at rape trials, 
but these questions only received the answer that judges already 
had sufficient discretion in this matter without further 
legislation (85). However, existing practice was regarded as 
inconsistent by many, and criticised for being dependent on "the 
judge’s view of the deserving character of the woman" (86).
The Rape (Anonymity of Victims) Bill was introduced by F.P. Crowder
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M.P. in July 1974. This Bill was intended to encourage victims to 
come forward and make statements to the police without fear of 
publicity, and was described by its sponsor as "not a controversial 
measure" (87). The need for anonymity was presented as a matter of 
complete unanimity, which one Member of Parliament argued as 
follows;
"It would be one more advance for a woman’s rights, and
welcomed by all with any respect for her dignity". (88)
The Bill sought to provide anonymity for victims of "illegal rape", 
an expression which led the New Law Journal to comment that rape 
was not
"being treated with the seriousness either the subject or
the reform of the law deserves" (89).
It was concerned with the need to protect the genuine complainant, 
but because of the supposed danger of encouraging false 
accusations, it did not intend to provide full scale anonymity on 
all occasions. It would have kept the victim’s name unpublished 
during the proceedings, but would then have vested the judge with 
authority to direct, on application by the defence, that her name 
be revealed in cases where she "out of spite and venom...quite 
unjustly and wrongfully" made a false accusation (90),
Although Crowder’s Bill did not go beyond a first reading, the 
question of anonymity remained a live issue throughout 1974 and 
1975. The Bill was re-introduced in early 1975 (91), and its main 
provisions were also incorporated in Ashley’s Bill in June 1975. 
The matter was also considered by the Heilbron Group, and the 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 includes an anonymity 
provision for complainants in rape cases. The details of this will 
be discussed below.
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The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976
As the Home Secretary intended, the Advisory Group on the Law of 
Rape under the chairmanship of Mrs. Justice Heilbron considered a 
number of issues relevant to the law of rape in addition to the 
Lords' decision in DPP v Morgan and others, and its recommendations 
covered the definition of the offence, the question of evidence, 
the anonymity of complainants and the composition of juries.
Written and oral evidence was sought from a variety of individuals 
and organisations from the legal and medical professions, the 
police, women's groups and the media. Information was also received 
from other countries and the Group studied the Bills which had been 
presented in Parliament by Ashley and Crowder respectively. The 
evidence presented to the Heilbron Group reflected the controversy 
that had characterized public response to the Morgan ruling,
although interestingly, that issue was perhaps least disputed among
the matters considered by the Group.
The Group's report was published in December 1975. Although most of 
its recommendations concerned the conduct of rape trials, the need 
for a statutory definition of rape was stressed from the outset. It
was felt that a comprehensive definition emphasizing lack of
consent rather than violence as the essential ingredient of the 
offence was required, as the absence of a statutory definition had 
in the past caused some difficulty. Furthermore, the Group argued 
that although the decision in DPP v Morgan and others was right in 
principle, it would be desirable to clarify the point by 
incorporating in a statutory definition some reference to the law
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governing intention in rape cases. Thus, the Group recommended that
statutory provision should
"(i) declare that (in cases where the question of belief 
is raised) the issue which the jury have to consider is 
whether the accused at the time when sexual intercourse 
took place believed that she was consenting, and
(ii) make it clear that, while there is no requirement of 
law that such a belief must be based on reasonable 
grounds, the presence or absence of such grounds is a 
relevant consideration to which the jury should have 
regard, in conjunction with all other evidence, in 
considering whether the accused genuinely had such a 
belief" (92).
Much of the evidence received by the Group tended to criticise the 
practice and procedure followed in rape trials rather than the 
substantive law of rape or indeed the decision in the case of 
Morgan. The Group acknowledged the "prolonged ordeal" (93) and 
"humiliation and distress" (94) that the complainant is likely to 
suffer during cross-examination. While emphasizing that every 
accused person must have a fair trial, the Group argued that some 
restriction ought to be placed on the kind of cross-examination 
which
"does not advance the cause of justice but in effect puts 
the woman on trial" (95).
In considering this, the Group outlined their approach as follows:
"We have reached the conclusion that the previous sexual 
history of the alleged victim with third parties is of no
significance so far as credibility is concerned, and is
only rarely likely to be relevant to issues directly 
before the jury. In contemporary society, sexual 
relationships outside marriage, both steady and of a more 
casual character, are fairly widespread, and it seems now 
to be agreed that a woman’s sexual experiences with 
partners of her own choice are neither indicative of 
untruthfulness nor of a general willingness to consent.
There exists, in our view, a gap between the assumptions 
underlying the law and those public views and attitudes 
which exist today which ought to influence today’s law"
(96).
The Committee felt that matters relating to the relationship of the 
complainant and the accused would generally be relevant to the
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issues in the trial and hence admissible in evidence. However, they 
strongly argued that the complainant’s sexual history with anyone 
else, including the general question of ’’bad reputation”, ought not 
to be admissible, subject to one important exception. The trial 
judge would have the discretion to admit such evidence, according 
to principles set out in legislation as follows:
"...if the judge is satisfied -
(a) that this evidence relates to behaviour on the part 
of the complainant which was strikingly similar to her 
alleged behaviour on the occasion of, or in relation to, 
events immediately preceding or following the alleged 
offence; and
(b) that the degree of relevance of that evidence to 
issues arising in the trial is such that it would be 
unfair to the accused to exclude it.” (97) . .
If evidence as to the complainant’s sexual history is thus
introduced, whether with the defendant or third parties, that ought
not to put the defendant’s character at issue. Otherwise, the Group
took the view that the defendant’s character should be let in only
in certain limited circumstances, following the pattern set out in
the Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in this respect.
The Group also acknowledged that complainants in rape cases can be
greatly distressed by the publicity which they sometimes suffer and
that there was widespread support for providing anonymity for
complainants in such cases. They rejected the idea of holding rape
trials in camera, and argued that any exception to the full
reporting of criminal proceedings should be especially justified.
They concluded that
’’complainants in rape cases should, in general, be given 
anonymity in the sense of protection from identification 
in the press and on radio and television”. (98)
The Advisory Group on the Law of Rape rejected the view 
incorporated in the Crowder Bill that the judge should have
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discretion to release the complainant's name where, in his opinion,
she has lied or brought a false charge. The publication of the
woman’s name in such circumstances would be a penal measure, and
punishment without a trial would be wrong in principle. Also, it
was again stressed that the rape trial ought not to be treated as
the trial of the complainant. Their recommendation regarding
anonymity was that
"there should, in general, be anonymity for complainants 
in rape cases with a strong presumption against lifting 
it, unless there are special circumstances". (99)
Application to lift the restriction should be made to the judge
before or not later than at the start of the trial, and the judge’s
discretion should only operate in favour of the defendant in
"cases where the complainant’s identity is necessary for 
the discovery of potential witnesses, the Judge being 
satisfied that there are real grounds for supposing that 
the proper conduct of the defence is likely to be 
substantially prejudiced by a refusal" (100).
The Group rejected the view that the defendant ought also to be
given anonymity in rape cases:
"We think it erroneous to suppose that the equality 
should be with her (the complainant) - it should be with 
other accused persons and an acquittal will give him 
public vindication". (101)
The final set of recommendations concerned the composition of
juries. The Group’s opinion was that both sexes should be
adequately represented in juries trying rape offences, and
consequently they wanted to
"ensure that in rape trials, there is a minimum of four 
women and also four men on a jury, in order to keep the 
balance of the sexes within reasonable bounds...We 
suggest that challenges should not be capable of being 
used so as to frustrate the minimum numbers". (102)
Some of the Group’s recommendations were received with
reservations. The Medico-Legal Journal questioned the wisdom of
proposals aimed at ensuring the representation of both sexes on
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juries, and asked whether such juries were
"more likely to be any better at determining guilt or 
innocence than any jury chosen at random, subject to 
peremptory challenges?" (103)
The Times criticised the Report for going too far in protecting the
woman against publicity. It argued that women making malicious and
entirely untruthful allegations should not "escape unscathed,
either by the law or by publicity", and suggested that the trial
judge have the discretion to reveal the woman’s name in cases where
her behaviour "amounts to or approaches gross perjury" (104).
Despite such reservations, the Report was on the whole well
received. Its recommendations were seen as a major step forward in
protecting rape victims;
"(they) should do a great deal to persuade women that it 
might after all be worthwhile to report rape". (105)
One commentator congratulated the Group
"on producing such a lucid report, ranging over so many 
issues, in so short a time; on its coolness in the face 
of popular clamour; and on the persuasive presentation of 
its proposals". (106)
It was called a "sensible and sensitive report" (107) and although
it contained no proposal to reverse the Morgan ruling, some of the
popular press even dubbed it a "Charter for rape victims" (108).
The Heilbron Report constitutes the basis of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Bill, which was drafted by parliamentary draftsmen and 
had full government support although it was introduced as a Private 
Member’s Bill. Initially, it incorporated all of the Advisory 
Group’s recommendations, with the exception of the one concerning 
the composition of juries. This was rejected as it was felt that 
interference with the random selection of juries may extend to the
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trial of other offences, and that such a fundamental change in an 
important aspect of the legal system was not justified.
At the Committee stage, a new clause was introduced regarding
anonymity for defendants in rape cases. Because of the potential 
consequences of a groundless accusation for an innocent man, it was 
argued that the defendant too should be covered by an anonymity 
provision, to be lifted in the event of a conviction. A number of
Members opposed this clause, because the principle of singling out
defendants in rape trials for special treatment was felt to go 
against the core of the criminal justice system. However, the 
proposition to grant anonymity to defendants gained support from 
the majority of the House, particularly from those who saw outright 
anonymity for complainants as a dangerous measure which would 
enourage malicious accusations. Taking his lead from Hale, one Q.C. 
warned that
"there is no branch of law, no class of case, where it is 
so easy for a woman to make an allegation, of this kind 
and to make it against a professional man. It is men too 
who require protection of their reputations against 
baseless allegations of rape, which frequently occur"
(109).
The clause regarding anonymity for defendants, which was 
incorporated in the Act, was thus seen as an attempt at redressing 
the balance between complainant and accused, and at ensuring that 
false accusations would not be made too lightly from "acute 
jealousy or from morbid feelings of having been rejected" (110) by 
"emotionally and psychologically unbalanced" women (111).
It has been observed elsewhere that debates on matters of crime and 
penal policy in the Commons tend to have considerable input from 
members of the legal profession (112). The debates considered here
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are no exception, in that they were dominated throughout by lawyers
from both sides of the House, who claimed expertise in this field
by virtue of their experience in ciminal trials in general and rape
trials in particular. Indeed, the tone of the debate occasionally
suggested open conflict between lawyers and non-lawyers: the
Heilbron Group, not predominantly composed of members of the legal
profession, was said to have
"transgressed into the criminal law with insufficient
experience of what it was seeking to do" (113).
This criticism was made particularly strongly in connection with
recommendations to limit the scope of cross-examination, where is
was felt that the proposed legislation represented an intrusion
into the professional autonomy of lawyers.
Individual opinions were legitimated by reference to professional
expertise: while the Heilbron Group felt that a woman’s sexual
experience was generally irrelevant to her consent or credibility
when she made an allegation of rape, there was considerable support
in the House for the view that this was at least likely to be
relevant to her consent. Frequent reference was made in this
context to cases where the woman in question was of "thoroughly ill
repute in sexual matters" (114), and one Member observed that
"a woman with a past...is less likely to be the victim of 
rape than a maiden aunt, an unpromiscuous virgin, or a 
respectable married woman" (115).
The relevant clause was eventually redrafted, largely as a
concession to the legal views outlined here. It was simplified, and
did not lay down strict rules for judges to follow in considering
applications to admit evidence of this kind, beyond the matter of
unfairness to the defendant (116). Thus, the principle put forward
in the Heilbron Report was followed insofar as the Act conceded
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that a woman's previous sexual experience was generally not a 
matter for the court to consider in seeking to determine whether or 
not she has been raped. In practice, however, the decision as to 
the relevance of such evidence in any particular case was left 
entirely up to the trial judge.
Although the opposition party criticised the Bill in a number of 
respects and had considerable misgivings about some of its 
provisions, it did not oppose it. The crux of the Conservative 
criticism of it (and this was shared by a number of Labour lawyers 
in the Commons) was that it tilted the balance too far in favour of 
the complainant and that it undermined the usual safeguards which 
apply in law for the protection of the accused.
The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 received the Royal Assent
on 22nd November, 1976 (See Appendix I). It was described by its
sponsors as a victory for the rape victim, and as a measure which
would encourage women to come forward and report sexual assaults:
"It will not make it easy for a woman who has suffered 
this appalling ordeal to report it. What I hope it will 
do is to make it less difficult to report and, without 
taking away any right from the defendant, give added 
protection to the growing numbers of women to whom this 
wilest of crimes will become a terrifying reality" (117).
A closer examination of the parliamentary debates reveals, however,
that the Act was not quite the unmitigated success that the above
statement suggests. It seems that for every concession made to the
complainant in accordance with the recommendations of the Heilbron
Group, there was some counter-measure which favoured the defendant.
In the first instance, the Act reinforced the Law Lords’ decision
in the case of Morgan which had caused such furore, particularly
among women. Secondly, although it granted anonymity to
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complainants in rape cases, it also extended this to defendants. 
Interestingly, victims of blackmail are also protected by anonymity 
but the provision in those cases does not extend to the accused; 
the logic of granting anonymity to both parties in rape cases is, 
to say the least, unusual. Finally, as we have seen, the Heilbron 
Group recommended that evidence regarding the complainant's 
previous sexual experience should only be admitted in exceptional 
cases, and that the trial judge be guided by principles set out in 
legislation in considering whether or not to admit such evidence.
In particular, it was recommended that cross-examination of the 
complainant should be limited to behaviour which was strikingly 
similar to the complainant's behaviour on the occasion of the 
alleged offence, and to cases where the relevance of the evidence 
was such that it would be unfair to the defendant to exclude it. 
However, in the final event, one is left with a piece of 
legislation which leaves the grounds for admissibility of such 
evidence entirely to the discretion of the trial judge. There are 
no guiding principles laid down in legislation beyond the criterion 
of fairness to the defendant, which is a somewhat vague concept and 
involves the exercise of a large degree of discretion. The evidence 
becomes relevant if the judge deems it to be so, and thus it is 
likely that judges will differ in their interpretation of that 
section of the Act.
The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 has been described as a
"response to feminist agitation about the absence of
adequate concern for rape victims in Britain" (118).
Somewhat more cynically, however, one could also argue that the 
legislative work involved in the passage of the new law was 
designed
8 1
"to provide a theatrical display of reassurance, a 
display which is governed more by dramaturgy than 
bureaucratic rationality" (119).
In other words, the Act can be seen as a mere concession to popular
agitation rather than a meaningful change in legal attitudes
towards rape victims. A discussion of the significance and impact
of this piece of legislation must center around its application in
the courts. Some of the initial questions which arise in that
context are the following; in what circumstances do judges lift the
restriction on the publication of a complainant’s name? How
frequently are such applications made, and how successful are they?
How frequently are applications made by the defence to
cross-examine the complainant on her previous sexual experience?
What grounds are put forward to justify the need for such
cross-examination from the defendant’s point of view? How do judges
rule on these applications? What types of criteria emerge in
determining the relevance of various matters under application?
Does evidence of this sort continue to be introduced without an
application to the judge, and if so, in what circumstances? How far
is the law adhered to? Is the outcome of the trial likely to be
affected by the introduction of evidence of sexual character? To
what extent, if at all, does the Court of Appeal intervene in the
exercise of discretion of trial judges?
This study aims to answer some of the above questions, on the basis 
of material collected from some fifty trials for rape offences in 
1978-79, and to make broader observations on the social definition 
of rape which emerges in court.
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CHAPTER THREE. RESEARCH METHODS
The principal aims of this research are to examine empirically the 
implementation of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. its 
impact on the reporting of rape and, in particular, on the trial of 
rape offences.
The study analyses the statistical frequency of reported rape and 
compares conviction rates before and after the Act. It discusses 
the issue of anonymity, and seeks to establish how frequently and 
for what reasons that provision is lifted on complainants and 
defendants. It considers the impact of the relevant section of the 
Act on the newspaper reporting of rape, as well as practices and 
procedures adopted in court with regard to anonymity. It also looks 
at the effect of the Morgan ruling which, as we have seen, was 
incorporated in the Act.
The study considers the application of Section 2 of the Act, which 
aims to limit the admissibility at a rape trial of evidence 
relating to the complainant’s previous sexual experience. It seeks 
to describe how judicial discretion is exercised in this respect, 
and to point to areas in which the law is not being applied.
Empirical research based on observations of court procedure is in 
fact the only reliable and valid way of obtaining answers to 
questions regarding the implementation of an Act of Parliament such 
as this. Newspaper reporting of rape is superficial and patchy, and 
as such, it is an unreliable and insufficient source of 
information. Criminal statistics provide some information on the
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number of defendants tried each year, the outcome of trials, 
sentencing, and so on, but they do not tell us what happens in 
court and how various decisions are arrived at.
Transcripts of trials are not generally available. While a 
shorthand note is taken of all the evidence and of the judge's 
summing up at every trial, this is only transcribed if particular 
aspects of is are needed for an appeal against conviction. Even 
then, only extracts relevant to the substance of the appeal are 
transcribed. Trials ending in acquittals would escape attention 
altogether. Thus, applications under S.2 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976 would only be transcribed where the trial 
judge had refused leave to cross-examine on previous sexual 
exerience, and this decision became the grounds of an appeal. This 
occurred in only one case in the present study; that case was 
widely reported and will be discussed below (1).
One of the major objectives of the Act had been to rectify the 
earlier position where the alleged victim of rape was, in effect, 
as much on trial as the defendant. This study makes certain general 
observations regarding defence tactics and strategies used in rape 
trials, with a view to establishing how far the Act has reached 
that aim. The question of whether legislative reform in general, 
and this Act in particular, are effective means for improving the 
treatment of the rape victim in the criminal justice system is also 
given some consideration.
Background assumptions
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The relationship between the legal and social structure has 
received a good deal of sociological attention, Durkheim claimed 
that the law reproduced the "principal forms of social solidarity", 
and perceived it as a means of classifying societies (2). Weber saw 
the increasing rationality of law as a product of the development 
of Western capitalism (3). Various conflict theorists have studied 
legislative developments in an attempt to understand the nature and 
location of power in society (4). The common feature of most such 
works is that they tend to postulate a series of more or less 
complex links between the formulation and implementation of the law 
and the structure of the society within which it operates (5).
This inquiry considers one aspect of the link between social and 
legal structure. It aims to examine the way in which certain ideas 
commonly held in society are reproduced in the functioning of one 
social institution of that society. More specifically, it aims to 
investigate the relationship between current social perceotions 
relating to the phenomenon of rape and the implementation of a 
specific law, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976. The 
research describes the operation and broad impact of various 
aspects of the Act; it also tests a number of hypotheses concerning 
the processes involved in the trial of rape offences. In 
particular, it considers the way in which the social definition of 
rape influences the application of Section Z of the Act, and the 
trial of rape offences in general. Before stating the general and 
specific hypotheses used in this study, a number of background 
assumptions will be noted and discussed.
We have seen earlier that recent research findings do not support
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the traditional view of the rapist as a seriously disturbed sexual
psychopath. Rape has consequently been redefined as an act of
violence and aggression, reflecting feelings of inferiority or
inadequacy, rather than an offence mainly motivated by sexual needs
and impulses (6), Rape has been termed a "pseudo-sexual act";
"careful clinical study of offenders reveals that rape is 
in fact serving primarily non-sexual needs. It is the 
sexual expression of power and anger". (7)
Despite the considerable weight of evidence on this issue, there
remains a widespread belief that rape is the outcome of frustrated
sexual needs; such a belief provides the basis for a whole series
of misconceptions with regard to both victim and offender.
One of the most persistent myths regarding the victim that is
derived from this view is that she provoked the offence. This
assumption has the effect of shifting the responsibility from the
offender to the victim. As Groth comments, if the assumption is
that the assailant
"is sexually aroused and is directing those impulses 
towards the victim, then it must be that she has 
deliberately or inadvertently stimulated or aroused this 
desire in him through her actions, style of dress, or 
some such feature". (8)
These perceptions encourage the ascription of some kind of
deserving status to the victim of rape, and provide the substance
of what Sykes and Matza have termed "techniques of neutralization".
They argue that there are certain processes involved in creating a
"legitimate" victim, in the sense of being a victim deserving of
his or her victimization. They discuss a number of techniaues
whereby juvenile delinquents justify their behaviour, and divide
these techniques into five somewhat overlapping categories which
include denial of responsibility, denial of injury and denial of
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the victim (9). It is important to note that these techniques are 
based on cultural norms, shared not only by the delinquent in 
question but also accepted by society in general.
In denying responsibility, the offender asserts that
"delinquent acts are due to forces outside the individual 
and beyond his control" (10).
While denial of responsibility mitigates the offence with reference
to the offender, other techniques of neutralization revolve around
the victim. Denial of injury involves a distinction between acts
that are wrong in themselves and acts that are illegal but not seen
as intrinsically wrong. Sykes and Matza note that
"wrongfulness often hinges on the question of whether or 
not anyone has been hurt by the offence; and that, of 
course, is open to a variety of interpretations". (11)
This technique has particular relevance for rape offences; one can
argue that as long as these are seen as acts of sexuality rather
than aggression and hostility, they will be interpreted as
predominantly pleasurable to both parties, rather than as harmful
to the victim.
The denial of the victim is closely linked to denial of injury.
Here, the offender may assume responsibility for his deviant
actions and their results, but nevertheless, attempt to neutralize
any moral indignation attached to such actions
"by an insistence that the injury is not wrong in the 
light of the circumstances. The injury, it may be 
claimed, is not really an injury; rather, it is a form of 
rightful retaliation or punishment... By a subtle 
alchemy, the delinquent moves himself into the position, 
of avenger and the victim is transformed into a 
WTong-doer" (12).
This theme has been adopted by a number of commentators. For
example, Weis and Borges have observed that when a woman is
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"sexually provocative, morally inferior, has a bad 
reputation or needs to be taught her place... the 
offender can justify his behaviour via the rationale that 
she both asked for it and deserved it" (13).
Reynolds illustrates this process from a slightly different
perspective by arguing that a victim who fails to demonstrate her
good character or her adherence to strict moral standards
discredits her claim to victim status and may even get labelled as
the deviant;
"When there is evidence that the victim was or gave the 
appearance of being out of her place, she can be raped 
and the rapist will be supported by the cultural values, 
by the institutions that embody these values and by the 
people shaped by these values" (14).
The question now arises as to how these assumptions underlying the
social definition of rape affect the court process in a rape case.
As we have noted above, rape law in this country before the Sexual
Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 explicitly acknowledged that an
alleged rape victim's character was highly relevant to the issues
in the trial (15). There is also evidence that judges take the
complainant's behaviour into account when sentencing rapists.
Recently, Judge Bertrand Richards fined a man convicted of rape. He
was reported as justifying this unusually lenient sentence by
saying that the victim, who had been hitchkiking, "was guilty of a
great deal of contributory negligence". (16)
It has been noted that in rape trials, the conduct of the defence 
will generally involve some attempt to discredit the alleged victim 
by attacking her character, her sexual reputation or her behaviour 
at the time of the offence, on the assumption that rape is a crime 
of passion which, at least, to some degree, was precipitated by 
her. (17)
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The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 sought to limit the scope 
of defence strategy in this respect by restricting the 
admissibility of evidence regarding the complainant's previous 
sexual experience. However, perceptions of the nature of rape 
influence notions of appropriate behaviour on the part of the 
"genuine" victim. Such notions have important implications for the 
implementation of the new Act, and in particular for the way in 
which judicial discretion is exercised with regard to Section 2(2) 
of the Act.
Hypotheses and variables
The first and main hypothesis of this study is that the social 
definition of rape outlined above, and ensuing assumptions relating 
to the relevance of an alleged victim's sexual experience, have 
been carried into the operation of the Act.
Except for trials where the defendant's identity is the sole issue, 
applications under Section 2 are expected to be made frequently. 
Furthermore, because the Act failed to lay down strict guidelines 
for the exercise of judges' discretion, applications are expected 
to be generally successful, unless their explicit purpose is to 
discredit the complainant and to suggest that the sort of woman she 
is, by virtue of her sexual experience, is an unlikely if not 
impossible rape victim.
The specific hypothesis is that the premises upon which 
applications are based, as well as the criteria implicit in 
judicial rulings in this respect, will reflect the assumptions
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outlined above. The introduction of evidence regarding previous 
sexual experience is expected to be justified with reference to the
social definition of rape, which views it as a crime primarily
motivated by sexual needs. When it is said to be committed by a 
seemingly non-psychopathic man (which was the case for virtually 
all defendants in the present study) the alleged victim's sexual 
reputation and behaviour are subjected to close scrutiny in an 
attempt, wherever possible, to shift a varying degree of
responsibility on to her. One effective way of achieving this is to
allege that her past sexual behaviour and morality were less than 
exemplary. It is therefore expected that some attempt will be made 
to introduce such evidence in a high proportion of the cases 
studied, and furthermore, that such attempts will be successful in 
all but a minority of cases.
This hypothesis is tested by an examination of applications under 
Section 2 of the Act with regard to their frequency, substance, 
circumstances and results; and by a qualitative analysis of 
assumptions implicit in the applications regarding the 
complainant’s perceived role in and responsibility for the offence. 
A similar examination is made of decision making by judges in this 
respect, and areas where the Act is not strictly adhered to are 
also considered.
The Act also aimed, in a more general way, at altering the position 
where the alleged victim was effectively on trial. There are, 
however, strong indications that she continues to be judged on the 
seeming assumption that only certain kinds of women can be raped.
It appears that a defendant's guilt can only be established if the
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alleged victim's innocence and good character are proved.
The stereotype of the "ideal" case involves a view of rape as an 
explosive sexual encounter between total strangers, the offender 
being a dangerous and violent psychopath. The ideal victim is 
either sexually inexperienced, or a respectable woman with a "good" 
reputation. In either case, she does everything in her power to 
resist her attacker and may sustain serious injuries as a result of 
the assault.
This empirical investigation has been devised to test the 
hypothesis that there is a systematic connection between this 
stereotype and actual decision making in court. Cases which 
approximate to the "ideal" would be most likely to result in a 
conviction for a rape offence. Furthermore, although the outcome of 
a trial might be conceptualised as a function of a number of 
factors, including characteristics of the defendant, the judge and 
the jury, the study hypothesizes that in rape cases they are 
strongly and consistenly related to characteristics of the alleged 
victim.
This hypothesis is tested by an examination of the relationship 
between the outcome of rape trials and a number of variables 
pertaining to general attributes of the complainant, and to 
particular features of her behaviour at the material time. In 
considering general attributes and characteristics of the alleged 
victim, three main variables are looked at. These are her previous 
relationship with the defendant, her sexual experience, and her 
general reputation. As far as her behaviour at the time of the
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alleged offence is concerned, the variables investigated are her 
consent to being in the situation, the extent of her injuries and 
promptness in reporting the rape.
It is not suggested that the list of variables considered in this 
respect is in any way exhaustive. However, the choice of a limited 
numer of variables is justified insofar as this study may be 
described as exploratory, seeking to highlight certain problem 
areas rather than to make definitive statements regarding this 
aspect of rape trials.
The variables investigated will be defined more specifically in 
Chapter Six, and this section is confined to the statement of the 
expected links between the independent and dependent variables.
The victim’s prior sexual experience (excluding here any prior 
relationship with the defendant) is expected to be an important 
factor in the outcome of the trial. Trials involving complainants 
presented and perceived as unchaste or promiscuous are likely to 
result in acquittal, whereas an allegation made by a woman who is 
seen as having a good reputation is more likely to lead to a 
conviction.
The general character of the victim is also thought to be of 
importance in determining the outcome of the trial. It is expected 
that the likelihood of an acquittal will be greater in cases where 
an attempt is made to discredit the complainant with reference to 
her family problems, psychiatric history, drinking pattern, 
criminal record, etc. If the defence do not attack the complainant
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in this way, and she is seen as a "decent" or "respectable" woman, 
her assailant is more likely to be convicted.
The victim’s relationship with the offender has been defined as one 
aspect of the "social distance" betwen them (18) and it is expected 
that social distance in this sense will influence the outcome of 
the trial. The most favourable position for a conviction is where 
the victim and the offender were total strangers prior to the 
attack. Conversely, a degree of prior relationship is likely to 
correlate with an acquittal. This is particularly true when a prior 
sexual relationship between the complainant and the defendant is 
alleged; in such cases, it is expected that the defendant will 
almost invariably be acquitted.
With regard to the second set of hypotheses, the first variable 
considered is the complainant’s consent to being in the situation 
where the alleged offence occurred. It is expected that a defendant 
is likely to be acquitted if the complainant’s behaviour can be 
perceived as precipitating or provoking the rape. If there is 
evidence that she went willingly with the defendant to the place 
where the offence was committed, or was in more general terras 
willing to be in his company, her responsibility for what happened 
will be deemed considerable and this will increase the defendant’s 
chances of an acquittal. Conversely, if the defence do not put 
forward as part of their case the complainant’s consent to being in 
the situation where the alleged offence took place, the chances of 
conviction are expected to increase.
The second variable in this context is related to the injuries
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sustained by the complainant as a result of the alleged offence.
The "genuine" victim is expected to put up a considerable degree of 
physical resistance when she is being assaulted and to prove her 
lack of consent by the injuries she sustained during the struggle. 
Unless the complainant exhibits relatively serious bodily injuries, 
there will be a presumption of consent and the defendant will be 
more likely to be acquitted.
Finally, the true victim must report the offence to the police 
promptly if she is to be believed. Any delay in reporting will 
weaken her case and can only be mitigated by evidence of an early 
complaint of rape made to some third party. It is expected that 
rape offences reported immediately or within a few hours of their 
occurrence are more likely to result in a conviction than offences 
which for some reason are reported at a later stage.
Although there is clearly some interaction in each case between the 
above factors, their effect on the outcome of the trial is measured 
invidually. The hypotheses are tested by the chi-square test with 
regard to each variable. This test indicates whether there is a 
statistical association between the trial characteristics outlined 
above and the outcome of the trial. The results tend to support the 
hypotheses insofar as the distributions are all in the expected 
direction, and in general the associations are not explained by 
chance factors alone.
In addition to testing the above hypotheses, this study seeks to 
examine whether rape is seen as an act motivated by sexual 
instincts and whether only those cases which conform to the
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stereotype are classified as "real" rapes by the legal 
institutions.
Research design and procedure
This study is based on information collected during trials for rape 
offences at the Central Criminal Court in London between September 
1978 and July 1979. The sentences of two defendants had been 
deferred beyond this time period, and a further defendant's retrial 
took place in November 1979. Both sentences and retrial were also 
included in the study. At the start of the observation, the Act had 
been in force some twenty months. The period of data collection of 
ten months was chosen to ensure that a minimum sample of fifty 
trials was obtained.
The Central Criminal Court was established in 1834 for the trial of
offences committed in London, Middlesex and certain parts of Essex,
Hertford, Kent and Surrey. It became a Crown Court by virtue of the
Courts Act 1971, but it retains much of the tradition and
ceremonial associated wth its former role as the court of the City
of London. For example,
"The Lord Mayor of the City and any Alderman of the City 
shall be entitled to sit as judges of the Central 
Criminal Court with any judge of the High Court or any 
Circuit Judge or Recorder" (19).
Two types of judges sitting at the Court have jurisdiction to try
rape cases; visiting High Court judges and permanent circuit
iudges, including the Recorder of London, who is the judge of the
Central Criminal Court, and the Common Serjeant. At the time of
data collection, rape belonged to the class of offences which was
"to be tried by a High Court judge unless a particular
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case is released by or on the authority of a Presiding 
judge. A Presiding judge is a High Court judge assigned 
to have special responsibility for a particular circuit".
(20)
More recently, the Lord Chancellor directed that only senior judges 
also authorized to try murders should preside over rape cases (21). 
This new direction would have affected only about a quarter of rape 
cases tried at the Central Criminal Court, had it been implemented 
before the data collection period. Seventy percent of the trials in 
this study were tried by senior judges.
Cases included in the sample were generally committed from 
Magistrates' Courts in the Greater London area, the Central 
Criminal Court being the only London Crown Court with jurisdiction 
to try Class 2 offences (now Class 1) which include rape. This does 
not, however, mean that all London rapes are tried there; a certain 
number of cases are transferred elsewhere for trial, in particular 
to St. Albans Crown Court.
When the overall research design had been formulated, the first 
step was to make contact with the Court. The Central Criminal Court 
gave the author permission to sit in the body of the court, and 
arrangements were made for daily contact with the Listing Office of 
the Court. This is where cases awaiting trial are assigned to the 
various courts within the Central Criminal Court, and information 
was collected daily on where such trials would be heard.
The main instrument of data collection consists of two schedules 
containing predominantly open-ended categories, designed for the 
"guilty" and "not guilty" pleas respectively. These schedules, 
completed on the basis of a longhand note taken during the
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proceedings, record for each trial information regarding the 
following main areas;
Background data; dates of the trial, names of 
defendant(s), judge and counsel; time and place of the 
alleged offence; outcome of trial; sentence; details of 
any appeal.
Defendant; age; occupation; marital status; previous 
convictions; use of alcohol; prior relationship to the 
complainant; use of violence.
Complainant; age; marital status; injuries sustained; 
behaviour at the time of the offence; reporting; evidence 
of general character; evidence of prior sexual 
experience.
The trial; evidence given; applications under Sections 
2(2) and 4(2) of the 1976 Act; issues in the trial; 
directions to acquit; judge’s direction regarding 
corroboration; composition and length of deliberations of 
the jury.
A first draft of this research instrument was prepared and tested 
in court over a period of some three months, between May and July 
1978, with a view to ascertaining whether it was suitable for 
retrieving information on criminal trials. During this time, the 
schedules underwent considerable changes; for example, they were 
altered for use on trials involving several defendants and/or 
complainants.
As both schedules are appended ( Appendix II ) their content will 
not be discussed here in any detail. Nevertheless, a number of 
general points must be made regarding their use and some of the 
difficulties encountered in their application.
Different schedules were used for "guilty" and "not guilty" pleas 
respectively in view of the different procedures involved in the 
two types of trial. When a defendant pleads "guilty" to the offence 
charged, or to some lesser acceptable offence, the Court proceeds 
immediately to sentence. The prosecution outlines the circumstances 
of the offence to the Court and goes on to call evidence of the
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defendant's previous character and convictions, if any. Various 
reports (e.g. medical, social inquiry) may be presented to the 
Court. This is followed by a plea in mitigation bv defence counsel 
and the ludge then passes sentence on the defendant. The whole 
procedure is generally brief, and does not involve any of the 
complexities of a contested trial. The information that becomes 
available during such a trial is limited, and this is reflected in 
the type and amount of data sought by the schedule. The schedule 
used for "not guilty" pleas, in contrast, contains a large number 
of questions aiming to record information on various salient 
aspects of contested trials, with particular reference to the 
application of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976.
In cases involving several defendants and/or complainants, the 
relevant parts of the schedule were completed for each individual. 
It became clear that reliable information was not systematically 
available for a number of areas which were intended to be 
investigated. These include marital status and use of alcohol for 
both defendant and complainant, as well as occupation and 
employment for the defendant.
Parts of the trial which involved a conflict between the 
prosecution and the defence presented an additional problem for 
data collection. One example of such an area is the use of 
violence. The defendant and the complainant were invariablv in 
conflict over this issue, and this needed to be incorporated in the 
body of data collected. The problem was solved by recording both 
sides' version of the events in question. We shall see below how 
the problem was dealt with in the analysis.
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One further point regarding the use of the schedules concerns the 
final section on appeal against conviction and/or sentence. This 
was completed after the initial period of data collection had 
ended, and the information contained therein is based on the 
records of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).
Between September 1978 and July 1979, the author attended and took 
a detailed note of all the trials included in this study. That 
note, which covered the circumstances of the trial, the evidence 
given, legal argument and the judges summing-up and directions, 
forms the basic data source from which the information recorded in 
the schedules is derived.
A number of commentators have discussed the issues and problems
involved in using participant observation as a method of data
collection (22). In this instance, as discussed above, direct court
observation was the only way of obtaining information likely to
provide answers to the main research questions. The author's role
in court was one of "complete observer";
"Here a field worker attempts to observe people in ways 
which make it unnecessary for them to take him into 
account, for they do not know that he is observing them 
or that, in some sense, they are serving as his 
informants" (23).
In this role, the researcher remains entirely outside the observed
interaction and his presence does not in any way alter that
interaction. However, one possible problem with this method is
that, precisely because the researcher does not interact with his
informants, he may fail fully to understand the meaning of the
processes involved. In this study, the possible danger of
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misunderstanding was countered in two ways. Firstly, by following 
the trial from the body of the court rather than from the public 
gallery, it was possible to make informal contact with many of the 
individuals involved in the various trials, including the 
complainant, relatives and friends of both the complainant and the 
defendant, solicitors, barristers, the police, probation officers, 
representatives of the Rape Crisis Centre, court officials, etc. A 
considerable amount of background information was obtained in this 
way. Secondly, a great deal of preparatory reading was undertaken 
concerning the criminal law and the criminal process so that the 
author was able to make full sense of the interaction and 
proceedings observed during the course of the trials.
The processes involved in an undefended trial have been referred to 
above. Before embarking on a description of the exact procedures 
adopted during the data collection period, it may be helpful to 
briefly outline the course of a contested case.
When the defendant pleads "not guilty" to the offence or offences
charged, a jury is empanelled to try him. Counsel for the
s
prosecution then opens the case,
"by telling the jury the essential matters alleged 
against the defendant and how such facts would amount to 
the offence charged" (24).
The prosecution then call their witnesses and examine them in
chief. In a rape trial, the complainant is almost invariably the
first witness. The giving of evidence in chief is followed by
cross-examination for the defence, which is designed to
"(a)... elicit evidence favourable to the defence case, 
and (b) to discredit the testimony of the witness" (25).
It is usually just before or during cross-examination of the
iUO
complainant that an application is made by the defence under 
Section 2 of the 1976 Act, in the absence of the jury, to ask her 
questions relating to her previous sexual experience.
In a rape trial, the complainant's evidence is usually followed by 
that of a medical witness, regarding the complainant's condition 
after the alleged offence. Police witnesses then generally give 
evidence of the circumstances of the defendant's arrest, details of 
any interviews with him, as well as details of written statements 
alleged to have been made by him to the police.
There may be other witnesses whose evidence completes the case for 
the prosecution, and this is of course dependent on the individual 
circumstances of each trial. Statements of witnesses may also be 
read out; this occurs when the prosecution seek to adduce evidence 
which is not disputed by the defence.
At the end of the prosecution case, the defence may make an
application, in the absence of the jury, that the judge direct the
jury to acquit. It can be argued that
"a)...the prosecution have failed to produce any evidence 
to establish some essential ingredient of their offence, 
or
b).,.the evidence produced is so weak or so discredited 
by cross-examination that no reasonable jury could 
convict" (26).
If the application is successful, the defendant is acquitted at 
this stage. If it is not, or if there is no such application, the 
trial proceeds to the defence case. In a rape trial, the case for 
the defence tends to be relatively brief and hinges on the 
defendant, who can either decline to give evidence or he can give 
evidence on oath like any other witness (27). If he chooses the
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latter course, he is subject to cross-examination by the 
prosecution. There may be other defence witnesses, to establish, 
for example, an alibi for the defendant.
When all the evidence has been heard, prosecution and defence 
counsel in turn address the jury about their respective cases. 
Finally, the trial judge sums up the case and directs the jury 
about the relevant law. In a rape trial, his directions include 
some statement about the burden and standard of proof, the legal 
definition of rape and the main components of the offence. The 
judge also warns the jury against the danger of convicting on the 
uncorroborated evidence of the complainant, and tells them what 
evidence, if any, is capable of constituting corroboration in the 
particular trial. After the summing-up, the jury retire to consider 
their verdict and if it is one of "guilty", the court proceeds to 
sentence as in an uncontested trial.
In the course of the study, field notes were taken, as near 
verbatim as possible, of the evidence, legal submissions, judicial 
directions, verdict and sentencing for each trial. As the judge too 
takes a longhand note of the evidence, there was little difficulty 
in keeping up with this in court. All quotations from trials in 
this thesis are based on these notes, and they accurately represent 
what was actually said during the trials.
On occasions, several rape trials were being followed 
simultaneously and consequently certain parts of a number of cases 
were not attended. However, at least the following stages of each 
trial were observed;
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- indictment and plea;
- prosecution opening of the case;
- the complainant's evidence and cross-examination;
- applications under Section 2(2) of the 1976 Act;
- all other prosecution evidence in chief;
- the defendant's evidence and cross-examination;
- the judge's directions to the jury in summing up;
- verdict and sentencing.
For trials where the defendant pleaded "guilty", such a problem of 
coverage did not arise and it was possible on all occasions to take 
a full note of the whole procedure.
At the end of each trial, the information contained in the field 
notes was transferred onto the prepared schedules. The substance 
and outcome of applications made under Section 2(2) of the Act were 
summarized in these schedules, but they were also transcribed 
verbatim separately in order to facilitate analysis at a later 
stage.
After the data collection period, the task of classifying and 
coding the information contained in the schedules was undertaken. 
The development of an adequate coding systeo presented some 
difficulties, mainly because the material related partly to the 
trial, partly to the defendant(s), and partly to- the complainant. 
Hence, there was no clear unit of analysis upcn which all the 
classification could be based. The final cods for both, schedules 
consists of two somewhat overlapping iters, using the defennant and 
the complainant respectively as units of analysis. The codes for 
"guilty" and "not guilty" pleas are comparable, although the latter 
are of course considerably more detailed than the former.
When the data had been coded, frequency distributions were obtained 
for most of the items of information sought in the study. Answers
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to some of the questions were not coded, as the information 
obtained proved to be insufficient or unreliable. A number of 
cross—tabulations were also derived with a view to testing the 
hypotheses discussed earlier in this chapter.
Finally, all trials included in the study were followed up in the 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) where the author was granted 
access to the relevant records. There are a number of reasons why 
such follow-up was important. Firstly, decisions in the Court of 
Appeal can drastically alter the outcome of trials in that they may 
considerably vary the sentence or indeed quash the conviction. Such 
decisions must clearly be considered if one is to have a complete 
picture of the criminal process as it relates to the offence of 
rape. Secondly, in considering the application of the 1976 Act, it 
is essential to examine whether, and if so, to what extent, the 
Court of Appeal is willing to interfere with the discretion of 
trial judges in respect of Section 2(2). Thirdly, the examination 
of the files of the Court of Appeal provides a reliability check 
for parts of the data collected on the trials themselves: a 
comparison could be made between the transcripts contained in those 
files and the author's notes of the corresponding cases.
In addition to the data obtained with regard to the sample of rape 
trials included in the study, various source materials were used. 
Newspaper reports were collected both on the cases in the study and 
on rape, sexual offences and related topics in general. Criminal 
statistics were also extensively consulted. A thorough examination 
was made of reported as well as some unreported case law concerning 
rape offences both before and after the Sexual Offences (Amendment)
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Act 1976.
Sample characteristics
The main sample consists of fifty trials where the indictment 
against the defendant, or against one defendant at least, contained 
a count alleging a rape offence; where the defendant thus charged 
pleaded "not guilty" to the rape offence, as well as to any 
alternative counts of lesser offences. Additional material was also 
collected for thirty-one trials where a plea of "guilty" to a rape 
offence or to some lesser offence was entered, and where such a 
plea was accepted by the Crown.
For the purposes of this study, a rape offence is defined In
accordance with the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 as
"rape, attempted rape, aiding, abetting, counselling and 
procuring rape or attempted rape, and incitement to 
rape". (28).
In the majority of cases, a single defendant was charged in any one 
trial; a substantial number of trials, however, involved more than 
one defendant. The total sample includes 112 defendants, eighty of 
whom pleaded "not guilty". The distribution of rape cases involving 
one and several defendants between the groups of "'guilty"’ and "'nof 
guilty" pleas is given in Table 1. It is interesting to note that 
when several men were charged together, they almosf inv.arfatly 
pleaded "not guilty" to the charge:
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TABLE 1. Distribution of types of rape between "guilty" and "not 
guilty" pleas
TYPE OF RAPE "GUILTY" PLEA "NOT GUILTY" PLEA TOTAL
Single
Pair
Group
30 (97%) 
1 (3%)
34 (68%)
8 (16%)
8 (16%)*
64 (79%)
9 (11%) 
8 (10%)
Total 31 (100%) 50 (100%) 81 (100%)
[* Four trials with three defendants, two trials with four 
defendants; one trial each with five and six defendants.]
As far as the number of alleged victims is concerned, nearly all
defendants charged with rape offences on more than one woman
pleaded "guilty". In the majority of cases, however, defendants
were charged with the rape of one woman only:
TABLE 2. Number of complainants per trial for each defendant, 
"guilty" and "not guilty" pleas
NUMBER OF 
COMPLAINANTS
"GUILTY" PLEA "NOT GUILTY" 
PLEA..,
TOTAL
One
More than one
20 (65%) 
11 (35%)*
44 (88%)
6 (12%)**
64 (79%)
17 (21%)
Total 31 (100%) 50 (100%) 81 (100%)
[* Eight defendants were charged with rape offences against two 
women, one defendant, with offences against three women, and two 
defendants, with offences against four women.]
[** In all six cases, defendants were charged with rape offences 
against two women.]
Most of the defendants in the study were charged with the full 
offence of rape, but in two trials of the group of "not guilty 
pleas, one defendant was charged with a rape offence while his 
co-defendant(s) was (were) charged with indecent assault only:
11:
TABLE 3. Main offence charged, all defendants
MAIN OFFENCE 
Rape
Attempted rape
Aiding, abetting, 
counselling or 
procuring rape
Indecent assault 
Total
"GUILTY" PLEA "NOT GUILTT"
26 (81%) 
6 (19%)
PLEA 
65 (81%) 
6 (8%)
6 (8%) 
3 (4%)
TOTAI^
91 (81%) 
12 (11%)
32 (100%) 80 (101%) 112 (100%)
The majority of those pleading "guilty" were convicted ®£ tbe 
rape offence charged, while about a third were convicted c£ a 
lesser rape offence or of other offences including incecent 
assault, unlawful sexual intercourse and Incest, A retrial waa 
ordered for two defendants who pleaded "net guilty" aa tike jwry at 
the initial trial was unable to reach a verdict, Im amalygi#g t W  
data, the first trial of these defendants is exlnêeâ^ wlier® 
relevant, in order to avoid double-cccmtlng.
Forty-one defendants were convicted following a triiml.
They were convicted of the main offence chargedwitlfn t&g 
of seven offenders convicted of a lesser rape clfeaca tübsün 
or of indecent assault. The Court of Appeal (CrfjiTimiall 
subsequently quashed three of these C C ' n v i c t , Ftir tihe pùîrpœgia;® 
of testing the hypotheses of this study, hcwavcr^ camtSciticuT a.tdl 
acquittal are both defined with reference- te> t W  ttinjaiJ gdagie arndi 
independently of the octcote of any appeal.
Thirty seven defendants were acquitted of rape amd sdLlL
sexual o ffe n ces , Most o f Ite s e  were found mot g?miilltyv %v îüî¥ç jji.cryq
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but a fairly substantial number were acquitted either following a 
direction by the trial judge, or because at the start of the trial, 
the prosecution offered no evidence. In one trial, the judge 
directed the jury to acquit both defendants before the prosecution 
closed their case, but after the evidence of the complainants had 
been heard. In another case, the complainant attended court but 
refused to give evidence and the judge therefore directed the jury 
to acquit.
Seven defendants were acquitted because the prosecution offered no 
evidence in support of the charges against the defendants. In the 
trial of a rape offence, the evidence of the complainant is of 
paramount importance, and if she is not available, the case against 
the accused effectively breaks down. In three cases, one of which 
involved four defendants, the complainant could not be traced or 
was known to be unwilling to come forward and give evidence at the 
trial. In one case, the alleged victim was six years old and could 
not be called as a witness; that case folded following the judge’s 
ruling that certain statements allegedly made by the defendant to 
the police were not to be admitted as evidence at the trial. The 
outcome of trials where the defendant pleaded "not guilty" is 
summarized in Table 4:
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TABLE 4. Outcome of trial, "not guilty" pleas 
OUTCOME OF TRIAL NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS
Convicted as charged 34 (42%)
Convicted of lesser
offence 7* (9%)
Total convicted_______________  41________(51%)
Acquitted by jury 24** (30%)
Acquitted on j u d g e ’s
direction 5 (6%)
Acquitted because Crown
offered no evidence 8 (10%)
Total acquitted__________________________ 37_______ (46%)
Retrial ordered 2*** (3%)
TOTAL 80 ri0n%)
[* One of these defendants was initially charged with indecent 
assault.]
[** One defendant included here was charged with rape offences 
against two women. He was acquitted on one count by the jury, and 
on the other, on the judge’s direction.]
[*** The retrials resulted in a conviction for a lesser offence, 
and an acquittal because the Crown offered no evidence.]
Because of the number and length of trials for rape offences
conducted at the Central Criminal Court, it was not possible to
include in the sample all the trials that took place there during
the data collection period. The completed sample represents a
coverage of 85% of the total population of trials for rape offences
defined above. The selection of trials for inclusion in the study
was entirely random (Table 5) . The sample obtained, therefore,
offers an adeaua^e coverage of trials for rape offences at the
Central Criminal Court in 1978/79, and it is on that basis that t^e
data has been analvsed.
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TABLE 5. Sample selection
WHETHER
INCLUDED
Yes
No
"GUILTY" PLEA "NOT GUILTY"
31 (89%) 
4 (11%)
PLEA 
50 (83%) 
10 (17%)
TOTAL
81 (85%)
14 (15%)
Total: 35 (100%) 60 (100%) 95 (100%)
The findings of the study and the interpretation of those findings 
constitute the substance of the following chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR. EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS SEXUAL EXPERIENCE
No systematic study has been made of the type and range of evidence 
introduced in rape trials before the Sexual Offences (Amendment)
Act 1976 with regard to the complainant's previous sexual 
experience. The Advisory Group on the Law of Rape received evidence 
that cross-examination relating to such experience, often extremely 
painful and distressing for the woman, was widespread. The Group 
made a firm recommendation against the routine introduction of such 
evidence and, as we have seen above, a modified version of that 
recommendation was included in the new Act.
The present chapter is concerned with the effect on rape trials of 
legislative change in this respect. It seeks to assess, in 
particular, the extent to which the assumptions reflected in 
earlier case law have been incorporated into the operation of the 
new Act. Before discussing the application of Section 2, however, 
the development of relevant case law since the early 19th century 
will be considered. Cases referring to the complainant's prior 
relationship with the accused will be dealt with at a later stage.
The development of case law
A reading of the case law indicates that evidence of the 
complainant's prior sexual experience tended to fall into two major 
categories, namely that she was of notoriously immoral character, 
or that she had previously had sexual experience with persons other 
than the defendant.
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General evidence of "notorious bad character", usually a euphemism 
for an allegation of prostitution, was introduced to suggest that 
because of her sexual reputation, the woman in question was likely 
to have consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant. The 
relevance of this kind of evidence to the issue in the trial has 
been firmly entrenched in common law since R v Clarke (1817) where 
the defence called evidence of the complainant's "abandoned 
character" and "lack of chastity". This case also established the 
principle that such evidence could only be adduced in general 
terms:
"In the Case of an indictment for rape, evidence that the 
woman had a bad character previous to the supposed 
commission of the offence is admissible; but the 
defendant cannot go into evidence of particular facts."
(1)
The principle that a woman's sexual reputation or character is
relevant to establishing consent has since been reaffirmed in a
number of cases. In R v Barker (1829), the complainant was asked
whether she had been
"...walking in the High Stret, in Oxford, to look out for 
men" (2);
in R V Tissington (1843), the alleged victim (who, incidentally,
was a child under 12) was cross-examined as to
"facts of indecency ... and of solicitation by her 
previously made to men to have connection with her" (3);
and evidence was admitted in R v Clay (1851) that the complainant
had been seen some twenty years before the offence,
"on the streets of Shrewsbury as a reputed prostitute"
(4).
The above cases have been followed in this century (5), and the 
position until 1976 was as sumarized in the report of R v
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G r e a t b a n k s  (1959):
"In a case other than rape, such evidence would clearly 
not be admissible. In rape cases, however, special rules 
applied. It was certain that evidence of intercourse with 
named men could not be admissible in a rape case, but 
evidence that the woman was a prostitute or, as in this 
case, that she was a woman of loose character and 
notorious for want of chastity or decency was, on the 
authorities, admissible". (6)
The second type of evidence relating to sexual experience involves
what has been termed the woman’s "private sexual history",
excluding allegations of prostitution and the like (7).
The earliest authority on this matter is interesting insofar as it
diverges from subsequent case law. In R v Hodgson (1812), the
defence proposed to ask the complainant whether she had had sexual
intercourse with persons other than the accused and, in particular,
with a man named during the trial. The prosecution’s objection to
this line of questioning was successful:
’... the witness was not bound to answer these questions 
as they tended to incriminate and disgrace herself... he 
(the judge) thought there was not any exception in the 
case of rape". (8)
The prosecution also objected to the defence proposal of calling a
witness to prove the above allegations against the complainant, on
the grounds that the particular facts in question were not
connected with the rape charge. The judge allowed the objection.
On the face of it, R v Hodgson appears to have established that a 
woman’s private sexual history in this sense was not relevant to 
her consent or credibility in a rape trial. However, the case is 
hardly mentioned in later authorities except as a
"rule which may be doubted in the present day". (9)
The decision seems to have been overturned in R v Robins (1843)
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where it was held not only that the complainant could be 
cross-examined as to particular acts of sexual intercourse with 
third parties, but also that witnesses could be called to 
contradict her evidence. The judge justified this course of action 
as follows:
"It is not immaterial to the question whether the 
prosecutrix has had this connection against her consent, 
to shew that she has permitted other men to have 
connection with her, which on cross-examination she has 
denied". (10)
Later case law shows that a compromise between the decisions in
Hodgson and Robins was eventually settled on. It was established
in R V Cockroft (1870) and reaffirmed in R v Holmes and Furness
(1871) (11) that the complainant could indeed be cross-examined as
to her private sexual history. However, such evidence
"cannot be regarded as relevant to the issue, but only as 
going to the credit of the witness. The witness' answer 
is therefore binding". (12)
This is an important decision which draws a clear distinction, at
least in law, between evidence as to "notorious bad character" and
to private sexual history. Evidence to show that the complainant
was, for example, a prostitute, had been admitted in rape trials
because it was felt to affect the issue in the trial:
"... such evidence is relevant to the issue of consent, 
as showing a person more likely to consent to sexual 
intercourse". (13)
The introduction of evidence relating to a woman's private sexual
history, however, was not justified in terms of its relevance to
consent:
"The reason sometimes advanced for pursuing this line of 
questioning has been that it casts doubt on the 
credibility of the woman, i.e. that the fact that she has 
had prior sexual experience, it is said, tends to prove 
that she is an untruthful or unreliable witness". (14)
Different rules of evidence apply to cross-examination to the issue
123
(i.e. consent, in this instance) and to credit. The former is
designed to elicit statements concerning the facts relevant to the
issue which may be defined as
"the point or matter issuing out of the allegations and 
pleas of the plaintiff and the defendant in a cause, 
whereupon the parties join and put their cause upon 
trial". (15)
Cross-examination to credit, on the other hand, consists in asking 
questions of a witness designed to test his/her credibility and may 
involve a general attack on his/her character and reputation. In a 
rape case, the complainant's answer to a question in 
cross-examination to the issue may be contradicted by further 
evidence, while her answers in cross-examination to credit are 
final and cannot be rebutted by other witnesses. (16)
The law of evidence in this respect suggests that there is a clear 
distinction between cross-examination to the issue and to credit.
In practice, however, that distinction in rape trials is an 
extremely nebulous one in a number of respects.
It is not always immediately apparent whether a particular piece of 
evidence comes under the heading of "notorious bad character" or of 
private sexual history. Expressions such as "lack of chastity", 
"immorality" and "promiscuity", for example, are used in this 
context whether it is the complainant's lack of consent or general 
reputation that is being questioned. It becomes difficult to define 
what constitutes evidence going to the issue and to credit 
respectively. Smith has argued that contemporary attitudes towards 
sexual behaviour are no longer in line with the assumptions 
underlying 19th century case law;
"It is thought that few would wish to defend the
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admissibility of evidence of sexual immorality on the 
ground of its relevance to credibility". (17)
While theoretically, this view may be correct, court procedure
suggests that the distinction in practice between relevance to
credit and relevance to consent is, at best, blurred and unclear.
The case law biefly reviewed above indicates that between 1812 and
1976, the complainant in a rape trial was frequently exposed to a
whole barrage of questions totally unrelated to the charge which
aimed to discredit her evidence by suggesting, more or less
explicitly, that she was the type of woman who tends to consent
freely. If, for example, it was alleged that the complainant had
some prior sexual experience, she may ostensibly have been
cross-examined to credit but evidence thus introduced was bound to
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affect the jury's view of her likelihood to consent:
"Here the difficulty is extreme for the jury might be 
excused if they thought that the prosecutrix’s 
promiscuity had substantially more bearing on whether she 
consented than on whether she was a liar". (18)
This clearly suggests that there is assumed to be a strong link
between a woman's sexual experience and her consent to sexual
intercourse on the occasion in question. Her credibility as a rape
victim, i.e. as a woman who did not consent, is seen as dependent
on prior sexual conduct on her part with persons other than the
defendant. The rationale underlying the relevance of such evidence,
whether it is presented in terms of general bad reputation or
private sexual history, is based on the assumption that any degree
of sexual experience in a woman is indicative of an overall
willingness to consent. In other words, it is considered more
probable that an "unchaste" woman would assent than a "virtuous"
one. At one extreme, prostitution provides a good example of this
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view. The very fact that a woman is a prostitute tends to destroy
her credibility as a rape victim, and this is given some
acknowledgment in law insofar as even contemporary judges warn
juries, occasionally in somewhat ambiguous terms, not to dismiss
such cases out of hand:
"When one ... is considering thoughts about morality and 
immorality and permissive societies and all the rest of 
it, it is no excuse, even if that woman was a common 
prostitute, if she did not consent to intercourse and a 
man had intercourse with her against her will. Even with 
that sort of a woman, that is rape just the same". (Case 
18)
The Heilbron Group’s approach constitutes a radical challenge to
the above assumptions. The Group argued that whatever a woman’s
sexual experience with partners of her choice, it cannot logically
be construed as a general willingness to consent to sexual
intercourse, or indeed as an indication of untruthfulness on her
part. It was therefore recommended that:
"in general, the previous sexual history of the 
complainant with other men (including general evidence of 
bad reputation) ought not to be introduced". (19)
It was felt that such evidence should only be admissible with the
leave of the trial judge: in exercising his discretion, the judge
ought to take into account among other matters whether the
relevance of the evidence to the issue in the trial is such that it
would be unfair to the defendant to exclude it.
Parliament did not follow the Group’s recommendations with regard 
to laying down guiding principles for judges in exercising their 
discretion. According to Section 2 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976, an application must be made to the judge in 
the absence of the jury, to adduce evidence or to cross-examine the 
complainant about her sexual experience with any person other than
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the defendant. With regard to the use of discretion, legislation 
was set out in very general terms:
"... on such application, the judge shall give leave if 
and only if he is satisfied that it would be unfair to 
that defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be 
adduced or the question to be asked." (20)
The Act therefore overruled the precedents established in the 19th
century with regard to evidence of prior sexual experience, but
left a good deal to the trial judge's discretion. We must therefore
consider court procedure itself in order to assess what effect, if
any, legislative change has had on the trial of rape offences. The
following sections will describe current practice with regard to
applications under Section 2 of the Act on the basis of the sample
used in this study.
Applications under Section 2.
Applications for leave to introduce evidence relating to the 
complainant's previous sexual experience were made in eighteen of 
the forty-five contested trials in the sample, on behalf of a total 
of twenty-nine defendants (21).
Such applications were most common in trials where two or more 
defendants were charged jointly, as Table 1. illustrates. The 
reason for this may be that it becomes imperative to attack the 
complainant's sexual morality when she is alleged to have consented 
to intercourse with several men. In these cases, applications were 
not always made on behalf of all defendants, but the halo effect of 
the introduction of evidence to discredit the complainant must be 
noted here. When a judge gives leave for cross-examination as to 
prior sexual experience to one defendant, his co-defendant(s) in
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trial will also gain advantage from the fact that the jury is led
to take a particular view of the complainant’s character. As one
judge remarked in the trial of two defendants,
Judge; One can't help observing that if I allow one, the 
other will benefit. (Case 66)
TABLE 1. Applications under Section 2 and number of defendants 
tried together
NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS 
TRIED TOGETHER
MADE AN MADE NO TOTAL
APPLICATION APPLICATION
Defendant tried alone 7 (23%) 23 (76%) 30 (100%)
Defendant tried with one 22 (56%) 
or more co-defendants
17 (43%) 39 (100%)
TOTAL
(22)
29 (42%) 40 (58%) 69 (100%)
The link between frequency of applications and issue in the trial 
deserves some mention here. In all criminal trials, the burden of 
proof rests with the prosecution and in a rape case, this amounts 
to establishing a number of matters, one or more of which may be at 
issue. These matters include the identity of the defendant, the 
occurrence of sexual intercourse between the defendant and the 
complainant, the complainant's lack of consent, and the defendant's 
intent, i.e. knowledge of or recklessness as to her lack of 
consent. Predictably, the overwhelming majority (83%) of 
applications were made on behalf of defendants whose case involved 
the question of consent. For the remainder, the issue was the 
occurrence of sexual intercourse;
TABLE 2. Applications under Section 2 and main issue at the trial
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MAIN ISSUE 
AT THE 
TRIAL
DEFENDANT MADE DEFENDANT MADE TOTAL
APPLICATION NO APPLICATION
Identity
Occurrence of sexual 5 (20%) 
intercourse
Consent or belief in 24 (57%) 
consent
3 (100%) 
19 (79%)
18 (42%)
3 (100%) 
24 (100%)
42 (100%)
TOTAL
(22)
29 (42%) 40 (48%) 69 (100%)
Another related point is that applications for leave to introduce 
such evidence, although not universal, are certainly a good deal 
less exceptional than the Heilbron Group or Parliament intended. In 
the present sample, nearly 60% of those defendants whose case was 
based on consent made such applications. Furthermore, 75% of all 
applications were wholly or partly successful, insofar as leave was 
given by the judge to cross-examine the complainant on some aspect 
of her sexual experience.
Applications under Section 2 were based on a variety of grounds, 
although the difference between the substance and grounds of 
applications was not always clear. In some cases, application to 
cross-examine was made without any attempt to argue the relevance 
of the proposed questions to the case. Judges generally intervened 
and required an explicit statement of the purpose of such 
questions, but occasionally, leave to cross-examine was granted 
despite an open acknowledgment that the matters in question were 
not relevant to the issue in the case. An example is as follows;
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Defence counsel: I want to cross-examine the complainant 
on her previous sexual experience. In her statement to 
the police, there is a sentence which reads: "I am not 
inexperienced in matters sexual". That is all I seek to 
put to her.
Judge; I suppose that has not much to do with this case;
I don’t think it’s right to stop the question. (Case 49)
Generally, however, applications are a great deal more detailed and
appear to fall into three broad categories. Evidence of the
complainant’s prior sexual history may be argued to be relevant to
her credibility; to issues in the trial excluding consent; and to
the issue of consent.
Applications for leave to cross-examine alleged victims with regard 
to their sexual experience on the grounds of relevance to credit 
were made in six trials in the present study. Two of these arose
out of an inconsistency between the complainant’s evidence at the
trial and her earlier statement to the police, and the remainder 
were based on previous rape complaints made by the alleged victim.
An example of the first type of application in this category is a 
case where the complainant’s written statement to the police 
included a reference to the last occasion she had sexual 
intercourse before the alleged offence. In her evidence in chief at 
the trial, however, she volunteered the information that she had 
had no sexual experience before the rape incident. There was 
medical evidence to support the substance of her statement to the 
police, and the defence application was directly based on the
question of her overall credibility as a witness;
Defence counsel; If she is lying about her prior sexual
experience, what else is she lying about? (Case 69)
Cross-examination on this issue was allowed, and it must be pointed 
out that an application was only made under Section 2 as a matter
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of formality, because of the sexual nature of the inconsistency 
involved in the witness' evidence, A major contradiction such as 
this between a witness' evidence and his/her written statement to 
the police, irrespective of its substance, normally leads to 
cross-examination aimed at discrediting that evidence.
In four trials of the present study, the defence sought to 
cross-examine the complainant about previous complaints of rape she 
was alleged to have made. The proposed cross-examination was 
intended to go to credit in the sense that the defence were 
prepared to be bound by the complainant's answers.
Inquiry into prior complaints of rape is based on one of the most 
persistent themes in the history of the offence, namely the fear of 
the false accusation. The fear may be that the woman in question 
has a tendency to invent incidents of rape which have no basis in 
reality or, alternatively, that she has consensual intercourse 
which she subsequently labels as rape out of malice, embarrassment, 
spite, jealousy or some such motivation. It is interesting that 
applications to cross-examine on the former grounds sometimes rely 
directly on psychoanalytical theory which gave the fear of the 
false accusation some pseudo-scientific basis in the early 20th 
century;
Judge; (Referring to an earlier rape complaint by the 
alleged victim) What evidence is there that that was a 
false allegation?
Defence counsel; None. But very often, there are people 
who allege rape for some psychological reason. It may be 
some sexual fantasy. There is a certain kind of woman who 
alleges rape, a certain type... There is a type of woman 
who'll make hysterical, untrue allegations of rape. (Case 
56)
In view of the deep suspicion with which the law has always treated
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alleged victims of rape, it is not surprising that a woman who has
made more than one such complaint is subject to extreme scrutiny.
It is often thought that several sexual assaults in the life of one
woman are so improbable as to be practically impossible and
consequently, that all such allegations stand or fall together:
Judge: You want to tell the jury that three rapes in one 
year are so unlikely that she is not credible in this 
instance ...
Defence counsel: I want to tell the jury that they should 
either believe all or none of her allegations. (Case 31)
It follows from this that applications of this type were always
based on the implicit assumption that prior complaints of rape
amounted to false allegations. As one judge pertinently pointed out
to defence counsel,
Judge: If she had reported it to the police, and there 
had been a trial and a conviction, you would not be 
asking to cross-examine on that". (Case 56)
Evidence ^f previous rape complaints was excluded in two cases
largely because the trial judges involved were not willing to
endorse the defence assumption that the earlier complaint was a
false or unfounded one:
Judge; It could only be relevant to show the 
complainant's tendency to make up a story. There is no 
evidence that that story was made up... There is nothing 
in her statement to give grounds for the defence to 
suggest that it was untrue. (Case 56)
In two other cases, however, leave was given to introduce evidence
of previous complaints. In both cases, the woman was alleged to
have made more than one such complaint, and the judge took the view
that this was relevant;
Judge; The issue is that of previous similar complaints - 
it would be unfair not to allow it. (Case 35)
The latter decision seems to follow the guidelines suggested in the
Heilbron Report, namely that evidence of prior sexual experience
should be admitted if it
132
"relates to behaviour on the part of the complainant 
which was strikingly similar to her behaviour on the 
occasion of, or in relation to events immediately 
preceding or following the alleged offence". (23)
Nevertheless, one should note that the divergence between judges
illustrated here indicates that interpretations of the meaning of
Section 2 vary considerably. We shall return to this point later in
the chapter.
A few applications for leave to cross-examine on sexual experience
were made on the grounds of relevance to the issue of whether
sexual intercourse had occurred between the defendant(s) and the
complainant at the material time. These arose when the medical
and/or forensic evidence introduced by the prosecution suggested
that the complainant had had sexual intercourse at the relevant
time, but the defence argued that such intercourse had not been
with the defendant(s). An application would then be made to
cross-examine the complainant about her sexual experience in order
to offer an alternative interpretation of the scientific evidence,
i.e. to suggest thatfshe had sexual intercourse with someone other
than the defendant on the day in question. Such applications were
successful in all cases, but judges always stressed that the
introduction of evidence arose on a limited point only.
Occasionally, defence counsel tried to pursue matters further to
attempt to cast doubt on the complainant’s sexual reputation. In
one case, for example, the judge had given leave for a question to
be asked of the complainant about the last occasion when she had
intercourse before the alleged rape. The application went on;
Defence counsel; I would like to go further, and do a bit 
of probing in the normal way.
Judge; No. What do you mean, probing?
Defence counsel; Asking how often she was having sexual 
intercourse at the time, with whom... (Case 56)
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Such a line of cross-examination was not permitted in any of the
above cases, but it must be noted that the relevant applications
were only made in two trials in the present study. A Court of
Appeal judgment seems to endorse that judges are justified in
prohibiting cross-examination without adequate instructions:
"...any further questions beyond those which he (defence 
counsel) was expressly allowed to ask would necessarily 
have been a roving commission or a fishing expedition, 
call it what one likes. The learned Judge endeavoured to 
allow just so much questioning of the girl as would 
enable the defendants' point to be developed, without the 
further difficulty and distress which would be caused to 
her by the roving commission or fishing expedition. It 
may be that other judges might not have come to the same 
conclusion as did the learned Judge, but that is not the 
point... This was a proper exercise of his discretion and 
accordingly it cannot be faulted." (24)
The vast majority of applications were argued on the grounds of
their relevance to the issue of consent, and this is the criticial
area in terms of assessing whether the new Act has brought about
any fundamental change in the trial of rape offences. The findings
of the present study suggest that the principles established in
19th century case law are to a large extent being reflected in the
implementation of the new Act. The basic assumption that a
complainant's prior sexual experience is relevant in establishing
consent has not been substantially altered by a procedural change
in the law. Applications for leave to introduce such evidence on
the grounds of its relevance for consent are not infrequent, and
furthermore, they tend to be successful. They will now be
considered in some detail.
One measure of the importance of a "good reputation" for an alleged 
rape victim is the extent to which her prior virginity is used to 
strengthen the prosecution case. Women with no previous sexual
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experience tend to be presented as highly trustworthy with regard 
to their complaint of rape. The prosecution inevitably introduce 
this in opening the case; later, the complainant is asked about it; 
and finally, the doctor is questioned in some detail about the 
results of his genital examination of the alleged victim. In other 
words, wherever possible, a complainant's prior virginity is firmly 
underlined for the jury, and, as we shall see below, this appears 
to contribute strongly to her credibility as a rape victim.
A further indication of the importance of virginity is the way in
which the defence sometimes disputes the prosecution's allegation
that the complainant had had no sexual experience. In such cases,
the issue takes on tremendous proportions and a good deal of time
and effort is devoted by both sides in trying to make their version
of the truth prevail or, as far as the defence is concerned, to sow
some doubt at least in the minds of the jury. In one case, for
example, the doctor's cross-examination went as follows:
Defence counsel: About the condition of the hymen, what 
does your examination mean?
Doctor : There was a single split in it, which had no 
connection with this incident.
Defence counsel: Can your examination show that she had 
not had sexual intercourse before that occasion?
Doctor: Yes, there would be more damage to the hymen.
Defence counsel: Once a woman has become used to sexual 
intercourse, you can't really tell?
Doctor : I would not say that this young lady was 
accustomed to frequent sexual intercourse. I would say 
her hymen was consistent with her being a virgin.
Defence counsel: If I suggest that the lady had sexual 
intercourse more than ten times about six months before 
this incident, is that consistent with your findings?
Doctor: I suppose it is possible. But I would have 
expected something different in the hymen if that had 
been the case. (Case 25)
In three trials of the present study, the complainants, aged
between 14 and 17, had not been virgins prior to the alleged rape
incidents, and in all cases, this became the substance of an
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application under Section 2 of the Act. It was argued that the jury
should not deliberate on the assumption that the complainant had
been a virgin:
Defence counsel: The defence is consent, and this is 
relevant to establish consent: the fact that this was not 
the complainant's first experience of sexual intercourse.
If it were, it would be heavily against the defendant.
The matter ought to be before the jury, or, in view of 
her age, they may draw inaccurate conclusions about her 
virginity. (Case 66)
Apnlications to introduce evidence of sexual experience were not
limited to cases involving the issue of virginity in young
complainants. They were often made, and seemed to be based on the
idea that the credibility of the complaint was to a large degree
dependent on any sexual experience, in general terms, that the
alleged victim may have had. For example:
Defence counsel: The defence is effectively that she 
invited (the two defendants) in a threesome on the bed.
That kind of suggestion has to be balanced against the 
fact that she has had sexual experience and against the 
degree or extent of that experience. (Case 67)
Defence counsel; The girl, although a virgin, was not 
sexually inexperienced. She made suggestions to the 
defendant which are entirely incompatible with her
account of struggles... The suggestion is that she had
done that with her boyfriend regularly. (Case 55)
Applications were occasionally made to cross-examine a complainant
in a specific area or aspect of her previous sexual experience. In
such cases, the defence aim to show not merely that the complainant
had some sexual experience, but that her experience was with
persons bearing some similarity to the defendant. In one case, for
example, two men in their forties were charged with the rape of a
teenager. The defence made an application to cross-examine her
about her previous sexual experience in the following terms:
Defence counsel: The complainant was living with a man 
much older than herself. There was also another (older) 
man sharing their squat. I want to ask her about that.
(Case 71)
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The implicit suggestion here was that because the complainant was 
cohabiting with an older man, she was more likely to consent to 
intercourse with others in that age group, including presumably the 
defendants.
Elsewhere this line of reasoning was used with regard to the
question of race. In this case, the complainant was white, her
assailants black, and the defence made the following application;
Defence counsel: I want to show that the complainant was 
not averse to having sexual intercourse with coloured 
men. The jury should have no presumption of lack of 
consent because of the colour of the people involved 
here. Her sexual experience was almost entirely with 
coloured men. (Case 52)
Before considering the extent to which judges were persuaded by
such arguments to allow evidence of previous sexual experience to
be introduced, it is important to point to another area where 19th
century assumptions survive to influence, and indeed to form the
basis of applications under Section 2. This is where the
defendant's state of mind is concerned. (25) The idea here seems to
be that the defendant's view or knowledge of the extent or type of
previous sexual experience the complainant may have had is relevant
in determining his intent at the time of the alleged offence. The
assumption is that his knowledge, whether based on the truth or
not, of her sexual proclivities in some way mitigates his
intentions. In other words, if he thought that because of her
sexual past the woman in question was "fair game" that ought to be
taken into account by the jury when they consider his guilt. For
example:
Defence counsel: Shortly before this incident, the 
complainant's boyfriend (who was an acquaintance of the 
defendants') ...invited the defendants to have sexual 
intercourse with her. He said that the girl was easy and
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would sleep with anyone who came along. The defendants’ 
belief in her consent is the issue here. Even though it 
was a first meeting, they had heard that she was sexually 
easy and that goes to their state of mind. (Case 71)
All applications of this type were successful. The underlying
assumption seems to be that although the complainant may not have
consented to sexual intercourse, the defendants were justified in
coming to the conclusion that she did in fact consent on the basis
of their knowledge, however mistaken, of her sexual experience.
This is a further illustration of the principle that a woman's
sexual experience, even if it only occurred in the imagination of
the defendant, is considered to be relevant in deciding whether or
not a rape has occurred.
Judicial decisions
Decisions with regard to applications under Section 2 of the Act 
must be seen not only against the background of legislation itself, 
but also of relevant case law which has been published since. As 
the Act simply gave judges a broad discretion, principles which 
have evolved for the exercise of that discretion are extremely 
important and will be considered here first.
At the time of the present study, two cases had been reported with 
regard to Section 2 of the Act.(26) One of these concerns a 
somewhat marginal issue, namely the admissibility of evidence 
regarding alleged conversations between the complainant and the 
defendant about the complainant's sexual experience. In the case in 
question (27), these conversations were relevant to the direct 
issue, namely the events immediately preceding the alleged offence. 
Nevertheless, they were clearly covered by Section 2(1) of the Act
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and their admissibility in evidence was therefore subject to an 
application. Leave was given for the questions to be asked in that 
case, but only as far as conversations were concerned and not with 
regard to the complainant's actual sexual experience. This is a 
further indication that the alleged victim need not have any sexual 
exerience for this to be deemed relevant to consent, and the 
defendant's belief in this respect is sufficient to warrant the 
admission of such evidence.
The main case on the matter, however, is that of R v Lawrence and
Another (1977) and this was referred to on a number of occasions
during the trials included in this study. The trial judge in that
case ruled as follows;
"The important part of the statute which I think needs 
construction are the words "if and only if he (the judge)
is satisfied that it would be unfair to that defendant to
refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced or the 
question to be asked". And, in my judgment, before a 
judge is satisfied or may be said to be satisfied that to 
refuse to allow a particular question or a series of 
questions in cross-examination would be unfair to a
defendant he must take the view that it is more likely
than not that the particular question or line of 
cross-examination, if allowed, might reasonably lead the 
jury, properly directed in the summing up, to take a 
different view of the complainant's evidence from that 
which they might take if the question or series of 
questions was or were not allowed." (28)
The first published interpretation of Section 2 seems to diverge
from the spirit of the Heilbron recommendation that relevance to
the issue should be the main criterion for the admissibility of
evidence of this kind. Instead, R.v Lawrence reflects the old
common law principle that cross-examination should be allowed
insofar as it affects the complainant's credibility or
trustworthiness. A further point in this context is that R v
Lawrence appears to make a somewhat spurious distinction between
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evidence intended to attack the complainant’s sexual character and 
evidence "going to credit properly";
the learned judge ruled that cross-examination 
designed to form a basis for the unspoken comment "well, 
there you are, members of the jury, that is the sort of 
girl she is" was not permissible; distinguishing between 
cross-examination designed to blacken the complainant’s 
sexual character so as to leave such comment and 
cross-examination as to the trustworthiness of her 
evidence, the learned judge ruled that only the latter 
going to credit properly was permissible". (29)
The decision in R v Lawrence has certainly been used as an argument
to support the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual experience
in the trials of this study, and it can be seen as an endorsement
of some of the pre-1976 ideas and positions. Indeed, it is probable
that any sexual experience in a complainant which is capable of
being construed as "inappropriate" will lead the jury to take a
different view of her evidence. As the Heilbron Report commented,
in a slightly different context;
"They (the jury) may also react critically to any 
admissions she may make on the assumption that any sexual 
experience, however unrelated to the charge, shows her to 
be a person more likely to consent to sexual intercourse, 
even with a stranger". (30)
Having considered published case law, let us now turn to a
discussion of judges’ interpretations of Section 2 in the trials of
the present study. We must note here the novelty of the Act for a
number of judges; although High Court judges generally seemed to
have some experience in dealing with applications under Section 2,
this was not the case for the majority of circuit judges sitting at
the Central Criminal Court. This, coupled with the scarcity of
reported cases on the issue, probably accounts for one of the most
striking findings of this study, namely the wide variation among
judges in handling such applications.
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One judge, for example, on his first encounter with Section 2,
decided to clear the court and hear the application in camera. In
summing up, he explained this to the jury as follows;
Judge; I took that course for this reason; I do not know 
whether it could happen in this case or not, but 
sometimes in cases the members of the jury have relatives 
or friends who come to court with them, for perfectly 
proper reasons, natural interest in what is going on, and 
they sit in the public gallery. If they heard what went 
on in the absence of the jury, they might hear something 
which the judge has decided the jury should not be told.
There is another reason as well, quite apart from that 
reason. If the judge decides that the complainant should 
not be asked about her previous sexual experience but it 
comes out during the hearing in the jury’s absence, then 
it is a little unfair, do you not think, that members of 
the public who might know this complainant - a neighbour, 
maybe, who knows about the case and has come along to 
hear it - should hear all about the complainant’s past if 
it has been private up until that moment. (Case 52)
This is perhaps a fairly minor area in terms of differences among
judges, although one might argue that the above is a sensitive and
commendable course of action which ought to be adopted by all
judges in trying rape cases. However, the wide variation
encountered in this study among individual judges is potentially
far more significant in three further, although related areas, as
follows. First, in their commitment to the Act; second, in the
extent to which the Act is enforced; and third, in respect of
decisions on applications under Section 2.
Apart from the extent of judges’ own experience in dealing with
this particular Section, one factor which may well affect their
decisions on the relevant applications is their expressed
commitment to the Act. Opinions voiced on the subject in court
ranged from strong approval to equally strong disapproval, as these
extracts illustrate;
Judge; Before the 1976 Act, this was common practice and 
difficult for a judge to stop. It worked unfairly on the
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woman: the woman has the right to choose with whom she 
has sexual intercourse. It does not show that she 
consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant. The 
Act intended to stop this illogical unfairness. (Case 3)
Judge: It is not up to me to comment on Parliament, but 
most of them have no practical experience of how one 
arrives at the truth in criminal trials... I think it 
might be unfair, perhaps even more so in an older woman, 
to prevent cross-examination on sexual proclivities, but 
that is what Parliament wants... This wretched Section 
overturns many of our habits in criminal trials. (Case 
66)
Opinions of this kind must clearly influence how a particular judge 
chooses to exercise his discretion, and we shall see below the 
extent to which judges in fact vary in their decisions on whether 
or not to admit evidence of previous sexual experience.
In addition to differences between judges in their commitment to 
the spirit of the Act, the variability between them is also evident 
with regard to areas where the law, on occasions, is not being 
applied.
Two judges in the present sample systematically questioned the 
complainant about her previous sexual experience without an 
application from the defence, and without any intervention from the 
prosecution. One such case, not included in this study, was 
considered by the Court of Appeal, where the following observations 
were made:
"The Judge admitted that he had made a mistake as the 
argument proceeded. I think I should emphasize that a 
familiar problem facing the judiciary is that Judges who 
are immensely experienced in one branch of the law find 
themselves, apart from their duty, from time to time 
presiding in other cases, in which their experience may 
be minimal. That evidently was the situation in this 
case". (31)
While this may understandably occur in some cases, particularly 
with a new Act of Parliament, there seems to be no justification
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for a judge to introduce evidence of previous sexual experience in 
this way when he is aware of the terms of legislation. In the 
present study, one judge who mmade extensive reference to the Act 
in his summing up explained to the jury that in his opinion, they 
ought to have information about the complainant's sexual 
experience. During the trial, after a few questions in 
cross-examination, he had intervened as follows:
Judge: How old were you at the time of this incident?
Complainant : I was sixteen and a half.
Judge: Had you had sex with anyone before this?
Complainant: Yes.
Judge: With one boy, or more than one boy?
Complainant : More than one.
Judge: At the time, were you going steady with one boy?
Complainant: Yes.
Judge: So whatever may have been your reputation, were -
you going steady and was all that finished with? (Case
20)
On the basis of the present study, it is not possible to estimate 
the frequency of this type of judicial intervention in rape trials. 
This is nevertheless a disturbing finding insofar as it shows that 
some judges are deliberately flouting the intention of Parliament 
as embodied in the Act. As R v Rahimipour (1979) clearly states, it 
is not part of judges' discretion in this area to give themselves 
leave, as it were, to cross-examine the complainant and such 
questioning amounts to a misuse of judicial power. (32)
A second problem area concerns cases where the defence ask 
questions of the complainant without making an application to the 
iudge and where such questions relate to some aspect of the 
complainant's sexual experience. The following are some examples:
Defence counsel: Were you working as a prostitute at the
time? (Case 5)
Defence counsel: Had you been living with your boyfriend?
(Case 14)
Defence counsel: Had you been to bed with B. before?
(Referring to a man named during the trial, other than
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the defendant) (Case 78)
Differences among judges are further underlined by the extent to 
which various judges intervened in improper cross-examination of 
this kind. In some cases, the judge sent the jury out as soon as 
the offending question had been asked and tackled defence counsel 
about it, in fairly strong terms;
Defence counsel; I apologize...
Judge; That is not enough. You know about that Section.
Defence counsel: I'll not suggest that she had any sexual 
experience. I was seeking to find out where she was 
living. I didn't realise the implication of what I was 
saying.
Judge: That's outrageous. This was incredibly negligent.
(Case 14)
In other cases, however» neither the judge nor the prosecution
intervened in any way and the defence were free to ask a whole
series of questions which, on the face of it, appear to be
expressly prohibited by the new Act. In one instance, the
complainant was questioned by the defence about her prostitution in
the following way:
Defence counsel: Would you say yours was a risky 
business? Say in the Piccadilly area, around midnight? It 
would be a risky business, finding yourself with a 
strange man in a room? And if a man looks like an Arab, 
rich and lives in a hotel, that would be OK? In your 
profession, stealing is very common, isn't it? You are 
well trained to do that? Isn't that why you had a knife, 
to help you steal? (Case 12)
Such questioning occurred relatively frequently in trials of the
present study, and must also cause some concern with regard to the
effectiveness of the law in this area.
As mentioned above, seventy-five percent of applications under 
Section 2 in this study were wholly or partly successful; some 
evidence of the complainant's prior sexual experience was 
introduced in such trials. In this area, the variation among judges
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is particularly noteworthy. We have seen above, for example, that 
different rulings were made in various trials with regard to the 
admissibility of evidence concerning previous allegations of rape 
by the complainant. In this context, it is interesting to consider 
two factually similar cases where trial judges differed in their 
ruling with regard to applications under Section 2.
In both cases, the complainant was about 14 years old and according
to her statement to the police, had had a very limited degree of
sexual experience before the alleged rape. The defence in both
cases sought to cross-examine about this, on the grounds that it
would be unfair to the defendants if the jury assumed the
complainant's virginity:
Defence counsel: This was not the first sexual experience 
of this girl. In view of the fact that the defence is 
consent, it is perhaps important to 'establish that this 
was not the first time. (Case 66)
The contrast between the two judges' decisions here illustrates
widespread differences in the interpretation and application of the
Act:
Judge: The test in the judge's discretion is unfairness 
to the defendant... My ruling is that it would not be 
unfair to the defendants if such questions are 
excluded... A sensible summing-up will dissuade the jury 
from indulging in guesswork. (Case 3)
Judge : I am very troubled by this. It goes against the 
grain to deny the defence latitude and to give it to the 
complainant. I'll take a bold course and allow the one 
question to be asked. (Case 66)
Without clear guidelines regarding the exercise of discretion, it
is perhaps not surprising that judges differ considerably in their
interpretation of the Act. However, the lack of uniformity in the
implementation of the law clearly presents a problem; this is
particularly important and serious if, as we shall see below.
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evidence of prior sexual experience affects the verdict juries 
eventually reach.
It should be noted here that judges' decisions in this respect,
until very recently at least, were final and the Court of Appeal
was reluctant to interfere with judicial discretion. One must bear
in mind of course that only those cases where evidence of sexual
experience is excluded, and where there is a conviction, will ever
be considered by the Court of Appeal - these represent only a small
proportion of those cases where applications under Section 2 are
made. The question was first considered in R v Mills (1978) where
an application was made for leave to appeal against conviction on
the grounds that the trial judge had been wrong in refusing to
admit evidence of the complainant's sexual experience. The
appellant's counsel argued that the Court of Appeal should
»
substitute its own discretion for that of the trial judge. The
Court, however, firmly declined to take such a course of action:
"It would be impossible, and it would be quite wrong, for 
this Court in any way to seek to disturb that exercise in 
discretion, which seems to us to be wholly in accordance 
with Section 2(1) and (2) of the statute." (33)
More recently, however, and after the data collection for this
study had been completed, the Court of Appeal took a different view
in R V Viola (1982). The Lord Chief Justice ruled as follows:
"...it is wrong to speak of a judge's "discretion" in 
this context. The judge has to make judgment as to 
whether he is satisfied or not in the terms of section 2.
But once having reached his judgment on the particular 
facts, he has no discretion. If he comes to the 
conclusion that he is satisfied it would be unfair to 
exclude the evidence, then the evidence has to be 
admitted and the questions have to be allowed". (34)
Of course, discretion remains insofar as the judge has to decide
whether the exclusion of evidence would be unfair to the defendant.
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and this is where problems arise with the application of this 
Section. Nevertheless, Viola establishes the principle that the 
Court of Appeal is in just as good a position to make the relevant 
decision as was the trisl judge, and is therefore capable of 
overruling a decision made in the Crown Court. This is what 
happened in R v Viola: the Court of Appeal decided that the judge 
in that case had been wrong, and should have admitted the evidence. 
The conviction was quashed.
The reasons advanced for refusing to give leave to cross-examine a
complainant about her prior sexual experience are interesting
insofar as they shed some light on the criteria judges use in
exercising their discretionary powers in this matter. The analysis
here indicates that there is only one type of case where such
evidence is excluded fairly systematically, and that is where the ,
defence propose to probe into a complainant’s sexual past despite
the fact that the defendant clearly has no factual knowledge of
this. In one case, for example, two men were accused of raping a
young girl they knew by sight. They knew nothing of her previous
sexual experience, but the medical evidence revealed that she had
not been a virgin. On that basis, the defence made an application
to cross-examine her in very general terms about her sexual
backgound. The judge's reaction was as follows:
Judge: I am not clear about your application. You have no 
instructions about the complainant's past sexual 
experience. Thus, you want to embark on a fishing 
expedition and ask her whether, how, etc. she has had 
sexual intercourse. Is that right? (Case 67)
One problem is that applications are not always phrased in quite
such explicit terms and this poses some difficulty for judges. As
one judge candidly remarked.
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Judge; I would find this question easier to decide... if 
it were to be more of a fishing expedition. (Case 66)
Nevertheless, where applications were turned down, the defence
always blatantly proposed to discredit the complainant by inquiring
into her sexual past in very general terms. It must be pointed out
that this relationship only holds one way: a proposal of overt
mud-slinging seems necessary for, but does not guarantee the
exclusion of such evidence.
In this context, one cannot fail to note that even if, as in the
majority of trials in this study, applications are couched in
relatively neutral terms and do not seem to imply a direct attack
on the complainant's character, the introduction of almost any such
evidence is bound to have some effect on the jury's view of the
type of person she is. Consider for example the probable
consequences of the following:
Judge: I want to make clear why I did that (give leave to 
cross-examine). It was alleged, as you know, and she 
admitted it (sic), that although she had been married to 
a white man for some years, that marriage had not been 
consummated and had been dissolved. She has since lived 
at various times with two or three or four, I forget, 
coloured men, one of whom is the father of her child. I 
allowed the cross-examination not in order to show that
she was promiscuous or a woman of loose or low morals. I
did not allow it for that purpose, but it was simply to 
show, in fairness to these defendants, that it is 
manifest that (the complainant) was not averse to having 
sexual relations wih coloured men. (Case 52)
Conclusion
The findings of this study indicate that the practical application
of Section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 is
unsatisfactory in a number of respects. It largely incorporates 
assumptions reflected in earlier case law regarding the relevance 
of a complainant's previous sexual experience to the issue of
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consent. Furthermore, the wide variability among judges in their 
interpretation and application of that Section presents a major 
problem. These difficulties derive largely from the broad way in 
which legisation was phrased. Clearly, without explicit guidelines, 
judges must ultimately rely on personal experience and individual 
perceptions of what constitutes relevance or unfairness, and these 
are bound to vary. Moreover, in the absence of any criteria, judges 
are likely to refer to and be guided by the spirit of old case law 
in deciding whether a particular piece of evidence is relevant.
This probably accounts for the fact that assumptions implicit in 
those cases are largely reflected in the operation of Section 2.
Flaws in the application of this Section illustrate the difficulty 
in changing basic attitudes by altering legal procedure. As long as 
the social definition of rape depends on the view one takes of the 
complainant's character, the defence will be bound to make some 
attack on her in order to legitimate their own position. The Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 does not appear to have modified that 
definition.
The next chapter will consider the cross-examination of the alleged 
victim in a wider perspective. It will be shown that her reputation 
is often attacked not only through evidence of sexual experience, 
but also through indirect evidence, implication and suggestion, 
none of which is covered by the provisions of the new legislation.
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CHAPTER FIVE. DISCREDITING THE COMPLAINANT
It takes very little to discredit the alleged rape victim's sexual 
reputation. My observation of the court process involved in the 
trial of such offences indicates that, even in the absence of solid 
evidence and valid grounds for an application under Section 2. of 
the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, there is almost 
invariably some attempt to attack the complainant with regard to 
her sexual history or behaviour. Defence strategies in this respect 
appear to fall into three major, although to some extent 
overlapping, categories.
The first one aims to show that the complainant is in general terms 
"worldly" or "experienced". This relies on the same assumptions as 
the majority of applications under Section 2, namely that any 
sexual experience in a woman is indicative of overall consent. 
Attacks of this sort on the complainant tend to be used when the 
defence have no specific or direct knowledge of her sexual 
experience and they are therefore generally couched in rather vague 
terms.
The second strategy consists in attacking the complainant's 
behaviour at the time of the offence. This is an attempt at showing 
victim precipitation, and ranges from comments about the woman's 
clothes and appearance to suggestions of sexually provocative 
language, gestures, or general behaviour towards the defendant.
The third major strategy is to allege that the complainant had had 
previous consensual intercourse with the defendant, whether or not
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this is agreed by her. Although the legitimacy of this line of 
questioning was endorsed by the Heilbron Group, it relies on the 
rather dubious assumption that once a woman agrees to intercourse 
with a man, the likelihood is that she will continue to consent at 
any later stage in their relationship, or indeed when the 
relationship has ended. The rationale here is reminiscent of Hale's 
famous dictum regarding the permanent nature of consent given on 
marriage, which has been discussed above.
Furthermore, the complainant's general reputation is frequently put 
at issue to suggest that she is not a credible witness because of 
her "bad" character. It may be suggested, for instance, that she 
has a history of mental illness or a drink problem, and hence that 
her rape allegation cannot be believed.
The use of these defence strategies in the course of trials 
included in the present study will be discussed and illustrated 
below.
General attacks on sexual character
It has been noted that Western society tends to adopt a split view
towards women: Holmstrom and Burgess have termed this the
"Madonna-Whore complex" (1). Chafetz has argued that
"a basic dualism is ... displayed toward the female, who 
is simultaneously held to be 'sexually passive, 
uninterested' (the Virgin Mary image) and 'seductive, 
flirtateous' (the wicked Eve tempting poor, innocent 
Adam). This theme runs throughout the history of Western 
civilization and our mores concerning 'good' and 'bad' 
females have no parallels for males". (2)
Although such a view bears no resemblance to the sexual practices
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of the majority of women today, the double standard remains and
provides the basis of what is frequently a highly successful line
of defence in rape cases. It has been observed that
"at the institutional level our legal system still 
epitomises our double standards, imposing greater control 
over female sexual behaviour than male and, in effect, 
punishing women and girls for behaviour overlooked in men 
and boys". (3)
Insofar as a sexually active woman will be seen as a ’bad' woman,
and therefore an unlikely rape victim, it becomes important for the
defence in the trial to portray her as such. Depending on the
nature and circumstances of the case, this may be done in a variety
of ways. Where the prosecution allege that the complainant had been
a virgin prior to the rape, the defence may challenge this and
attempt to present her as sexually experienced:
Complainant ; I was a virgin. I had tried to have sexual 
intercourse but couldn't.
Defence counsel: Did your boyfriend never try to 
penetrate you?
Complainant: I don't know really ... we didn't go all the 
way ... nothing really happened. After that, I went to 
see a doctor and had an internal examination.
Defence counsel: (On the occasion of the alleged rape)
you say two people raped you?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: Was there any bleeding?
Complainant : No.
Defence counsel: There were swabs taken from you and 
there was no sign of blood from loss of virginity. Do you
still say you were a virgin?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: How is that possible, without any blood?
It's impossible. I suggest you are lying, you'd had sex 
before. (Case 31)
It may also be implied that the complainant's familiarity with
sexual terms or expressions is indicative of experience on her
part. A fifteen year old victim was cross-examined as follows;
Defence counsel: How did you know Frank (the first 
defendant) was coming if you've never had sex with him 
before?
Complainant: I knew from people talking ... mum and the 
police helped me.
Defence counsel: Did he ejaculate? '
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Complainant; (Made no reply)
Defence counsel: Did you feel any wet?
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: But there was no contraceptive used? 
Complainant : Frank didn’t.
Defence counsel; You haven’t become pregnant?
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: Had you used any contraceptive?
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: Did you know Tom (the second defendant) 
was coming?
Complainant: I knew with Frank because he shouted it out 
to Tom.
Defence counsel: But you've said that you noticed Frank 
coming in some other way. It was Tom who shouted out. 
Complainant: I don't remember which - one of them did.
(Case 25)
Another technique is to question the complainant about any
contraceptive used, and thereby to suggest promiscuity on her part.
In the following example, this is compounded by the implied
existence of a boyfriend, although there was no evidence at the
trial that he did in fact exist:
Defence counsel: Did you use any contraceptive?
Complainant: I was on the pill.
Defence counsel: Did you say to him (the defendant) that 
you had a regular boyfriend who was away?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: And that meanwhile, you went out with 
someone else?
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: Wasn't it this second boyfriend who did 
not turn up that day?
Complainant: No, that was my boyfriend. I later found out 
that he was away.
Judge: What is the relevance of this?
Defence counsel; My client felt that this woman was used 
to having casual relations with men. (Case 26).
The presence of vaginal infections may be used to imply sexual
experience and promiscuity, even where there is medical evidence
that such infections were not transmitted through sexual contact.
The existence of some such infection is occasionally suggested by
the defence without any independent evidence at all:
Defendant: Yeah, I had sex with her, but not completely.
I thought I might catch something off her, it turned me 
off. (Case 71)
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Even in the absence of direct questions in cross-examination about
vaginal infections, the defence may capitalise on the fact that
these have connotations of being "dirty" and "unclean". One N.S.U.
sufferer was cross-examined as follows:
Defence counsel: I suggest you were dressed in a slovenly 
fashion, with a hole in your dress.
Complainant; No, I was a manageress in a boutique...
Defence counsel: Were you managing to keep yourself clean 
and tidy at that period of time?
Complainant; Yes.
Defence counsel: The defendant also says that you were 
slovenly that evening.
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: When he first saw you at the pub, you 
looked slovenly to him.
Complainant: No, I had a new dress on. (Case 56)
Later in that case, on the request of another defence counsel, the 
judge went on to ask the complainant about her habits of personal 
cleanliness;
Judge; I want to ask you a personal question. There was 
some semen found inside you, and I want to clarify the 
question asked from you about sexual intercourse. Have 
you a bath at home?
Complainant: Yes.
Judge: How often a week do you have a bath?
Complainant; Two to three times.
Judge: This took place on June 28th. How long before did 
you have a bath?
Complainant; Probably the night before.
Judge: Certainly two to three nights before?
Complainant: I think it was the night before. (Case 56)
Defence counsel may try to show similarities between features of
the alleged rape and aspects of the complainant's everyday life in
an attempt to normalise the former. The following example is an
extract from a trial were three black youths were charged with the
rape of two white girls; here, the suggestion of sexual experience
is linked to the issue of race:
Defence counsel: Did you often have boys there (at the 
flat) until 3 a.m.?
Complainant; No.
Defence counsel: Did boys used to come round at night? 
Complainant : In the evening, yes.
Defence counsel: Had the boys coming to the flat nearly
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always been black?
Complainant; Not all of them, some.
Defence counsel: The question was, apart from the girl, 
were they nearly all black?
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: Do you know what a blues party is? Soul 
music, low lights?
Complainant; Yes. (Case 67)
In some cases suggestions of sexual experience are made almost in
passing and there is no attempt to relate this directly to the
issues in the trial. For example, one woman was asked about her
divorce which preceded the alleged rape by some eight months, in
the following terms:
Defence counsel: On what grounds was your husband 
divorcing you?
Complainant: Desertion. He also tried to put in adultery, 
but that wasn't true. He also tried to say I was mentally 
disturbed. (Case 56)
Such apparently casual questions and the replies they elicit
nevertheless serve to discredit the complainant and to portray her
as sexually "easy". Even when she is not cross-examined in this
way, the defendant’s evidence may serve the same purpose:
Defendant; She seemed very liberated and attractive. She 
was thumbing a lift, anyway ... She told me about her own 
private life, that she was sick of her boyfriend who
slept around too much. She told me she was intending to
sleep around too. I think she mentioned that later. She 
said she’d slept with her boyfriend’s best friend, to 
spite him. (Case 63)
On other occasions, there is nothing subtle or casual about attacks
on the complainant’s sexual reputation. The following example is an
extract from the particularly vicious cross-examination of a woman
who had been allegedly raped and severely beaten by four men, all
of whom were total strangers to her:
Defence counsel; I suggest you started to flirt with 
other men in the pub, to show how little you cared for 
your boyfriend.
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: Were you in the habit of going to pubs 
by yourself, in the evening?
Complainant : No, it was the first time. I went there in a
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temper, to get away from my parents and my boyfriend.
Defence counsel; I suggest you did, and that is why you 
walked out of the pub with the first young man who came 
along.
Complainant: No, I didn’t.
Defence counsel: Why talk to your boyfriend in the pub 
about your first husband using a milk bottle inside you? 
Complainant ; I was hoping he’d get embarrassed and leave.
I ’d lost control, I was near to tears.
Defence counsel: At that stage, I suggest, other people 
joined in the conversation and someone said, ’’who’s got a 
bottle then’’. You shared the joke, showing what kind of a 
person you really were, prepared to have sex with 
strangers.
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: You were drawing attention to the bottle 
in a way that you’d enjoyed it, that you wanted it 
repeated. Isn’t that right?
Complainant: No. (Case 58)
Evidence from the various defendants in the trial, partly perhaps
because of the impact of repetition, reinforced the image that
counsel had tried to create in cross-examination:
First defendant: A girl came in (the pub) and she had a 
row with her bloke. She was buying drinks. She was 
putting herself about, just a slag. It was ’hello, 
darling, you in the red shirt, I fancy you’.
Second defendant: She was drunk when she came in. She got 
herself a gin. She was joined by her boyfriend, and 
bought a pint. She was over everybody. She smelt like an 
old fishpond. She pulled someone to her knee, she was 
dancing about.
Third defendant: The way she behaved, I thought she was a 
bit of an old bag. (Case 58)
The above extracts illustrate the suggestions that are made in
court to discredit the complainant’s sexual reputation. It is,
4
however, difficult to convey in print the hostile and insinuating
tone in which the pertinent questions are frequently asked. In one
trial, for example, the alleged victim was questioned as follows:
Defence counsel: Do girls in your flat often get raped? 
Complainant: No, ...
Defence counsel: Do they rape easily? (Case 67)
Similarly, facial expressions of utter incredulity often accompany
questions such as this:
Complainant; I had sex with him because it was done by 
force - I had no choice.
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Judge: How much did you get paid for it? (Case 75)
Complainant behaviour at the time of the offence
In addition to general suggestions regarding the complainant's past
sexual reputation, the defence may attempt to discredit her with
reference to her behaviour around the time of the alleged offence.
The emphasis here is on the alleged victim's role in and
responsibility for the rape incident. The purpose is to show that
the rape was somehow her fault, or "victim precipitated", a concept
which has been discussed above (4), Weis and Borges have argued
that the notion of victim precipitation could be seen as a
practical application of neutralization techniques, particularly in
terms of denying the victim:
"One might argue that the denial of the victim hinges 
upon the issue of his innocent or deserving attributes. 
Utilizing this technique, a deserving rape victim is 
defined as a woman who is sexually provocative, morally 
inferior, has a bad reputation, or needs to be taught 
"her place"... The actor (offender) can justify his 
behaviour via the rationale that she both asked for it 
and deserved it" (5).
As an analytical and theoretical concept used to understand the
phenomenon of rape, victim precipitation was a product of the
sociological literature of the 1960s and has now largely been
discredited (6). Nevertheless, the defence in rape trials continues
to rely on the old stereotype that rape occurs as a result of
uncontrollable sexual urges aroused by sexually provocative women.
In trying to show that the alleged victim was "asking for it", a
variety of approaches may be used.
One technique is to comment on the complainant's clothes and 
appearance. Although society expects women to look attractive, if 
they happen to become rape victims, this may subsequently be used
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against them. The implication is that their appearance is 
indicative of what must be their sexual behaviour. In his closing 
speech, one defence counsel described the complainant in these 
terms;
Defence counsel; A girl wearing hippy sort of clothes, 
tight jeans and plimsols, walking around alone late at 
night, getting into a car with three men, having just 
left the flat of a fourth man... (Case 69)
Another victim was cross-examined as to what she usually wore in
bed;
Defence counsel; You wore no clothes in bed?
Complainant: No. I had a quilt on and a sheet. I was 
sitting up in bed.
Defence counsel; Were your breasts showing?
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel; I suggest that the quilt slipped and 
your breasts were showing. (Case 28)
It is frequently suggested that the complainant consented to being
in the company of the defendant and/or in the situation where the
alleged offence occurred. This is then construed as implied consent
to sexual intercourse as well. This example is taken from a case
where the complainant, who was acquainted with the defendant,
accepted a lift home from him. Her cross-examination went as
follows:
Defence counsel; You got off the bike before him, or he 
wouldn’t have been able to get off.
Complainant: No, he got off first. He kind of pulled me 
off.
Defence counsel; Did you resent that?
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel; So he helped you off.
Complainant: Same difference.
Defence counsel: Were you willing to get off?
Complainant: Yes.
At this stage, the judge intervened:
Judge: On the bench, you expected a bit of necking, 
didn’t you?
Complainant : No.
Judge: Why on earth did you think you were sitting on the 
bench?
Complainant: He said to talk.
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Judge: (looking at the jury, incredulous) I see... (Case 
20)
It may also be suggested that the complainant actively sought the
company of the defendant and was the one to initiate contact with
him. This is then used to imply that she was ’asking for’ what
happened, as the following extract illustrates:
Defence counsel: You told (your friend) to fuck off, 
because you wanted to stay at the pub.
Complainant; No.
Defence counsel: Having said that, you joined the 
coloured men (the defendants) and asked one of them what 
he was doing after the pub.
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: He told you he was going to a club. 
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel; When he told you he was going to a club, 
you asked if you could go with him because you liked 
reggae music.
Complainant : No.
Defence counsel: It had been suggested that you should go 
back to his place to listen to music.
Complainant; No,...
Defence counsel: and you were happy to go there?
Complainant ; Not at first. There was nothing said about a 
club.
Defence counsel for the other defendant at this trial went on to
question her as follows:
Defence counsel: I suggest you made it quite clear that 
you wanted to be with these men, rather than with your 
friend, even earlier when he was still at the pub. You 
said he could fuck off, you wanted to have a good time. 
Complainant; No, ...
Defence counsel: You wanted some kicks. Why did you agree 
to go to a party and then want to creep out?
Complainant: No, I meant later on, when I saw no one
there - that’s when I wanted to creep out. (Case 18)
The defence may imply that the complainant was ’’out to have a good
time’’ in general terms, and was actively looking for a pick-up, or
at least gave the appearance of being available. The following
extract is taken from a case where the complainant had spent the
evening preceding the alleged rape offence in a disco with a
girlfriend:
Defence counsel: You didn’t go with your boyfriend, so
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you just danced with anybody and everybody?
Complainant: No, just people we knew.
Defence counsel: I suggest you danced many times with the 
defendant.
Complainant: No. (Case 22)
Occasionally, the complainant is portrayed as not merely sexually
available, but as engaging in behaviour which is explicitly sexual
and provocative; the obvious implication here being that such
behaviour is indicative not just of consent, but of active
participation too:
Defence counsel: I suggest that you put a record on and 
started to dance around on your own. While you were doing 
that, the defendants sat down and opened three bottles of 
lager.
Complainant: I put no music on and didn't dance.
Defence counsel: You were offered a lager with a glass - 
you just took the bottle. You continued dancing and drank 
it rather quickly.
Complainant; No.
Defence counsel; You went on dancing and went up to one 
of the defendants and told him to get up and dance. 
Complainant; This is all being made up.
Defence counsel: He said he wasn’t dancing. You grabbed 
him by the arm and pulled him to his feet... You said you 
were a bad woman, and ripped open your blouse. That’s 
when the various buttons fell off.
Complainant ; It’s all lies.
Defence counsel: (Later) you told one of the defendants 
that you liked him and asked where the bedroom was. 
Complainant; It’s all lies.
Defence counsel: I suggest you said you were tired and
wanted to relax. (Case 18)
It may be suggested that some consensual intimacy took place
between the defendant and the complainant immediately before the
alleged offence, which is another way of implying that consent to
intercourse can hardly be a realistic issue:
Defence counsel: I suggest you were enjoying yourself (at 
the party), away from your boyfriend.
Complainant: That’s not true.
Defence counsel; You danced with the defendant?
Complainant: I’ve never seen him before.
Defence counsel: I suggest you flirted with him, holding
him tight as you danced. (Case 52)
A defence witness reinforced this picture by describing the
complainant’s behaviour as follows:
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Defence witness; She came in alone, and stood in the hall 
looking around, I danced with her, a very, very, close 
dance like young people do today. I danced with her to 
half a dozen tunes or more. She was close all the time. I 
thought her attitude very rude ... Later, she danced with 
another bloke (the defendant) for about two records. She 
was the same, very close to him. They were talking, I saw 
them. They seemed familiar. (Case 52)
Occasionally, a somewhat greater degree of consensual intimacy is
suggested:
Defence counsel: I suggest you danced many times with the 
defendant.
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: And while dancing with him, you allowed 
him to kiss you?
Complainant: Not that I remember.
Defence counsel: I suggest he danced with you on a number 
of occasions and you allowed him to kiss you. (Case 22)
Defence counsel invariably engages in rather detailed
cross-examination in cases where the complainant agrees that some
sexual contact occurred between her and the defendant before the
offence, as in the following examples:
Defence counsel: Was there any kissing at the dance? 
Complainant: (He) kissed me just once at the dance hall.
He was nice anyway.
Defence counsel: And in the minicab?
Complainant: Yes, once.
Defence counsel: And during the drive around in the other
defendant's car, any more kissing?
Complainant: Just once, yes. I liked him a lot. (Case 43)
Defence counsel: You were quite happy to go and sit with
him on the balcony?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: There, you talked and kissed, you say? 
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: Kissing with some enthusiasm?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: There are several kinds of kisses - were 
you French kissing?
Complainant: We might have been.
Defence counsel: And you were quite happy and content for 
that to happen?
Complainant: Yes. (Case 14)
The clear suggestion here is that if the complainant flirted with
the defendant or allowed him to kiss her, for example, she must
also have agreed to sexual intercourse with him, or she was, at the
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very least, "asking for it" to happen. In other words, her consent 
to being in a situation containing some element of sexuality is by 
implication presented as a generalised consent to intercourse.
Previous intercourse with the defendant
This brings us to the last major strategy to discredit the
complainant's sexual reputation, namely suggestions of previous
episodes of consensual intercourse between her and the defendant.
In Amir's study, where a woman's "bad reputation" is seen as a
major element in victim precipitation, the category of "bad
reputation" covers not only rape victims who were known as
"promiscuous", but also those who "had sex relations before with
the offender" (7), If a woman has had a sexual relationship with a
man who later attacks and rapes her, no matter how brutally, her
rape allegation is likely to be viewed as extremely doubtful. As
one defendant put it, after being charged with the rape of his
ex-girlfriend:
Defendant: You must be fucking mad. How the fuck can I 
rape a bird if she has two kids of mine? I'm not saying 
anything, I can't remember anything happening. (Case 68)
The principle of admitting evidence of the past relationship
between the complainant and the defendant has long been
established. In 1827, it was held that
"on the trial of an indictment for rape, the prisoner 
might show that the prosecutrix had been previously 
criminally (sic) connected with himself" (8).
This was later reaffirmed in Rv Martin and Martin (9) and R v
Cockroft (10); the rationale for these decisions being given as
follows by Lord Coleridge:
"... But to reject evidence of her having had connection 
with the particular person charged with the offence is a
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wholly different matter, because such evidence is in 
point as making it so much the more likely that she 
consented on the occasion charged in the indictment. This 
line of examination is one which leads directly to the 
point in issue. Take the case of a woman who has lived, 
without marriage, for years with the accused before the 
alleged assault was committed. Can it be reasonably 
contended that the proof of that fact, or evidence 
tending to prove that fact, is not material to the issue, 
and if material to the issue, that such evidence should 
not be admitted?" (11).
More recently, the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape also favoured
the retention of this long established rule:
"We think that questions and evidence as to the 
association of the complainant with the accused will, in 
general, be relevant to the issues involved in a trial 
for rape, subject always to the power of the judge to 
control improper questioning". (12)
The frequency of allegations of a prior sexual relationship between
the parties involved was relatively high in the course of trials
included in the present study: they formed the basis of the defence
put forward on behalf of five defendants.
One of the most noteworthy features of this line of defence is that
prior consensual sexual contact was denied by half of the
complainants involved in such allegations. Consider the discrepancy
between the defendant and the complainant in the following case:
Defendant : Next she came over on a Saturday, a week or so 
before this. I wasn't surprised because she's been 
pressing me to take her out and I had no intention of 
doing it, especially while I was with my wife. She came 
over after 6 p.m. ... I gave her a Martini... She'd 
brought a photo of herself; she gave it to me but I 
didn't take it. She put a record on. We had sexual 
intercourse together. We danced, we became friendly.
Complainant: He used to say hello to me when he came to 
the garage. I didn't know his first name ... I had been 
looking for a room for two or three months, and I had 
mentioned it to a few customers. (On the day of the rape) 
another employee at the garage gave me a card with a 
message written on it, saying "if you're still interested 
in a room, come to the following address and ask for the 
tenant in room 1". I decided to try this place, and^went 
there about 6 p.m. Somebody came down, and I said I was
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looking for the tenant in room 1. I was taken there, and 
he (the defendant) was there. He introduced himself to 
me. (Case 76)
What the complainant claims is an earlier unreported rape attempt
may also be presented as an incident of consensual intercourse;
Defence counsel: Were you quite happy to accept a lift? 
Complainant: Yes, I've known him a number of years.
Defence counsel: You and he had sex before, didn't you? 
Complainant: No, but he tried.
Defence counsel: What did you tell the police about this? 
Complainant: I said that he had tried to have sex with 
me, but didn't manage to.
Defence counsel: Your statement says there had been an 
occasion in a ladies' toilet where he tried to kiss you 
and have sexual intercourse with you, and you didn't let 
him. Did you tell the police that the defendant succeeded 
in raping you before?
Complainant: No, only that he tried.
Defence counsel: I suggest you've had sexual intercourse
with him before, in that toilet, with your consent. 
Complainant: No. (Case 20)
Where the complainant denies defence allegations of prior sexual
involvement with the accused, it is not unusual for witnesses to be
called to contradict her. In the following case, a friend of the
defendant gave this evidence:
Defence witness: (When I arrived at the flat) the 
defendant made a sign with his arm which I associated
with sex - indicating that he had or was going to have
sex with (the complainant). Later, he told us that he and 
the complainant had had sexual intercourse before and 
that he'd picked her up to give her a lift. When he told 
me that, I said I'm very surprised, because she looked a 
very presentable, clean young lady. I couldn't believe 
she lived in a squat and hitched a lift. I said something 
about her looking like a young virgin. The defendant 
said, don't you believe it. (Case 63)
It has been argued that
"all rape is an exercise in power, but some rapists have 
an edge that is more than physical. They operate within 
an institutionalised setting that works to their 
advantage and in which the victim has little chance to 
redress her grievance". (13)
The existence of a prior sexual relationship between the
complainant and the defendant appears to be one such setting. Where
the complainant agrees that there had been sexual involvement in
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the past, the defendant is almost invariably acquitted. Cases of
this sort afford the defence with an opportunity to present the
alleged rape as an overreaction to a domestic dispute which
occurred within the framework of an established sexual
relationship. It is often suggested that the relationship is closer
than the complainant is willing to admit, or in some cases, that it
amounts to cohabitation. In any event, she is likely to be
cross-examined in considerable detail about practically all aspects
of the relationship, however irrelevant they are to the trial:
Defence counsel: How would you describe your relationship 
with the defendant?
Complainant: I was going out with him, but it wasn't a 
permanent relationship. Sometimes he didn't use to come 
round at all... He stayed the night, but not most nights.
Just some nights.
Defence counsel: It's important for you that nobody 
should think that he lived at your flat because of social 
security payments, isn't it?
Complainant: Yes,...
Defence counsel: I suggest he lived there, that this was 
his home all the time.
Complainant: No. (Case 72)
Where the relationship between the complainant and the defendant
was no longer a sexual one by the time of the alleged rape, the
picture of their past relationship is sometimes compounded by
suggestions of promiscuity on the part of the woman. This may be
couched in rather general terms, as in the followig example:
Defendant: I had been living with the complainant for 
over a year. We'd been having arguments. I left because 
there were too many men. She has so many men, you 
couldn't keep count. She'd have anyone. (Case 45)
Alternatively, the defence may go into a detailed account of the
complainant's sexual behaviour, as in the following case. It should
be noted that a successful application to introduce this evidence
had been made in this case under Section 2 of the Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act 1976. It is merely cited here to illustrate the way
in which suggestions of promiscuity may be linked with evidence of
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a prior sexual relationship with the defendant:
Defendant : There had been previous occasions of sexual
intercourse at the flat. We'd gone there with Joe, Peter, 
Corinne, the complainant and me. I went up to bed with 
Corinne. I got up and when I came back, the complainant 
was in bed with Corinne, making advances to her. Corinne 
got up and went into the lounge. Then I had sexual 
intercourse with the complainant in the bedroom. Later,
Peter went into the bedroom with the complainant. He came 
out, and Joe went in then. He ended up staying the night.
I think Peter slept in that same room. I slept with 
Corinne. A week after that there was a similar occasion.
I never actually saw her have sexual intercourse with 
anyone, but Peter and Tony spent time alone wih her.
(Case 70)
Another strategy in this type of case is to normalise the alleged
rape in the light of the nature of the relationship between the
complainant and the defendant. The following example speaks for
itself; we should note that both parties agreed that their
relationship ended some months before the rape incident:
Defence counsel: I suggest that sex with the defendant 
was, previously, quite a stormy affair.
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: Physical violence was used from time to 
time, by the defendant to you.
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: You don't mind some roughness, some 
beating up?
Complainant: Yes - he hadn't beaten me up during sex. He 
had beaten me before sex on previous occasions. He used 
to just beat me up too, irrespective of sex. Sometimes, 
he was gentle.
Defence counsel: No beating stopped you having sex with 
him later, that was the pattern of life with him? 
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: And you didn't mind?
Complainant: They weren't severe beatings. He was very 
demanding. If I refused sex, he'd threaten. It was only 
like that towards the latter part of the relationship. 
Defence counsel: That night (rape) was no different to 
others - the beating may have been more severe, but 
that's all.
Complainant: It was very different. If I didn't want to 
give in before, he'd beat me for it. Only very 
occasionally would the beatings end up in sexual 
intercourse. i
Defence counsel: I suggest that on that day, the only 
abnormality was that there were two women. Otherwise, the 
violence and the oral sex had both happened before. 
Complainant: It was very different.
Defence counsel: Only in the degree of violence.
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Complainant; Yes, and all the other bits and pieces.
Defence counsel; There had been other occasions when you 
had consented...
Complainant: If I had consented in the first place. I'd 
never have got beaten up. (Case 68)
The defendant in this case was acquitted. He was, however,
subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for the rape of a woman
who had not been as severely injured as the above complainant, but
who had had no previous sexual contact with him (Case 80).
The existence of a prior sexual relationship serves not only to
discredit complaints of rape, but also to provide a wealth of
possible motives for false allegations. These are often very
convincing to a jury insofar as they make sense in terms of the
general folklore of rape and notions of female sexuality and
psychology. The suggestion that women claim rape in order to avoid
responsibility, for example, is a common one:
Defence counsel: I suggest you wanted to blame somebody 
for getting you pregnant, so that you could justify your 
pregnancy to your relatives.
Complainant: No, that's not the reason. (Case 7)
The defence may also claim that the rape complaint was made for 
financial gain. In one instance, defence counsel opened his case as 
follows:
Defence counsel: The defendant provided well for this 
girl and treated the place as his home. He was of course 
distressed to be locked out, away from his goods and his 
girl. If the whole case is about that girl exploiting 
that distress and exaggerating it, so that she can hold 
on to the possessions that she on social security 
couldn't afford - that has to be taken into account in 
considering the rape and common assault counts. (Case 72)
The most commonly attributed motive for rape allegations in such
cases is spite. This relies on the poetic notion that "Heav'n has
no rage, like love to hatred turn'd, Nor Hell a fury, like a woman
scorn'd" (14), a line which was quoted during the parliamentary
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debates of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill (15), as well as 
(usually inaccurately) during the trials included in this study. 
These are some illustrations of the practical application of this 
idea;
Defendant : I woke up to being slapped around the face. I 
just hit out, slapped her back. She kept asking if I 
loved her, and I said I still loved my wife. There was a 
row about it. She said she was going to get me for this.
(Case 63)
Defendant: It was at her invitation and with her consent 
that we had sexual intercourse. After, she asked if I 
still wanted to go back to my wife. I said I couldn’t 
just decide. I said I couldn’t just ignore my wife and I 
could only be friends with her (the complainant). She was 
upset by that - I told her to be reasonable. Then she 
went to the loo. I thought she was coming back, but that
was the last I saw of her. (Case 76)
In this chapter, I have tried to show that the defence can and do
use a number of strategies to discredit sexually the alleged victim
of rape, and that this may be done with considerable success
outside the scope of Section 2. of the Sexual Offences (Amendment)
Act 1976. Indirect evidence and suggestion are brought into play,
and the introduction of new legislation has not, and cannot in
isolation, influence this aspect of court practice. The importance
of information and speculation thus introduced is invariably
stressed in defence counsel’s closing speech:
Defence counsel: The girls themselves are worth looking 
at. One of the complainants’ hymen was ruptured before 
this incident. You might find it shocking that she was 
prepared to bed down in the same room as any man. (Case 
49)
What is perhaps more surprising is that the prosecution also tend
to acknowledge the relevance of evidence introduced in this way.
Indeed, they may go so far as actively to draw the jury’s attention
to these aspects of the defence case:
Prosecution counsel; You have heard evidence about the 
sort of girl she is - you have to take that into account 
as a background of the case. (Case 71)
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General character
We have seen that the complainant's chastity and sexual reputation
remain crucial issues in rape trials. Her general character,
however, also seems to be a salient factor in the course of such
trials and attempts are frequently made to discredit her in this
way. Anything other than totally "proper" and "respectable"
behaviour may be used for this purpose. The following are examples
of some such questions;
Defence counsel: Are you living on social security? (Case 
72)
Defence counsel: Did you tell the defendant that you were 
in a poor financial situation? (Case 49)
Defence counsel: Where did you meet the defendant?
(eliciting the reply that it was in a probation hostel)
(Case 70)
Defence counsel: Did your mother know that you were 
staying at the party all night? (Case 25)
Defence counsel: Had you lived in squats before? (Case 
71)
Defence counsel: Did you know that your boyfriend had had 
trouble with the police over drugs? (Case 59)
The most common strategies used to discredit the complainant's
general character are to bring out information or make suggestions
about her alcohol and drug use, her criminal record and her
psychiatric history.
The defence may go to great lengths to establish how much the
complainant had had to drink, particularly when she denies heavy
consumption. One alleged victim, who said that she had half a pint
of beer to drink on the day of the offence, had her blood alcohol
level checked and the scientific officer in charge of the analysis
was cross-examined as follows:
Witness: It's not possible that only half a pint of beer 
was consumed five hours earlier. That would have # 
dissipated in five hours.
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Defence counsel; Would excitement make the alcohol 
dissipate slower?
Witness: No, I have allowed for that. There had to be 
more alcohol taken at that time ... I would expect about 
four and a half measures of spirits, or four or five half 
pints to have been drunk five hours earlier.
Judge; What about the previous night's drinks? If she had 
five double Bacardis between midnight and five a.m.?
Witness: That could still produce that amount of blood 
alcohol after five hours. It might well affect the 
reading.
Defence counsel: But if she had no drinks after 5.30 a.m. 
would that still have an effect fourteen hours later?
Witness: It's just possible, yes.
Defence counsel: Up to that level?
Witness: I'd make it a bit less. (Case 25)
Such evidence is often linked to the issue of consent: the presence
of alcohol and/or drugs, for example, may be used to imply that the
alleged victim consented to sex with the defendant(s):
Defence counsel: (Around that time) were you drinking 
heavily?
Complainant: Yes. I was under the doctor.
Defence counsel; Is it right that in August you were 
fined for being drunk and disorderly?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: Isn't it right that you were very drunk 
in the car on the way to the party, as you said in your 
statement?
Complainant: I wasn't feeling drunk.
Defence counsel: Haven't you been in pubs enough to see 
people when they have had too much to drink? I suggest 
that everything that happened at the flat was because you 
had had too much to drink. (Case 56)
Alternatively, it may be suggested that the complainant's alcohol
intake and/or drug consumption so affected her memory of the events
that her evidence must be considered unreliable. In the following
example, the alleged victim was on a course of Librium, but denied
taking any on the day of the rape incident. The defence,
nevertheless, continued to operate on the assumption that she had
mixed alcohol and this drug, and cross-examined the doctor in the
case as to the probable effects of this combination:
Witness: Persons taking Librium and alcohol together may 
appear more drunk that they in fact are. It makes them 
feel more abandoned and outgoing... They would be 
unsteady, more likely to bump into things. If Librium had
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been taken with alcohol, that could affect the 
reliability of the girl's account — as much as in someone 
who is just drunk. (Case 58)
A complainant with a criminal record is a real bonus for the
defence. In such cases, she is almost invariably subjected to
lengthy cross-examination about her convictions. One young girl
with an extremely disturbed childhood spent largely in local
authority care was, in cross-examination, taken through each of her
numerous encounters with the police in some detail. The suggestion
was then made that these provided her with a strong motive to go
through with her rape allegation;
Defence counsel: I suggest you thought that if you 
withdrew your allegations, you'd be in serious trouble. 
Complainant: I knew I'd be in trouble.
Defence counsel: Have you been interviewed (by the 
police) about other offences, like clipping?
Complainant: Yes - that means getting men's money and 
running off. You make out you'll do business with them.
Defence counsel: You admitted doing this last September 
for some weeks. Were you earning £100 to £200 pounds a 
week, doing this?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: Were you charged?
Complainant: Yes, but it got dropped.
Defence counsel: Did that have anything to do with your 
giving evidence here?
Complainant: I don't know, I can't remember.
Defence counsel: Were you told why the charges were 
dropped?
Complainant: I don't know. (Case 35)
In more usual cases, any evidence that the complainant has a
criminal record is used to cast doubt on her credibility. As one
defence counsel argued.
Defence counsel: I want to put her conviction for 
shoplifting - this shows her dishonesty, her 
unreliability. (Case 56)
One of the main rape myths, as we have already discussed, is that
women have a marked tendency to make hysterical, unfounded
•r
allegations of rape for a variety of somewhat obscure psychological 
reasons. Where these hidden motives can be linked to an actual
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history of psychiatric disorder, this affords confirmation of the 
complainant's lack of stability, reliability and consequently, 
credibility. Cross-examination as to her psychiatric history may 
take the form of what has been termed a "fishing expedition", 
prompted for example by her spontaneous mentioning of feeling 
depressed:
Defence counsel: When you met the two girls, do you 
remember if you told them you'd just come out of 
hospital?
Complainant: No, I might have said that I worked in a 
hospital.
Defence counsel: Have you ever been to a mental hospital? 
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: Or received psychiatric treatment? 
Complainant: No. (Case 27)
However, where the defence have something more tangible and
concrete to hand, such as evidence of suicide attempts, periods of
hospitalisation in psychiatric institutions or outpatient
psychiatric treatment, no matter how long before the rape incident,
these are certain to be explored in great detail during the trial:
Defence counsel: (About two years ago) you were in a 
hospital for five months, were you not? A mental 
hospital?
Complainant: Yes. I was there because I cut my wrists.
Defence counsel: In an attempt to kill yourself?
Complainant: I don't know...
Defence counsel: How old were you at the time?
Complainant: Sixteen.
Defence counsel: That wasn't the only time you cut your 
wrists. There were many other times, were there not?
(Case 35)
That the introduction of this sort of information is intended to
discredit the complainant is unquestionable. As if the importance
of the unspoken links between psychiatric history, lack of
stability and false allegations of rape were not obvious, these are
made explicit for the jury in defence speeches: ^
Defence counsel: Allegations of a sexual nature, members 
of the jury, are so easy to bring and so hard to 
refute... We have here a girl of 18. We know from the 
scars on her wrists that there is some history of
174
attempted suicide. She might be confusing this (rape) 
with another incident. (Case 18)
We have seen that the counterdenunciation of the alleged rape
victim is a prominent feature of rape trials, particularly insofar
as her sexual reputation and general character are concerned. The
following chapter considers how far other aspects of her behaviour
become the focus of attention in rape trials, and the extent to
which her various characteristics and attributes appear to be
linked to the outcome of the trial.
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CHAPTER SIX. THE VICTIM ON TRIAL?
Introduction
The development and implementation of law in society, as well as 
the judicial process in general, are clearly influenced by a vast 
range of extra-legal considerations (1). The outcome of a criminal 
trial in particular is dependent on a variety of factors, including 
the judge's conduct of the proceedings, the lawyers involved, the 
impression created by the defendant and witnesses on both sides, 
and the nature and presentation of the evidence. Another major 
factor is the jury, whose role and impact in this respect have been 
the subject of much controversy (2) as well as some academic study
(3).
Research in this field has been hampered by the secrecy that
continues to surround the jury's deliberations. Consequently, the
performance of juries has sometimes been evaluated with reference
to differences between their decisions and decisions made by
judges. However, as Baldwin and McConville point out,
"Evidence that juries reach different conclusions from 
those that judges or lawyers would have reached fuels the 
controversy but does not resolve it. Those who argue tbat 
legal experts have no monopoly of the truth would perhaps 
see this as the greatest strength of the jury, whereas 
others see it as its weakness" (4).
There seems to be general agreement among supporters and opponents
of the jury system that the jury brings its own unique values and
interpretations to bear on any case. As Kalven and Zeisel note, in
their classic study of the American jury;
"The jury, in the guise of resolving doubts about the 
issues of fact, gives reign to its sense of values. It y
will not often be doing this consciously; as the equities
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of the case press, the jury may, as one judge put it,
"hunt for doubts". Its war with the law is thus both
modest and subtle. The upshot is that when the jury 
reaches a different conclusion from the judge on the same 
evidence, it does so not because it is a sloppy or 
inaccurate finder of facts, but because it gives 
recognition to values which fall outside the official 
rules". (5)
Researchers have also looked at the victim's role in the outcome of
the judicial process. Wolfgang, for example, found that in what he
defined as victim precipitated homicide, offenders were less likely
to be convicted than in cases where this was not an issue (6).
Denno and Cramer considered the possible effects of victim
characteristics on judges' sentencing decisions, and concluded that
"victim precipitation and the impression created by the 
victim appear to be of importance to the judge in the 
sentencing process". (7)
Most of the work in this area is based on experimental designs,
simulated juries and hypothetical cases. A notable exception is
Williams' work regarding the effects of victim characteristics on
the disposition of violent crimes. That study focuses in particular
on the possible effects of the victim's perceived responsibility
for the crime, and of the social relationship between the victim
and the offender, and concludes that these factors have some
influence on various processing decisions:
"Victim characteristics affect the prosecutor's decisions 
at screening and later in the case. However, the decision 
of whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty at 
trial did not appear to be influenced by characteristics 
of the victim". (8)
With reference to the offence of rape in particular, Kalven and
Zeisel have found that the jury goes beyond determining issues of
consent:
"it goes on to weigh the woman's conduct in the prior 
history of the affair. It closely, and often harshly, 
scrutinizes the female complainant and is moved to be 
lenient with the defendant whenever there are suggestions 
V of contributory behaviour on her part". (9)
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In a similar vein, other writers have examined the degree to which 
the defendant or victim were blamed according to the letter's 
"respectability" (10), and the role of the parties' character on 
jury decisions (11).
In their study of the institutional processing of rape in the 
U.S.A., Holmstrom and Burgess hypothesized a relationship between 
various victim characteristics and the outcome of trials. Although 
the numbers involved were small, the results strongly suggest the 
existence of a systematic link between various attributes of the 
alleged victim, such as general character, sexual reputation, age, 
race, and so on, and the verdict on the offender (12),
It has been noted in previous chapters that during the course of a 
rape trial, the alleged victim's sexual and general character are 
exposed and investigated in far greater detail than they would in 
any other criminal case. She is effectively on trial herself, and 
any suggestion that she may not be entirely innocent is used to 
imply that the defendant is not entirely guilty. Her personal 
attributes, general "respectability" as well sexual reputation are 
central foci of rape trials. In this context, her previous 
relationship with the accused has also been considered. The 
question now arises as to whether evidence or indeed suggestions of 
the kind described in earlier chapters have any bearing on decision 
making in court.
Rape has been viewed as an instrument of social control which 
operates to maintain the dominant position of men
"by restricting the mobility and freedom of movement of
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women, by limiting their casual interaction with the 
opposite sex, and in particular by maintaining the males' 
prerogatives in the erotic sphere. When there is evidence 
that the victim was or gave the appearance of being out 
of her place, she can be raped and the rapist will be 
supported by the cultural values".(13)
Consequently, it has been argued, rape is seen as a legitimate
punishment for women who do not adhere to traditional role
expectations, and the law acts only against those men who do not
rape "appropriately" in this sense. The purpose of this chapter is
to examine how far these views are supported by procedures and
decision making in court.
Firstly, the extent to which the alleged victim is "put on trial" 
will be considered. Issues relating to her character and sexual 
proclivities, as well as to particular aspects of her behaviour at 
the time of the rape incident will be discussed. Secondly, one of 
the central hypotheses of the study will be tested, namely that 
there is a systematic link between characteristics of the 
complainant, both in terms of attributes and behaviour, and the 
outcome of the trial. To this end, the relationship between verdict 
and various features of the alleged victim will be examined in some 
detail. The argument will be extended beyond the issues already 
considered, such as character and sexual reputation, to any 
previous relationship she may have had with the accused as well as 
to specific aspects of her behaviour at the time of the alleged 
offence. These will include perceived victim precipitation or 
"contributory negligence"; the degree of active resistance as 
indicated by physical injuries sustained by the complainant; and 
promptness in reporting the offence to the police.
Before discussing these links, a general point must be made with
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regard to the definition of the above variables. Wherever possible, 
these were established from the prosecution's case and reinforced 
by evidence independent of the complainant. For example, her 
evidence of virginity or of physical injuries was in all cases 
substantially supported by the evidence of the police surgeon 
involved in the case. The time of reporting the offence, similarly, 
was corroborated by police records.
Difficulties sometimes arose, however, with regard to the more 
controversial variables investigated. For example, in trying to 
establish what the relationship had been, prior to the rape 
incident, between the defendant and the alleged victim, one often 
comes up against conflicting accounts given by the prosecution and 
the defence respectively. It has been noted earlier that where the 
defendant alleges a previous consensual episode of sexual 
intercourse, the complainant may well present the incident thus 
referred to as a prior unreported rape. Similarly, defence counsel 
may question the complainant about alleged episodes of mental 
illness or criminal activities in an attempt to undermine her 
credibility, but without any concrete evidence to support the 
suggestions implicit in such questions.
Such seemingly unfounded allegations or suggestions may or may not 
have an effect on the jury's decision with regard to the guilt of 
the accused; in any event, they are so widespread as to make valid 
analysis almost impossible. In an attempt to overcome the 
difficulties inherent in the definition of these more problematic 
variables, evidence presented by the prosecution was used in 
preference to that given by the defence. In other words, we are
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dealing not merely with defence comments and suggestions, but with 
behaviour and attributes which are endorsed by the prosecution as 
being those of the complainant. This has the advantage of removing 
the relevant concepts from the strict context of the adversarial 
system into a wider perspective, and of allowing a more valid 
assessment of the interaction between the variables investigated 
here. We should note, however, that this may lead to an 
underestimation of the effects of complainant characteristics on 
the outcome of the trial. Seemingly unfounded suggestions by the 
defence regarding the complainant’s mental health, for example, 
have not been defined as constituting an attack on her character 
although they may well have an influence on the jury’s view of her 
credibility.
A second general point concerns the statistical analysis used in 
this chapter. The primary aim of this study was not to apply 
rigorous statistical tests to the material collected; indeed, the 
data does not easily lend itself to quantitative analysis. 
Nevertheless, the results presented here strongly suggest that 
various characteristics of the alleged victim do correlate with the 
verdict. All but one of the distributions are in the expected 
direction, some strikingly so, and the chi-square test has been 
used to test the statistical significance of the findings. Of the 
six relationships investigated, four are statistically significant, 
and another is nearing, although not quite reaching significance. 
The combined effect of the various factors favourable to conviction 
is highly significant. It must be remembered that the value of this 
measure increases with sample size and consequently, the results 
presented here are all the more impressive because of the
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relatively small numbers involved.
Previous sexual experience
One of the hypotheses of this study is that the alleged victim’s
prior sexual experience whether with the defendant or other persons
is an important determinant of the outcome of the trial. This has
been investigated by Holmstrom and Burgess in their study of rape
in Massachusetts, in which they argued that a good sexual
reputation in a rape victim is an important factor in conviction.
Their analysis is based on a very small sample but the results,
summarized as follows, are nevertheless very interesting:
’’In all cases of conviction for rape, the victim was 
either a virgin or sexually involved with just one 
partner at the time of the rape’’ (14).
There were very few cases indeed where the jury knew nothing of the
complainant’s sexual past before retiring to consider its verdict.
The prosecution brought in evidence of virginity in all pertinent
cases, and as far as the remainder of the sample is concerned,
evidence of previous sexual experience was introduced in some way
in respect of 96% of the complainants involved. Overall therefore,
it is only for 4% of the alleged victims in this study that no
evidence whatever of sexual past was introduced during the course
of the trial:
TABLE 1. Evidence of the complainant’s sexual experience given at 
the trial
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type of evidence
INTRODUCED
% COMPLAINANTS
Evidence of virginity
Evidence of some sexual 
experience with third 
parties
Evidence of prior sexual 
intercourse with the 
defendant
No evidence at all
20
59
17
96
TOTAL 100.0
There is a staggering difference in the conviction rates of those 
defendants whose victims were virgins,, or of whose sexual past the 
jury knew nothing, and those accused of raping women known to have 
had prior sexual experience. This highlights the perceived 
importance of chastity in the ’’genuine’’ victim of rape: virginity 
all but guarantees the conviction of the accused. In this sample, 
only one out of a total of seventeen defendants was acquitted of 
the rape of a virgin or a woman whose sexual past was not referred 
to during the trial:
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TABLE 2. Evidence of the complainant’s sexual experience and 
outcome of the trial
evidence of sexual DEFENDANT DEFENDANT TOTAL
EXPERIENCE CONVICTED ACQUITTED
Virgin or no evidence 16 (41%) 1 (4%) 17 (27%)
Evidence of some 23 (59%) 22 (96%) 45 (73%)
sexual experience
TOTAL 39 (100%) 23 (100%) 62 (100%)
(15)
rChi-square=9.77, significant at P=0.01]
It is worth briefly considering the other end of the spectrum of 
sexual experience and looking at the conviction rates among those 
men who were accused of raping a woman whose sexual reputation was 
markedly discredited during the trial. This includes alleged 
victims who were or had in the past suffered from sexually 
transmitted diseases, those who had had a reputation in the, local 
community for being sexually available in general terms, those who 
had been involved in sexual intercourse with a number of persons 
within a short period of time and those who were alleged to be 
prostitutes. A total of twenty men in the sample were accused of 
the rape of such women, and 52% of these were acquitted. It is 
interesting to point out that nearly all those defendants who were 
acquitted on the judge’s direction, i.e. whose fate was not felt to 
be safely left with the jury, were accused of raping women alleged 
to have such sexual histories.
The 52% acquittal rate in this group compares with 4% for 
defendants accused of raping virgins. The rate is nearer the 
average for those men whose victims came somewhere in between these 
two groups in terms of their degree of sexual experience:
trial
TYPE OF SEXUAL DEFENDANT DEFENDANT TOTAL
EXPERIENCE CONVICTED ACQUITTED
Virgin or no evidence 16 (41%) 1 (4%) 17 (27%)
General evidence of 
sexual experience
15 (38%) 10 (43%) 25 (40%)
Evidence of "bad" 8 (21%) 12 (52%) 20 (32%)
reputation
TOTAL
(15)
39 (100%) 23 (99%)
rChi-square=l1.684, significant at P=0.01] 
General character
62 (100%)
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The complainant’s general respectability is also hypothesized to be 
an important factor in determining the outcome of the trial. It is 
expected that a conviction will be more likely in cases where the 
alleged victim is seen as a ’’decent’’ or ’’respectable" woman. If she 
is blameworthy in one area, then she will be presented as 
blameworthy altogether, and she cannot therefore aspire to the
status of the innocent, genuine victim that the stereotype favours.
Holmstrom and Burgess lend support to this argument. Their findings 
suggest that
"a victim of good ’general reputation’ is also useful for 
conviction, but this factor does not seem as salient as 
sexual experience...In the majority of convictions, the
victim was of ’respectable character’. In most
acquittals, the victim’s character was discredited in 
some way". (16)
The category of ’highly discredited’ character in Table 4. refers 
to cases where a serious attack was made on the complainant s 
credibility and where, to some extent at least, the basis of that 
attack was substantiated by evidence from the prosecution. The
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following is a typical example;
The complainant was a young woman in her 20s, recently 
separated from her husband and the mother of a small 
child. There was a custody dispute between her and her 
husband, and at the time of the alleged rape, her child 
was in local authority care. After the separation, she 
was feeling very depressed and began to drink more than 
usual, and went to her doctor about this. She was sent 
for outpatient treatment for her depression and drink 
problem, and was seeing a psychiatrist once a fortnight 
for about three months, when she began to feel better.
During this time, she also lost her job because she could 
not cope with it, and persistently turned up late for 
work. She was questioned closely about all these matters 
by defence counsel who suggested that she was mentally 
unstable, clearly disturbed with a grudge against men, 
and an unfit mother with a serious drinking problem whose 
evidence could not be relied on. (Case 56)
Table 4. shows that defendants whose alleged victims had been
successfully discredited in this way have a higher acquittal rate
than others. The difference is statistically significant, and
supports the hypothesis that women who are perceived as having a
"good" character have a better chance of having their rape
complaint believed than others:
TABLE 4. Evidence of the complainant's general character and 
outcome of the trial
EVIDENCE OF GENERAL DEFENDANT DEFENDANT
CHARACTER CONVICTED ACQUITTED
TOTAL
Complainant not 
discredited
31 (76%)
Complainant markedly 10 (24%) 
discredited
15 (52%) 
14 (48%)
46 (66%) 
24 (34%)
TOTAL
(17)
41 (100%) 29 (100%) 70 (100%)
[Chi-square = 4.3, significant at P=0.05]
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Previous relationship with the accused
One important and particularly enduring myth about rape is that it
is an offence which generally involves people who were previously
not known to each other. A vast number of empirical studies in
recent years have shown conclusively that this is not so. In Amir’s
study, 57% of the offenders were to some degree known to the victim
(18). Sanders found that in another American sample, 68% of the
cases involved strangers while the remainder were acquaintances,
close neighbours, friends or relatives (19). Holmstrom and
Burgess's study of rape victims reveals that 39% (40/102) of them
knew the offender prior to the assault (20). Closer to home,
Wright's study of rape records considered genuine by the police in
six English counties finds an even higher proportion of offences
committed by men known to the victim;
"Most of the attacks, whether committed by a lone man or 
a group of men, involved people who knew each other. In 
about 60 per cent of the assaults, the victim could name 
her assailant. Two thirds of these cases involved 
relationships which could be described as 'close'. In the 
rest, the parties were briefly or superficially 
acquainted". (21)
Nevertheless, in spite of overwhelming evidence that strangers have
no monopoly on rape, the myth that the only genuine rapes are
committed by the mad, bad rapist leaping out of a dark alley
continues to influence the way in which juries perceive the offence
and decide on guilt or innocence.
It should be noted that the process of dismissing as unfounded 
rapes which do not fit into this category begins long before the 
trial stage is reached. Wright noted that victims were less likely 
to even report a rape when the attacker was not a stranger;
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"It seems that when the victim knew her attacker, she was 
especially hesitant in contacting the police. The reasons 
for this may have been an awareness that the police view 
such complaints with scepticism, or the fear of reprisals 
from the rapist or his friends". (22)
The police may also be less willing to accept as genuine complaints
of rape allegedly committed by a man known to the woman involved,
and these cases may drop out of the system at an early stage. An
American study of rapes classified as 'unfounded' by the police
found that the prior relationship between the parties involved was
an important factor affecting the likelihood of a complaint being
dismissed:
"The largest percentage of unfoundings came from cases in 
which the alleged offender was a date (43%) or an 
acquaintance (28%) as compared with a friend (19%) or a 
stranger (18%)." (23)
Holmstrom and Burgess also considered the link between prior
victim-offender relationship and outcome of the trial, and found
that it did not differentiate cases at the supreme court level.
They did note, however, that almost all convictions in their sample
were for rapes committed by strangers; but most acquittals were in
that category too. They interpreted this as follows:
"What these figures mean is that the bias is so strong 
against cases of rape committed by a person known to the 
victim that they drop out early in the system, long 
before they reach either the plea-bargaining or trial 
stage". (24)
In the present sample, the majority (66%) of the defendants who 
pleaded not guilty to a rape charge were previously known to the 
complainant. It is interesting to note that among those defendants 
who pleaded guilty, the percentage of stranger rapes was 
considerably higher at 53%, compared to only 34% among the not 
guilty pleas. There may be another process at work here, whereby 
defendants whose offence more closely approximates to the 
stereotype of the "real" rape are more likely to be selected into
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the group who do not contest the charge.
The type of existing relationship varied considerably. In some 
cases, the parties involved were general acquaintances, who may or 
may not have known each other's full names. This group included, 
for example, two adolescents who had been at the same school for 
some years, and knew each other by sight, and a complainant who 
worked as a cashier in a garage and whose assailant was a regular 
customer there. In other instances, the relationship was closer: 
one young woman complained of being raped by her brother's friend 
whom she had met at the family home on many occasions. The category 
also includes former boyfriends/eirlfriends, and cases where the 
complainant and the defendant lived in the same household (e.g. 
assaults by step-fathers).
Table 5. shows that there is a significant difference between the 
conviction rates of the two groups. Thus, it seems that in the 
sample, the existence of a previous relationship between the 
complainant and the defendant in general terms has a systematic 
effect on the jury's finding of guilt:
TABLE 5. Previous relationship between defendant and complainant 
and outcome of the trial
PREVIOUS
RELATIONSHIP
DEFENDANT
CONVICTED
DEFENDANT
ACQUITTED
TOTAL
Persons known 
Strangers
23 (56%) 
18 (44%)
23 (79%)
6 (21%)
46 (66%) 
24 (34%)
Total
(17)
41 (100%) 29 (100%) 70 (100%)
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[Chi-square = 4.06, significant at P = 0.05]
The link between any previous sexual involvement between defendant
a n d  complainant and the outcome of the trial provides another
illustration of the importance of a "good" sexual reputation. As
Sanders notes, the assumption seems to be that
"the woman’s worth, her reputation, is measured by the 
rape law in terms of her decision to have sex with a man, 
and if she does so voluntarily on one occasion, her worth 
is less on another if the man rapes her" (25).
This'is supported by the findings of another American study on
decision making by simulated juries, which reports that a
"specific relationship category which had a high rate of 
case dismissal is the group which has some kind of past 
or present romantic involvement, composed of the 
relationships of ’ex-spouse’, ’cohabiting person' and 
'girlfriend or boyfriend'. The rates of attrition for 
these cases were far above the average for all cases"
(26).
The number of cases involving such a relationship, acknowledged by 
both defendant and complainant, in the present study is very small. 
(N=5) but nearly all of the defendants in those cases were 
acquitted:
TABLE 6. Prior sexual involvement between defendant and complainant 
and outcome of the trial
PRIOR SEXUAL 
INVOLVEMENT
DEFENDANT
CONVICTED
DEFENDANT
ACQUITTED
TOTAL
No
Yes
40 (98%) 
1 (2%)
25 (86%)
4 (14%)
65 (93%) 
5 (7%)
TOTAL 41 (100%) 29 (100%) 70 (100%) (17)
rChi-sauare=5.17, significant at P=0.025]
The only conviction was in a somewhat unusual case, where the 
defendant and the complainant had had sexual intercourse on one 
occasion several years before the rape but had not seen each other 
at all in the intervening period, until he broke into her flat.
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forcibly disconnected the telephone, threatened her with a knife 
and left the following day, leaving a note to apologize for what he 
had done. (Case 73)
"Contributory negligence"
The concept of victim precipitation, at least as far as rape is 
concerned, originates in Amir's study (27). We have seen above that 
his definition of it implies a highly prejudicial and biased notion 
which seems to find its roots in various psychoanalytical theories 
where the victims of rape are seen as primary motivators of the 
offence.
It has been noted that as an academically respectable concept and 
as a valid analytical tool victim precipitation has attracted heavy 
but justified criticism. However, the popular stereotype of rape 
continues to define the 'true' victim as the totally innocent prey 
of a highly disturbed man. If she is seen as contributing to her 
victimization, she generally finds it more difficult to convince a 
jury of her allegation of rape. A number of studies have noted that 
where there is any indication that the victim somehow provoked the 
offence, the jury is likely to take a more lenient view of the 
crime, and although this phenomenon holds for other offences too, 
its implications for rape are particularly noteworthy.
Where the defence is one of consent, it may be sufficient to secure 
an acquittal to establish that the complainant had consented to 
being in the situation where the alleged offence occurred. If for 
example it can be shown that she accompanied him willingly or that
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she allowed him into her home, then the jury will be asked to infer 
consent to intercourse from her consent to being in the situation 
where the incident took place. As one defence counsel made this 
point for the jury;
Defence counsel; She went into the car and to the flat 
willingly - you must consider this in deciding whether 
sexual intercourse with (him) was without her consent. 
Consider her getting into the car - is that a risk any 
ordinary person would take? In the light of her admission 
of him taking her hand, and her going along anyway, her 
behaviour was not inconsistent with consent to sexual 
intercourse. (Case 5)
This followed cross-examination aimed at establishing how the
complainant came to be in the company of the defendants. The
existence of a prior relationship between them (he was a friend of
her sister's and known to her for many years) was in this case
underplayed by the defence, and she was questioned at length about
her reasons for going to his flat willingly:
Defence counsel: Would you have gone for a drink with the 
defendant?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: If the other man got into the car, why 
didn't you leave?
Complainant: I thought I was safe with the defendant. It 
didn't cross my mind that something like this would 
happen.
Defence counsel: But you were prepared to go shopping 
with them, and to the defendant's flat?
Complainant: Yes. I knew the defendant. I trusted him.
(Case 5)
In another case, the accused was charged with attempting to rape a
young woman he had met the evening of the alleged incident. It
differs from the previous example insofar as there were more
overtly sexual elements involved in the situation. Consequently,
the defence tried to establish and underline not only her consent
to being in the situation, but also consent to what was alluded to
as preliminary sexual activities:
Defence counsel: Did you have a conversation about how 
the defendant was going home?
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Complainant; Yes, I understood he was going to Clapham.
Defence counsel: Did you discuss how you were getting 
home?
Complainant: I think I had a conversation with him about 
a night bus.
Defence counsel: And was it suggested in the conversation 
that he walk you to the bus?
Complainant: Yes, we both decided that.
Defence counsel: And you were perfectly happy for him to 
do that?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: (On the way to the bus stop) he asked 
you for a good night kiss, and you were quite happy for 
him to do that, were you not?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: What sort of a kiss was it?
Complainant: Just a kiss.
Defence counsel: He had his arms around you, pressed 
against you and you against him, isn't that right? 
Complainant: I think he did have his arm around me, in a 
sort of embrace. (Case 14)
The assumption seems to be that a woman who gives a man any sort of
sexual encouragement and then retracts from intercourse has so much
responsibility for the offence herself that this negates the
occurrence of it altogether. In this particular case, prosecution
counsel overtly condoned and indeed supported the logic of
acquitting in his closing speech:
Prosecution counsel: If she really said 'yes' up to the 
last minute and then changed her mind, you might think 
that she asked for it. (Case 14)
On occasions, the judge may try to redress the balance by pointing
out to the jury the dangers of inferring consent to intercourse
from such behaviour, as the following extract illustrates:
Judge: It's true that the girls put themselves in that 
situation. It would have been wiser to run out, or shout.
On the other hand, put yourselves in that situation.
Don't say they were silly to be there in the first place 
- that has nothing to do with it at all. (Case 32)
Disapproval of victims who are seen as taking risks has often been
expressed by judges in sentencing. For example, now retired High
Court judge. Sir Melford Stevenson, had this to say about
hitchhiking victims of rape:
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"A girl looking for a lift who gets into a car at night 
with a man she doesn’t know can reasonably be said to be 
asking for sexual attention". (28)
More recently, another judge caused a major public outcry when he
fined a self confessed rapist because of what he termed
'contributory negligence' on the part of the victim (29). But do
juries take such matters into account when they try rape offences?
Holmstrom and Burgess considered how far the alleged victim's 
consent to being in the situation was linked to the verdict, and 
found some association although not one amounting to statistical 
significance;
"In the majority of convictions the victim unwillingly 
accompanied the assailant. In contrast, in most of the 
acquittals, the victim willingly accompanied the 
assailant". (30)
In the present study, the complainant's consent to being in the
situation does not, in itself, correlate with the verdict.
Acquittal and conviction rates are almost identical in the
'consent' and 'no consent' groups (Table 7.), which indicates that
this variable does not have any impact on the outcome of the trial.
We shall see later, however, that when the overall effect of all
factors favourable to conviction is considered, consent to being in
the situation in conjunction with other factors, may well tip the
scales in favour of the defendant:
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outcome of the trial
COMPLAINANT'S CONSENT DEFENDANT DEFENDANT TOTAL
TO THE SITUATION CONVICTED ACQUITTED
No consent 17 (41%) 12 (41%) 29 (41%)
Consent 24 (59%) 17 (59%) 41 (59%)
Total
(17)
41 (100%) 29 (100%) 70 (100%)
[Not significant]
The complainant's injuries
The edition of Archbold on Pleading, Evidence and Practice in
Criminal Cases which was current in 1975 when the Heilbron Group
was appointed defined rape as follows:
"It must be proved that the accused had sexual 
intercourse with the complainant without her consent...
The prosecution must prove either that the girl 
physically resisted or, if she did not, that her 
understanding and knowledge were such that she was not in 
a position to decide whether to consent or resist" (31).
In their Report, the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape emphasized
the consent element in the offence, and argued that the use of
force and violence should not be regarded as an essential
ingredient of it:
"It is ... wrong to assume that the woman must show signs 
of injury or that she must always physically resist 
before there can be a conviction for rape. We have found 
this erroneous assumption held by some and therefore hope 
that our recommendations will go some way to dispel it".
(32)
Their recommendation was incorporated in the 1976 Act which defines 
rape as "unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time 
of the intercourse does not consent to it" (33), and which makes no 
reference to the need to establish physical resistance in this
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context.
Nevertheless, an observation of court procedure clearly shows that 
violence is still deemed to be necessary for a conviction. If the 
woman can show that she physically resisted her attacker and 
sustained injuries in the process, she is much more likely to 
substantiate her allegation of rape than if she only offered verbal 
or passive resistance. As defence counsel commented in one such 
case.
Defence counsel; The rapes one reads about in the press 
are savage ones, where consent does not arise. That’s a 
straightforward case of rape, where the issues are clear. 
There has been a tragic misunderstanding here. (Case 14)
The need to look for signs of injury is frequently underlined for
the jury who are told that in ’real' rape cases one should always
expect to find evidence of physical violence. The following
extracts illustrate this point;
Defence counsel: There is no medical evidence, only an 
old bruise. There is no scientific evidence - in cases 
such as this, one is accustomed to buttons missing, 
fingernail scratches, torn clothes. There is nothing like 
that here. (Case 34).
Judge: Regarding the evidence of the girl, I have come to 
the conclusion that none of the things happened that one 
might expect: no scratches, no pain, no injuries, no 
evidence that she struggled. (Case 7)
There is a great deal of conflicting opinion, incidentally, as to
whether or not it is wise for a woman to physically resist her
attacker. Lack of resistance will certainly look bad in court,
while fighting back may expose the victim to further physical
injuries. Holmstrom and Burgess summarize the dilemma with this
sobering observation:
"If they do not struggle, they have a very hard time in 
court. If they do struggle, they run the risk of
incurring even worse injuries at the hands of the
rapist".(34)
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Groth and Cohen confirm the unpredictability of the effect of
resistance on the attacker from first hand interviews with
convicted rapists, who were asked about their reaction to it:
"One rapist answered, 'When my victim screamed, I ran'; 
another said, 'When my victim screamed, I cut her 
throat'". (35)
Whatever the risks to herself, physical resistance is expected of
the 'genuine' complainant.In cross-examination, defence counsel
usually makes a point of establishing just exactly how active her
resistance to the accused had been. The standard strategy is to try
and show that she did not put up a very convincing struggle, and
that she missed many opportunities of escape. In the absence of any
evidence of marked physical injury, the complainant's
cross-examination may be centered entirely around this issue:
Defence counsel: I suggest you made a weak attempt at 
moving his hand and when he persisted, you stopped 
objecting.
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: I suggest he didn't do anything to force 
you - he didn't put his hand over your mouth.
Complainant: Yes he did, and he had his hands behind my 
back.
Defence counsel: Did you scratch his face?
Complainant: You don't think of that at the time.
Defence counsel: Surely, it's instinctive?
Complainant : I didn't have the strength to do anything.
Defence counsel: Did you try and run away?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: Did you hit him?
Complainant: No.
Defence counsel: Did you push him away?
Complainant: Yes.
Defence counsel: Kick him?
Complainant : You don't think of things like that. I've 
already explained.
Defence counsel: Did you do any of those things?
Complainant : I was too scared. (Case 20)
Having sustained injuries in the course of the rape is not
necessarily enough to convince a jury of lack of consent. The
defence may suggest that the particular woman's injuries are not as
serious as they would have been in a "real" rape. In one case where
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the complainant had extensive bruising all over her body after
being beaten and raped by two men, defence counsel's closing speech
went as follows;
Defence counsel: There are not as many or as serious 
injuries as might be expected from her account. What she 
does have is consistent with vigorous sexual intercourse 
with consent, but in rather cramped conditions ... If she 
had been fighting for her honour as she says she was, 
there would be some injury to the defendants too. The 
examination shows that there wasn't - no sign of injury 
anywhere on them. (Case 52)
There are cases where the alleged victim's injuries are so severe
that it is impossible to minimize or understate them with any
credibility. It may then be conceded by the defence that she had
been "unfortunate" but nevertheless argued that her physical
condition after the assault was not inconsistent with consent:
Defence counsel: Some people prefer sex in a violent way 
- it was not necessarily without her consent. (Case 5)
On occasions the defence go to considerable lengths to sustain this
position. In one case, for example, the complainant had a vaginal
tear requiring several stitches as a result of the rape, and the
police surgeon who examined her gave evidence that such a tearing
of the tissues was extremely unlikely to occur unless considerable
force was used. The defence was to dispute this view and called
another doctor as an expert witness. The following is an extract
from his evidence:
Medical witness: There is not a single obstetrician who 
has practised over five years (sic) who hasn't seen such 
tears as a result of consensual sexual intercourse in 
non-virgins. The dangers of inferring lack of consent 
from genital injuries are commonly taught in forensic 
medicine textbooks. These tears simply occur through 
penetration, when there is a disproportion in the size of 
those involved. (Case 57)
Clearly then, much effort is invested in rape trials in
establishing that a complainant without injuries is not to be
believed, and that even severe injuries should be interpreted with
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caution as they do not necessarily equate with lack of consent. One
hypothesis of this study is that the extent of injuries sustained
by the alleged victim correlates with the outcome of the trial.
This link was also examined by Holmstrom and Burgess who found that
"in the majority of convictions, the victim sustained 
moderate to severe general physical damage ... In 
contrast, in almost all the acquittals, there were 
minimal or no general physical injuries". (36)
In this study, injuries are defined as physical damage sustained in
the course of the rape incident, including gynaecological damage,
but excluding the tearing of the hymen alone. "Some" injury
consists of isolated bruises and superficial scratches, while
"moderate to severe" injury refers to extensive bruising,
lacerations, tearing of tissues or fractures.
The conviction rate among men who inflicted moderate or severe 
physical injuries on their victims is higher than among those who 
behaved less violently. The difference is near statistical 
significance but does not quite reach it. Nevertheless, the data 
clearly suggest that evidence of violence additional to the sexual 
assault is helpful in securing a conviction. The bruised and 
battered woman approximates to the stereotype of the "ideal" rape 
victim more closely than the one whose sexual violation results in 
less marked physical injuries;
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TABLE 8. Complainant’s injuries and outcome of the trial
EXTENT OF INJURIES 
SUSTAINED BY THE 
COMPLAINANT
DEFENDANT
CONVICTED
DEFENDANT
ACQUITTED
TOTAL
Moderate to severe(37) 20 (49%)
None or minimal(37) 21 (51%)
Total 41 (100%)
(100)(17)
[Chi-square=2.2, not significant] 
Time of reporting
9 (31%) 
20 (69%)
29 (100%)
29 (41%) 
41 (59%)
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Although there is widespread acceptance of the fact that the vast
majority of rapes go unreported because the victim is too
embarrassed and ashamed to go to the police, there is also an
expectation that the "genuine" victim will be so distressed by the
assault that she will report it immediately. These conflicting
assumptions exist side by side, but when it comes to the law, the
latter takes precedence. It has been noted earlier that one of the
unique features of the law relating to rape is that evidence of an
"early complaint" is admissible at the trial. This indicates the
law’s the assumption that if an immediate report is not essential
to prove that the offence occurred, it is at least very helpful in
showing that the alleged victim’s behaviour was consistent with
lack of consent;
"The evidence (of fresh complaint) is not to be taken as 
proof of the facts complained of, but only as a matter to 
be borne in mind by the jury in considering the 
consistency, and therefore, the credibility, of the 
complainant’s story" (38).
Studies have been done in the U.S.A. on the social and 
psychological determinants of reporting behaviour in victims of
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rape, and they have found that there are many reasons why women
choose not to report, including embarrassment, fear of retaliation
and of further ordeals, shame, and a desire to avoid the stigma of
being known as a rape victim. (39) Dukes studied a group of women
who had been victims of rape and looked for differences between the
reporters and non-reporters. He found that four main variables
distinguished the two groups:
"One of these variables was the strength of fear 
experienced by the victim immediately after the rapist 
left. The stronger the fear, the more likely the victim 
is to report the offence. The other three variables 
concerned the victim's impressions of police handling of 
rape cases. The three variables were concern, efficiency, 
and consideration. The higher the victim’s appraisal of 
police with respect to these three variables, the more 
likely the victim is to report the offence." (40)
If similar factors apply in this country, recent publicity
regarding the alleged victim’s treatment at the police station will
not have improved women’s perceptions of police consideration and
is unlikely to have encouraged them to report rapes. (41) A study
by the Scottish Home and Health Department indicates that a
substantial majority of complainants in rape cases found various
aspects of the police investigation stressful. In particular, there
were strong criticisms of the lack of consideration and disbelief
with which the victims felt they were being treated. The same study
reports that 45% of the cases in their sample proceeded no further
than the police stage. (42) The Advisory Group on the Law of Rape
did not consider fully the police treatment of rape victims, but
urged that their interrogation should be conducted in a "tactful
and sympathetic" manner (43) and more recently, new guidelines
issued by the Home Office on this subject also indicate an official
acknowledgment that all is not well with the treatment complainants
receive at the police station.(44)
ZÜ2
Nevertheless, any delay in reporting is held against the alleged
victim at the trial. As one defence counsel put it,
Defence counsel; Afterwards, she doesn't go to the 
police, or anyone in the street to complain. She doesn't 
complain to her mother, which would have been normal.
Instead, she lies to her. Is her conduct afterwards 
consistent with that of a person who was raped, or who 
consented? (Case 3)
If the complainant fails to report the offence for days or weeks,
she is most unlikely to be believed. In cross-examination she will
be asked to justify the delay, and this may give the defence an
opportunity to suggest the "real" reason for what is presented as
an unquestionably false complaint:
Defence counsel: Why didn't you go to the police (after 
the rape)?
Complainant: I was too terrified ... I thought they'd be 
harsh ... I thought they would be very unsympathetic.
Judge: Why did you go eventually?
Complainant : I felt ashamed of what had happened to me. I 
also thought that he might rape somebody else, or come 
back and rape me again.
Defence counsel: At what stage did you go to the police? 
Complainant : I went the day I found out about the 
pregnancy.
Defence counsel: I suggest you went because you wanted to
blame somebody for getting you pregnant. So that you
could justify your pregnancy to your relatives. (Case 7)
Another strategy is for the defence to set up expectations in the
jury as to what happens in a "real" rape, and then to ask them to
judge their case with reference to that, and to draw what is
presented as the inevitable conclusion about the defendant's guilt:
Defence counsel: Consider the circumstances in which the 
allegation was made. Rape and indecent assault are 
extremely serious charges. You'd expect that an 
allegation of rape would be made at the earliest 
opportunity - because it is such outrageous conduct, in 
this case, by someone the complainant knew. If there is 
any truth in it, why didn't she make a complaint the 
following morning? She could have gone out and complained 
straight after the incident. She could have complained to 
her neighbours. She could have told someone at work, on
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Friday, Saturday or Sunday. But it wasn't until Monday 
that she went to the Magistrates Court (and afterwards, 
to the police), (Case 45)
When a complaint is made an hour or two after the incident, the
alleged victim may still be asked to justify this delay. In the
following extract, the complainant said that she went to the police
station immediately after the rape, but there was some discrepancy
between her timing and that of the police officer who first saw
her. Defence counsel commented on this as follows:
Defence counsel: It is more than significant evidence if 
the complainant makes her complaint as soon as possible.
There is something wrong about that in this case: it is 
not disputed that she arrived at the police station after 
5:20 p.m., but she got out of the (defendant's) car at 
3:50 p.m. We have no evidence of what happened in 
between, (Case 5)
The jury in this case were unable to reach a verdict and a retrial
was ordered. In the second trial the police produced further
evidence which confirmed that the complaint was in fact made at the
earlier time of 4 p.m., and the defendant was convicted.
Defence counsel invariably refers to any delay in reporting in 
cross-examination and comments on it in the closing speech: not 
making an immediate formal complaint is sometimes referred to as 
"an extraordinary thing to do" (Case 4), going against "what you'd 
expect a girl who has been raped to do" (Case 32).
Is there any systematic link between the time of reporting a rape
and the verdict? In their study Holmstrom and Burgess found that
"prompt reporting of the rape is important for conviction 
... Reporting promptly seems to be necessary for but does
not guarantee conviction". (45)
The present study also finds a correlation between these variables. 
About 40% of the victims reported the offence after some delay.
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ranging from one day to around three months. The conviction rate 
for those accused of the rape of late reporters differed from the 
rate for those whose victims made an immediate complaint, and the 
difference is statistically significant:
TABLE 9. Time of reporting the rape and outcome of the trial
TIME OF 
REPORTING
Immediately 
Some delay(46)
Total
(17)
DEFENDANT
CONVICTED
30 (73%) 
11 (27%)
41 (100%)
DEFENDANT
ACQUITTED
11 (38%) 
18 (62%)
29 (100%)
TOTAL
41 (59%)
29 (41%)
70 (100%)
[Chi-square=8.69, significant at P=0.01]
Combined effect of factors favouring conviction
Of the six variables considered in this chapter, four significantly 
relate to the outcome of the trial, and two are not statistically 
significant. All the distributions, however, are in the expected 
direction. So far, these factors have been considered in isolation 
from each other and their possible combined effect has not been 
mentioned. However, while the effect of some variables alone (e.g. 
consent to being in the situation) does not seem strong enough to 
have a significant impact on the outcome of the trial, it may be 
that, coupled with one or more factors (e.g. evidence of 
promiscuity and no injuries) it is likely to favour the defendant's 
acquittal.
In order to examine the combined effect of various victim 
characteristics on the outcome of the trial, the clustering of
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factors hypothesized to be favourable for a conviction has been 
looked at. The 'ideal' rape, most closely approximating to the 
stereotype, is one where the victim is sexually inexperienced, was 
not in the defendant's company willingly, physically resisted and 
got injured, and promptly reported the offence. A further factor 
which is thought to favour conviction is the presence of more than 
one defendant. An index of factors constructed on these assumptions 
strongly relates to the outcome of the trial. Cases with a low 
number (0-2) of factors favouring conviction were significantly 
more likely to lead to an acquittal than those with a high number 
(3-6) of such factors:
TABLE 10. Factors favourable to conviction and outcome of the trial
NUMBER OF FAVOURABLE DEFENDANT DEFENDANT
FACTORS CONVICTED ACQUITTED
TOTAL
0 to 2 factors 
3 to 6 factors
8 (20%) 
33 (80%)
16 (55%) 
13 (45%)
24 (34%) 
46 (66%)
Total
(17)
41 (100%) 29 (100%) 70 (100%)
[Chi-square=9.58, significant at P=0.01]
It is also noteworthy that there were no convictions at all in the 
cases with no favourable factors present (N=6); and no acquittals 
in the group which had six favourable factors present (N=5). The 
latter group not only seems to be invariably convicted, but usually 
heavier than average sentences are also imposed. One example of 
this type of case is that of an 18 year old vicar's daughter, 
staying for the weekend in her older sister's London flat. While 
she was asleep in the middle of the night, a young man broke into 
the flat and raped her. She put up considerable resistance, and was
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hit and choked by her assailant. He exerted such pressure on her 
throat that she momentarily lost consciousness. As soon as he had 
left, she ran into the street, visibly distressed, and told a 
passer by what had happened. The police were called in immediately. 
During the trial, it emerged that she lived at home with her 
parents, was still at school and although she had a steady 
boyfriend, she had been a virgin before the assault. The defendant 
was convicted.
It is clear that to fully understand the different outcomes of 
criminal trials, one must look at a whole range of factors and not 
only those relating to the complainant. Nevertheless, these 
findings clearly indicate that characteristics of the alleged 
victim have a considerable impact on whether or not the defendant 
in a rape trial is convicted, and that the offence of rape 
continues to be defined largely with reference to the deserving 
character of the complainant.
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PART III. THE EFFECTS OF LAW REFORM
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CHAPTER SEVEN. GENERAL IMPACT OF THE 1976 ACT 
Introduction
Previous chapters have shown that as far as restrictions on the 
admissibility of evidence of sexual past are concerned, the 1976 
Act has had precious little impact on the trial of rape offences. 
Applications to question complainants about their sexual history 
are made systematically when consent is at issue, and they are 
usually successful. Moreover, defence lawyers appear to tie 
extremely resourceful in finding ways of introducing comments and 
suggestions which, even in the absence of formal cross-examination 
as to sexual past, serve to discredit the alleged victim's sexual 
reputation and, consequently, her credibility as a "genuine" rape 
victim.
However, as mentioned above, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976 also brought about fundamental changes with regard to 
anonymity for both complainants and defendants involved in rape 
trials, and gave a statutory definition of the offence of rape 
which incorporates the decision in DPP v Morgan and others 
regarding intent or mens rea. The present chapter examines the 
operation of these innovations, as well as the overall impact of 
the 1976 Act on the reporting and disposition of rape offences.
Anonymity and the complainant
Section 4(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act prohibits the 
publication and broadcasting of the name, and of any other material
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likely to lead to the identification of, a woman as a complainant
in a rape case after a person has been accused of the offence. Any
proprietor, editor, or publisher of a publication which infringes
this rule is liable to a fine of up to £500. A person is "accused"
from the moment when a formal complaint is made alleging that he
has committed the offence, and remains so through all court
appearances and stages of the trial process. The restriction may,
however, be lifted in some circumstances;
"If, before the commencement of a trial at which a person 
is charged with a rape offence, he or another person 
against whom the complainant may be expected to give 
evidence at the trial, applies to a judge of the Crown 
Court for a direction in pursuance of this subsection and 
satisfies the judge -
(a) that the direction is required for the purpose of 
inducing persons to come forward who are likely to be 
needed as witnesses at the trial; and
(b) that the conduct of the applicant’s defence at the 
trial is likely to be substantially prejudiced if the 
direction is not given,
the judge shall direct that the preceding subsection 
shall not, by virtue of the accusation alleging the 
offence aforesaid, apply in relation to the complainant."
(1)
A similar provision exists for persons who have been convicted of a
rape offence, and who have given notice of appeal against the
conviction; they can also apply for the anonymity restriction on
the victim to be lifted and in this instance the Court of Appeal
may direct the publication of her name if it is satisfied
"(a) that the direction is required for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence in support of the appeal; and 
(b) that the applicant is likely to suffer substantial 
injustice if the direction is not given". (2)
A final potential loophole is that a Crown Court judge at a rape
trial may direct that the anonymity provision does hot apply if he
is satisfied that its effect
"is to impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction 
upon the reporting of the proceedings at the trial and
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that it is in the public interest to remove or relax that 
restriction". (3)
It should be noted, however, that he is not empowered to do that 
simply by virtue of the defendant's acquittal at the trial.
These restrictions on publicity with regard to both parties have
attracted heavy criticism. Geis and Geis have claimed that
"By far the most unusual provision of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act is its granting of anonymity (with 
certain exceptions) to both the alleged victim and the 
accused person", (4)
That anonymity would encourage women to report rape offences, they
argue, is,
"at best, a dubious proposition, and certainly so in 
smaller areas where the name of the rape victim becomes 
common knowledge." (5)
But their main criticism is that the anonymity provision implicitly
endorses the basic assumptions and myths that have made rape such a
"special" criminal offence. The need for the complainant's
anonymity is based on the idea that there is something essentially
 ^ different between victims of rape and those of other violent
offences. The implication is that there is something shameful and
stigmatising about rape, something which is likely to compromise
their character and reputation. While they agree that these
assumptions "have much basis in fact", they strongly argue that the
right way forward is not through the endorsement of these notions
through measures like the protection of the complainant's
anonymity. As they put it,
"The fight will be better fought by calm insistence that 
it is no different to be raped than to be victimized, by 
other criminal offences. The incentive for such a 
campaign could be seriously undermined by the new 
anonymity provisions which push rape into a shadowy 
status". (6)
Whilst it is difficult not to sympathize with the ideology embodied
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in this view, it fails to take account of the widespread concern 
that has developed over recent years over what is estimated to be 
very large numbers of unreported rapes, as well as over the plight 
of the rape victim who not only has to go through the trauma of 
giving evidence in a court of law, but also frequently has to 
suffer the additional ordeal of seeing detailed accounts of the 
most personal and intimate aspects of her evidence in the local, or 
indeed the national, press.
A study of the press coverage of rape cases in Britain over two 
decades before 1976 found that 54% of the reports revealed the name 
of the victim, and a third also gave her address. Details of the 
evidence and various discrediting remarks made to her by defence 
counsel were also reported, although not as frequently as the 
authors expected. They also noted that, particularly after an 
acquittal,
"newspapers often add somewhat gratuitous remarks about
the victims which will possibly titillate their readers".
(7)
Although the authors found no deterioration in the quality of press 
reports over the period of study, the tremendous violation of 
privacy which results from detailed reports has, probably rightly, 
been argued to be a significant deterrant when it comes to women's 
willingness to make a complaint of rape.
There are two principal ways of evaluating the effect of granting 
anonymity to complainants in rape cases: one is to ask how the 
provision is being applied, i.e. how often successful applications 
are made to disclose the name of the complainant, how far 
newspapers respect the law in this respect, whether and how far the
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law is enforced, and whether there have been any significant 
changes in the newspaper reporting of the offence. The second 
concerns the effect of changes on the reporting behaviour of women 
who have been raped: has the Act been successful in encouraging 
more women to come forward and report the offence to the police, or 
does rape continue to be as underreported as it had previously 
been? It is, of course, impossible to measure separately the impact 
of different components of the 1976 Act in this respect. The 
present section is chiefly concerned with the first set of 
questions, while the broader impact of the Act on reporting 
behaviour will be considered below.
Fears that judges would use their powers to lift the anonymity 
restriction on the complainant when the defendant is acquitted 
where they believed that she had lied or made a false accusation 
(8) appear so far to have been unfounded. There have to date been 
no reports of judges lifting the ban^under Section 4(3) on their 
own initiative, and only one case where the defendant made a 
successful application before the start of his trial to have the 
complainant's name published.
That case was unusual in a number of respects. Firstly, the 
defendant Powell, described in some newspaper reports as an 
"apparently wealthy company director", was one of only two middle 
class men charged with rape in this sample. Secondly, he had a 
number of convictions for obtaining pecuniary advantage, on each 
occasion by giving prostitutes invalid paying instruments. Thirdly, 
while awaiting trial on bail for this offence, he committed another 
rape for which he was subsequently also tried at the Central
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Criminal Court, Before his first trial, his counsel invoked Section 
4(2) of the 1976 Act for the name of the complainant to be "given 
as much publicity as possible" (9), so that witnesses may come 
forward to support the defendant's allegation that she was a 
prostitute who specialised in offering herself for flagellation.
The undisputed fact that the complainant was a prostitute would 
have been introduced by the prosecution at the trial, and in the 
unlikely event that the prosecution made no reference to it, the 
defence most certainly would have. In none of the cases of this 
study was evidence of prostitution kept from the jury, and it is 
most unlikely that such evidence would ever be excluded under the 
provisions of Section 2. It is doubtful whether evidence of 
prostitution is relevant to the issue of consent, but Powell 
certainly did not need to publicise the complainant's name merely 
to show that she was a prostitute. Nevertheless, he was charged 
with rape as well as with assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 
and his attempt to publicise what in court was termed "a special 
kind of rather attractive side show for clients who preferred it" 
arose from that lesser charge. Before agreeing to lift the 
publicity ban, the judge did remark that he had also to have regard 
to the complainant's feelings, but Powell's counsel replied that 
the publicity could be argued to potentially boost her trade. It 
was perhaps rather naive of everyone concerned to genuinely expect 
witnesses to come forward to give evidence of their specific 
dealings with the complainant under these circumstances and, not 
suprisingly, no such witnesses were produced at the trial. The 
judge's decision in this case was fiercely criticised by women's 
groups who interpreted it as the thin end of the wedge, but to date
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this fear too appears to have been unjustified. Since the 1976 Act, 
Powell has been the only defendant charged with rape to succeed in 
publicising the complainant's name.
There have been no legal cases claiming a breach of the law on the
anonymity of the victim, and only one complaint to the Press
Council about a report which appeared in the East London
Advertiser. In that instance, the complainant was not named but the
Press Council took the view that the report would have led to the
identification of the woman in the area where the paper was
published. In upholding the complaint, the Council noted;
"It is accepted by all newspapers that they do not 
identify victims in cases of this kind. In this instance 
the description of the victim given in the newspaper 
would clearly identify her to people in the circles in 
which she moved and was perhaps more objectionable than 
identification by name to people who were not known to 
her." (10)
So, newspaper publishers and broadcasters appear to conform to 
Section 4 of the 1976 Act. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the
Act has not gone far enough and that the privacy of victims may
still be threatened by the publication of various details such as 
their age, nationality, where they work or live, etc. Women may be 
referred to as Miss X. in these reports, but at times their 
authentic initials are used. Details such as these, in combination 
with extracts from the evidence presented at a trial, may identify 
victims at least in the local community which is precisely where 
they would most want to avoid publicity. It is unlikely that cases 
of this sort would be reported to bodies like the Press Council.
Advocates of the 1976 reforms hoped that apart from ensuring the
rape victim's anonymity, the new provisions would also alter the
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person, Rupert Murdoch - have the widest coverage of rape 
cases. In 1978, there were 72 reports in the News of the 
World, and 32 in the Sun. But, remarkably, not one rape 
case in that year was covered by both newspapers. The 
possibility of this happening by chance is so remote as 
to defy calculation... From this kind of evidence, we 
suspect that the press is increasingly using the soft 
pornography of rape reports, and reports of other sex 
crimes, as a mechanism to sell newspapers," (13)
Anonymity and the defendant
Anonymity for persons accused of rape was considered but rejected
by the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape. Nevertheless, the clause
covering this matter was introduced during the Committee Stage of
the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill. Some MPs felt that it was
"intolerable" for the complainant to be given anonymity while the
defendant did not enjoy a similar privilege. The House of Commons
rejected the Heilbron Committee’s view that comparisons and
parallels should not be drawn between complainant and accused, but
rather between persons accused of rape and those accused of other
offences. The granting of anonymity for the complainant alone was
thought to be a dangerous course of action, which would mean that
"someone who brings a completely groundless and, perhaps, 
malicious accusation of rape can be protected both from 
the social disapproval of the community and, in most 
cases,,., from other redress at the hands of the 
unfortunate defendant, while the defendant’s name can be 
stigmatised even if he is fully (sic) acquitted." (14)
It was also argued that rape is not only a "special" offence for
the complainant, but that it carries unique elements for the
defendant too; the stigma of being unjustly accused of rape was
such that
"an acquittal...is not enough finally and thoroughly to 
clear a man’s name and cleanse his character. There will 
always be those in the community and at work who are 
taking decisions about career prospects of the man who 
will say "No smoke without fire", and that can be most 
damaging to the individual". (15)
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These arguments, despite some opposition, were found convincing by
the majority of the House of Commons and the Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act 1976 protects the defendant from publicity until
"after he has been convicted of the offence at a trial 
before the Crown Court". (16)
However, if the accused person himself applies either to a
magistrates' court before his trial, or to the Crown Court during
his trial, to have this restriction lifted the Court may direct
that the anonymity clause should not apply to that person under the
following circumstances:
"(a) the judge is satisfied that the effect of the 
preceding subsection is to impose a substantial and 
unreasonable restriction on the reporting of proceedings 
at the trial and that it is in the public interest to 
remove the restriction in respect of that person; or 
(b) that person applies to the judge for a direction in 
pursuance of this subsection." (17)
An accused person's co-defendant may also apply for the anonymity
provision to be lifted under similar circumstances to those which
apply to the publication of the complainant's name, namely where
witnesses may be needed to come forward and where his defence would
be prejudiced if the accused's name is not publicised. (18)
Outside Parliament, extending anonymity to defendants has received
strong criticism, as most commentators felt that the Heilbron
Group's approach had been right in principle:
"Anonymity for the individual accused of rape, it appears 
obvious, stems from sympathy with the possible woes of 
the "respectable" person who is accused of the crime.
Surely, Parliament had in mind a situation such as one in
which a female of dubious repute accuses a 
well-positioned male - a Judge, a prominent businessman, 
or an M.P., for instance - of having sexually assaulted 
her. Certainly, they were not much concerned with the 
reputations of all falsely accused persons - otherwise, 
they would have seen the illogic of protecting the 
accused rapist from publicity while exposing the 
improperly accused burglar or robber to equally unwanted 
attention". (19)
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As with the complainant, the anonymity provision for the defendant 
is "working" insofar as there have been no prosecutions of 
newspaper publishers or editors to date under Section 6 of the 1976 
Act. There has only been one case where the defendant's name has 
been published on his own initiative after his acquittal had been 
legitimated, as it were, when another man confessed to the crime he 
had been initially charged with.
It is extremely rare for judges to allow the accused's identity to
be revealed after a rape acquittal, even when the person concerned
is convicted of another offence charged in the same indictment. One
notable exception was a direction by Mr. Justice Wien that the
names of twin brothers,acquitted of rape but convicted of unlawful
imprisonment and assault charges should be published. He is
reported as justifying this as follows:
"The editor would be placed in an impossible situation if 
he was not free to publish as heTthought fit in this 
case. Although both defendants have been acquitted of 
rape, 1 think it is in the public interest that he should 
feel free to publish, otherwise there will be an undue 
fetter on the press and there are too many fetters on the 
press at the moment". (20)
One unanticipated and very unfortunate effect of the anonymity
provision for defendants has been that persons acquitted of rape
but convicted of other charges arising from the same incident have,
almost invariably, remained anonymous. Although few such cases have
come to light, concern has been expressed about this phenomenon
which is in breach of the fundamental principle that the identity
of people who lose their liberty should be revealed. As an
editorial in Justice of the Peace commented,
"The Justices' Clerks' Society were surely right in their 
plea to the Government that no further restrictions 
should be placed upon the press without a comprehensive
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review of the existing law, the anomalies to which it can 
give rise and an attempt to balance the public interest 
in truthful and full reporting of criminal proceedings 
against the possible distress to which it can sometimes 
give rise". (21)
Findings relating to the present sample suggest that this
phenomenon may be of considerable magnitude. Table 1. shows that in
the whole sample, almost 20% of the defendants who are acquitted of
a rape charge are nevertheless convicted on other charges. This was
particularly a feature of the group of defendants who were included
in the sub-sample of "guilty" pleas. The charges these men were
convicted of include a variety of offences from indecent assault,
the most common category, to unlawful sexual intercourse, gross
indecency, unlawful imprisonment, buggery and incest as well as the
whole gamut of offences involving assault. It is usually a misnomer
to call these "lesser" offences: with one exception, all these
persons were sentenced to immediate imprisonment, and over half of
them received terms of over two years.
TABLE 1. Persons convicted of charge^, other than rape
DEFENDANT'S
PLEA
ACQUITTED 
OF RAPE. 
CONVICTED 
OF OTHER 
CHARGE
CONVICTED 
OF RAPE.OR 
ACQUITTED 
OF ALL 
CHARGES
TOTAL
"Guilty"
"Not guilty"
11 (34%) 
8 (11%)
21 (66%) 
62 (89%)
32 (100%)
70 (100%)(22)
TOTAL 19 (19%) 83 (81%) 102 (100%)
Of the nineteen defendants involved here, only one was identified 
in the press. He pleaded "not guilty" to rape, but "guilty to
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unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl of 10, and this plea was
accepted by the Crown. It was probably no accident that he received
the highest sentence in this group (18 years) and that he had a
string of convictions for similar offences. In the past, he had
been sentenced to seven years' for indecently assaulting a number
of girls between the ages of 5 and 14. The offence he was charged
with in this instance was committed about a year after he had been
released on licence from that sentence. The judge deemed him "a
menace to little girls" and although he did not lift the anonymity
restriction under Section 6, it was clear from his comments on
sentencing that he had a message for the press to convey:
"The only thing 1 can think of in your favour is that you 
may have been encouraged by the intemperate benevolence 
of those who released you on parole, probably the Home 
Secretary of the day or his advisors". (23)
Under the circumstances, nobody seemed to object to the
identification of this particular defendant. However, there is a
major issue involved here: it is hard to justify the anonymity of
the perpetrators of some very serious offences indeed by virtue of
their (sometimes technical) acquittal of a rape charge. This
anomaly highlights once again the imperative of reforming rape law
in the context of the rest of criminal law, and particularly of not
creating a fundamental distinction between offences which, for all
intents and purposes, are extremely similar. It cannot be argued
with any credibility that the dividing line between attempted rape
and indecent assault, for example, in terms of the damage they may
inflict in the victim or indeed in terms of the defendant's intent,
is a very clear or important one.
Critics of this Section of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976, it is submitted, appear to have been vindicated. There was
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little justification in the first place for defendants and 
complainants in rape cases to be treated in the same way with 
regard to anonymity. As has rightly been observed, there is no 
logic in arguing that being accused and acquitted of rape is any 
more damaging or stigmatising to the person involved than being 
similarly charged wih murder or armed robbery. The implications of 
this anomaly have been compounded by its unforeseen impact on the 
identification of persons acquitted of rape but convicted of other 
offences which may be equally, if not more, serious. The Criminal 
Law Revision Committee’s Report on Sexual Offences which was 
published in April 1984 recognises that anonymity for defendants in 
rape cases is an anomaly and recommends that the provision be 
repealed. It is to be hoped that legislative action will follow 
this proposal in the near future. (24)
Intent and recklessness
The controversy created by the case of DPP v Morgan and others and
the issue of intent in rape have been discussed above (25). The
Advisory Group on the Law of Rape, whose enquiry originated in the
Morgan decision considered the matter in some depth. The Group
concluded that the subjectivist stance of the decision was right in
principle and moreover, argued that the most important although
almost totally overlooked aspect of it lay in its implications for
recklessness:
"For the first time it has been stated clearly and 
unambiguously that recklessness as to whether the woman 
was consenting or not was sufficient mens rea for 
conviction. This was a matter of very considerable 
significance, not only in strengthening the law relating 
to the crime of rape, but also in having very important 
wider implications for the criminal law as a whole, 
particularly in regard to crimes of personal violence".
(26)
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In DPP V Smith (1961), the Law Lords held that a person would have 
the required intent to kill if a reasonable man, rather than the 
accused himself, realised that the other person’s death was the 
probable consequence of his act (27). The decision was dubbed "the 
apotheosis of the law’s reasonable man" (28), and as such provoked 
a storm of protest from academics, lawyers and even judges in other 
jurisdictions. When Lord Hailsham introduced a subjective element 
into the concept of intent in rape, it was part of a general trend 
of subjectivist thinking in the area of criminal responsibility: no 
person accused of a crime was to be convicted unless he himself, 
rather than a hypothetical reasonable man, was aware of the likely 
consequences of his actions. The combination of statute law in the 
shape of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and the decision in Morgan 
marked the end of the era of objective criminal liability.
The dictionary meaning of "reckless" is careless, regardless, or 
heedless of the possible harmful consequences of one’s acts. As far 
as an accused persons’ state of mind is concerned, this may cover a 
whole range of possibilities from failing to give any thought at 
all to the risk of those harmful consequences, to being aware of 
their existence but deciding to ignore them. The question of 
criminal liability in this context is a complex one, particularly 
when the range of proscribed behaviour is considered. Should 
recklessness have the same meaning when applied to rape and 
driving, for example? The Law Commission’s Report on the Mental 
Element in Crime considered this point and recommended that 
recklessness be given a standard definition for the interpretation 
of all criminal statutes (29). This was in substance approved by 
the Court of Appeal in R v Stephenson (1979) where it was
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unequivocally laid down that the test used should be a subjective 
one:
"A person should be regarded as being reckless as to a 
particular result of his conduct if, but only if,-
(a) He foresees at the time that the conduct might have 
that result and,
(b) on the assumption that any judgment by him of the 
degree of risk is correct, it is unreasonable for him to 
take the risk of that result occurring". (30)
The essence of recklessness in subjectivist thinking is then the
deliberate taking of an unjustified risk. A defendant who believes,
for whatever reason, that no risk of specific harmful consequences
exists is not considered reckless or criminally liable.
It was in this context that the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape 
recommended that a statutory definition of rape be included in any 
new legislation, to clarify both Morgan and the role of 
recklessness for the offence. It may be useful at this stage to 
repeat the definition contained in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) 
Act 1976:
"For the purposes of section 1. of the Sexual Offences 
Act 1956 (which relates to rape) a man commits rape if -
(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who 
at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it; . 
and
(b) at that time he knows that she does not consent to 
the intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she 
consents to it;
and references to rape in other enactments (including the 
following provisions of this Act) shall be construed 
accordingly". (31)
The Act goes on to clarify the requirements regarding the accused's 
belief in consent:
"It is hereby declared that if at a trial for a rape 
offence the jury has to consider whether a man believed 
that a woman was consenting to sexual intercourse, the 
presence or absence of reasonable grounds for such a 
belief is a matter to which the jury is to have regard, 
in conjunction with any other relevant matters, in 
considering whether he so believed". (32)
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The following section will consider the impact of the new 
definition on the trial of rape offences, having regard to the 
Morgan decision thus incorporated in statute law as well as to the 
concept of recklessness.
The application of Morgan
Where a defendant pleads "not guilty" to a rape charge and claims 
that the complainant consented to intercourse with him, he may in 
addition claim that even if she did not consent, he genuinely 
believed at the time that she did. Whatever the jury’s verdict in 
such a case, there is no way of establishing whether it was based 
on their finding about consent or about the defendant's belief in 
it. Thus, the full impact of the new statutory definition of rape 
with regard to the Morgan decision can only be evaluated in cases 
where, the two issues are not confounded in this way. In such 
trials, the defendant accepts that the complainant had not 
consented at the time of the intercourse, but claims that he 
genuinely believed that she did. There were only two such trials in 
the present study, and both involved some consideration of the 
grounds on which the defendant's belief in consent was held. The 
facts of these cases are worth examining briefly.
In the first case the defendant, who had recently met the 
complainant, invited her out for a drink. During the course of the 
evening, he made some preliminary sexual advances to her which she 
clearly rejected. He seemed, at that stage, quite happy to accept 
this. Later on, however, as he was driving her home, he took her to 
a deserted place where, with considerable threats and violence, he
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raped and assaulted her. At the trial, he gave evidence, and called
his wife to substantiate it, that he was only able to gain sexual
satisfaction when his partner appeared to refuse him. He also told
the jury that from the moment he stopped the car and the
complainant started to protest, giving the unmistakeable impression
that she was not consenting, he honestly thought that he had been
lucky enough to stumble across a girl who played the game his way:
Defendant: 1 thought she agreed and pretended to be 
difficult. When 1 realised that she didn’t agree it was 
too late". (Case 26).
The second case was no less extraordinary. The defendant
(ironically, another Morgan) followed the complainant, a total
stranger, from a bus stop with the intention of robbing her. He
pleaded guilty to robbing her of a small sum of money and some
jewellery. Having taken her property, he continued to threaten her
with what she thought was a knife but turned out to be a piece of
broken glass. The complainant spoke so little English that an
interpreter was used at the trial. Heir cross-examination started
with counsel conveying the defendant’s apologies to her for the
distress he had caused. He firmly maintained, however, that at the
time of the alleged offence he genuinely believed that she agreed
to what took place. He told the jury that as he was robbing her,
she said she did not have much money and all she could offer was
herself. The complainant denied saying this, but in view of the
fact that her English was so poor, the suggestion was that the
defendant misunderstood her. As he said at his trial.
Defendant; When 1 was asked by the police whether 1 
realised 1 had sex with her against her will 1 said yes.
1 meant that afterwards 1 thought it was rape. But at the 
time, when we were on the common and at the station, 1 
didn't think it was. (Case 57)
The grounds on which the defendants based their belief in the
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complainants' consent were undoubtedly somewhat out of the 
ordinary, and could be argued to be "unreasonable" by objective 
standards. The juries were clearly instructed that this was a 
matter which they should take into consideration, and that they 
should acquit if they thought the defendants genuinely believed 
that the complainants were willing. In the second case the judge 
told them to acquit if they felt that the complainant submitted in 
fear and the defendant failed to realise this. Both defendants were 
convicted, and neither of them appealed, an indication that defence 
counsel were satisfied that the judge's summing-up followed Morgan 
and was as favourable to their clients as possible.
Williams has asserted that the whole issue of mistake is only 
likely to arise in two specific circumstances, either when the 
defendant has been told a story by a third party, as in Morgan, or 
when he is drunk. (33) The two pertinent cases in this study do not 
fit into those categories, but lend Support to the argument that 
the matter is unlikely to arise very frequently. The findings 
suggest that the decision in Morgan has not had the effect that 
many of its opponents feared, namely that every person accused of 
rape would only have to state his belief, however ridiculous its 
grounds, that the complainant consented in order to assure his 
acquittal. That defence, in its "pure" form, does arise from time 
to time, as Court of Appeal judgments indicate (34), but it has 
certainly not replaced consent as the chief issue in the majority 
of rape trials.
In the immediate aftermath of Morgan, the Court of Appeal applied 
that decision in R v Cogan and Leak (1975). This too was a case
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where a husband (Leak) aided and abetted another man (Cogan) to 
have intercourse with his wife. Cogan appealed against his 
conviction for rape on the grounds that he believed that his victim 
was consenting. His conviction was quashed, following Morgan. Leak 
appealed on the grounds that if Cogan’s, the principal offender's, 
conviction was quashed, his own could not stand. The Court of 
Appeal decided that this did not follow and upheld Leak's 
conviction, justifying the somewhat incongruous position as 
follows:
"The fact that Cogan was innocent of rape because he 
believed that she was consenting does not affect the 
position that she was raped ". (35)
Since then, the Criminal Law Revision Committee have recommended
that the theoretical difficulties involved in that decision, which
they deem to be fundamentally correct, be removed by legislation.
(36)
There are indications, however, that"Morgan has not transformed the
law relating to intent and mistake in this context quite in the
manner anticipated. Case law since then gives a somewhat confused
and muddled picture of whether Morgan is still good law. The Court
of Appeal has on a number of occasions insisted that the accused's
belief in consent must be a reasonable one, and there has clearly
been some reluctance to follow the Morgan precedent:
"The courts from time to time have shown a propensity to
distinguish other offences from the common law concept of
rape so as to avoid having to follow the reasoning in R.
V Morgan". (37)
In his judgment in Morgan, Lord Hailsham stated that the issue as 
to belief was a question of great academic importance in the theory 
of English criminal law. Despite everything that had been said on 
the subject in 1975, a more recent judgment claims that the
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decision in Morgan was clearly
"confined and intended to be confined to the offence of 
rape". (38)
Some doubt has been expressed as to the correctness of that view, 
and the principle that an unreasonable mistake is a defence has 
since been extended to the offence of indecent assault. (39)
The effect of post-Caldwell recklessness
To complicate matters further, a recent House of Lords decision has 
created havoc with the concept of recklessness. In considering an 
appeal in R v Caldwell, a case of arson under the Criminal Damage 
Act 1971, Lord Diplock restated the law by holding that a person is 
reckless
"as to whether or not any property would be destroyed or 
damaged, if (1) he does an act which in fact creates an 
obvious risk that property will be destroyed or damaged 
and (2) when he does the act he either has not given any 
thought to the possibility of there being any such risk 
or has recognised that there was some risk involved and 
has nonetheless gone on to do it". (40)
This statement unquestionably adds an objective element to the
hitherto subjective definition of reckessness. The decision has
been described as
"as much of a setback for the subjectivist cause as 
Morgan had been a' triumph for it", (41) and as
"the worst of the House's decisions (not a few of which 
are infelicitous) in the last 20 years". (42)
The main criticism has been that the judgment goes too far and
unjustifiably enlarges the scope of the criminal law. It
effectively means that there may now be serious criminal liability
simply for inadvertence to "obvious" risk in circumstances where
the ordinary prudent person would not have been inadvertent and
acted otherwise. This comes perilously close to criminal liability
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for negligence which, as one legal commentator notes,
"has long been abhorred by eminent writers on the 
Criminal Law, and from which it had been thought that the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.8, took us away". (43)
What are the implications of the Caldwell decision for rape? It has
been suggested that it has put Morgan in doubt insofar as it seems
to herald a return to an objective test:
"Whilst without consent a man stands to be convicted of 
rape, Morgan had established that an honest, even 
unreasonable, belief in consent may relieve an accused of 
criminal liability. Yet this landmark decision of the 
House of Lords in 1975 has been either confined or placed 
in doubt. It has been increasingly suggested that where 
mens rea is concerned its effect, rather than being that 
of a general principle, is limited to the crime of rape 
only". (44)
The specific application of post-Caldwell recklessness to rape was
considered by the Court of Appeal in R v Pigg (1982). Lord Lane,
delivering the judgment, made extensive reference to Caldwell, and,
accepting it in principle, concluded as follows:
"Of course it is plain that that opinion cannot, so to 
.speak, be lifted bodily and applied to rape. There has to 
be a modification in certain of the matters which are 
there dealt with. But, in the end, it seems to us that in 
the light of that decision, so far as rape is concerned, 
a man is reckless if either he was indifferent and gave 
no thought to the possibility that the woman might not be 
consenting in circumstances where if any thought had been 
given to the matter it would have been obvious that there 
was a risk she was not, or, that he was aware of the 
possibility than she might not be consenting but 
nevertheless persisted regardless of whether she 
consented or not". (45)
Concern has also been expressed about the application of the
Caldwell decision to rape specifically, and about the implications
of "objective" recklessness for that offence. Telling has argued
that the decision in R v Pigg is tantamount to establishing a crime
of negligent rape. He claims that while women need to be protected,
the fact that
"a conviction for rape ... could follow if the accused 
never adressed his mind to the possibility that the woman
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was not consenting ... gives rise to grave misgivings,"
(46)
Discussions focussing on what is seen as an erosion of the
accused's rights and as an extension of the offence to include a
concept of recklessness containing objective elements conceal the
main issue in this context, which concerns the appropriate basis
for liability for rape. This hinges partly on the question of
whether mens rea is best defined uniformly throughout the criminal
law, and whether to claim an unreasonable mistake in rape in
particular (whatever the position is for other offences) should
protect a person from criminal responsibility. As Temkin argued,
"whether or not a man who honestly but wrongly and 
unreasonably believes in a woman’s consent should be 
criminally liable raises a moral problem which is 
obscured by arguments which focus on the definition of 
the crime or the frequency with which such a defence is
likely to be raised." (47)
The extraordinary cases which involved the use of a Morgan defence
found -in this study are clearly not the ones that present any real
difficulty. The central question is whether the following types of
beliefs should constitute a sufficient answer to a rape charge:
"(1) 1 know that the complainant is a 'slut'. 1 know for 
a fact that she regularly sleeps with my friends Tom,
Dick and Harry to say nothing of numerous others. Of 
course, 1 did not believe her when she said 'no'.
(2) 1 met the complainant at a dance. She was wearing a 
mini-skirt and a transparent blouse with a plunging 
neckline. She drank a lot throughout the evening. She 
accepted a lift home from me. 1 took it for granted that 
she was out to have a good time. 1 did not believe her 
when she said 'no'.
Alternatively, the defendant might be a man who believes 
that most women really want to have sexual intercourse 
and their 'no' is but a sham or who has had sexual 
intercourse with the same woman in the past and therefore 
places no credence on her refusal". (48)
Such claims and beliefs are all too frequently heard at rape
trials, although not usually as independent of consent: the
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defendant’s belief in the complainant’s consent is unchanged at the 
trial despite anything she may have said, and his belief is almost 
a side issue to the main one of consent. The jury’s prejudices in 
this regard often seen) to match those of the defendant and it is 
likely that, in the present climate at least, they too will 
disbelieve than anyone wearing so-called provocative clothing could 
have said ’no’ and meant it. Should culpability for rape turn on 
such beliefs?
It has been cogently and persuasively argued that it should not.
Temkin has suggested that
"the overriding objective which ... the law of rape 
should seek to pursue is the protection of sexual choice, 
that is to say, the protection of a woman’s right to 
choose whether, when and with whom to have sexual 
intercourse". (49)
It is clear that no law can aim to do this if it permits a defence
of mistake, either based on what someone else has told accused
about the complainant, or his own prejudices which lead him to
ignore her refusal in the circumstances referred to above, or on
failing to entertain the possibility that she might not be
consenting. If the law is to get away from its double-standard of
sexual morality for men and women, which is clearly reflected in
Morgan, and truly protect sexual choice for women, then logically,
unreasonable mistake cannot be a defence to the charge.
It has been suggested that mens rea for each offence should depend 
on the nature of the conduct proscribed: whereas it may be unjust 
to require that a mistake be reasonable for certain offences, this 
is perfectly appropriate for rape (50). As Temkin has put it, with 
compelling simplicity:
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"This is because it is possible for a man to ascertain 
whether a woman is consenting or not with minimal effort.
She is there next to him. He has only to ask. Since to 
have sexual intercourse without her consent is to do her 
great harm, it is not unjust for the law to require that 
he inquire carefully into consent and, it may be added, 
process that information carefully as well". (51)
The legal decisions in DPP v Morgan , R v Caldwell and subsequently
R v Pigg have been controversial for a variety of reasons.
Statutory intervention has been called for to reverse the effect of
Caldwell (52), which tly and large is seen as representing a step
backward in the development of rational modern law. It is to be
hoped, however, that any future consideration of the issue of mens
rea will take into account the premise that requirements which are
appropriate for one crime may not be so for others. For a just law
of rape, it is essential to do away with the concept of
unreasonable mistake as a defence and to require the defendant to
address himself to the question of consent.
Impact on reporting and disposition
Having analysed the working of different elements of the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, it now remains to consider its 
overall impact on the reporting and disposition of rape offences as 
reflected in official crime statistics. The problems in adopting 
this approach are only too clear. Published crime statistics do not 
reflect the "true" incidence of the offence and only provide 
information about the very few cases which reach the trial stage.
It is accepted that the link between a measure designed to 
encourage women to report rape more readily and actual reporting 
behaviour cannot be evaluated in any reliable way by an examination 
of official statistics. A change in the yearly number of rapes
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recorded by the police may be a reflection of a number of factors. 
It may mean an increase in the number of rapes that occur while the 
proportion of those that are reported remains constant. It could 
also reflect changes in police procedure and practice in this area. 
Alternatively, it could be that higher recorded numbers are an 
indication of the greater willingness of women to come forward when 
they have been raped, whatever the true incidence of rape in the 
community. This might be associated with provisions of the 1976 
Act, particularly the virtual guarantee of anonymity and the 
potentially decreased likelihood of distressing cross-examination.
Similarly, changes in acquittal and conviction rates could be 
explained in a variety of ways. It may be that there has been a 
genuine change in attitudes and that, because of the amount of 
publicity the offence has been accorded in recent years, juries are 
becoming more sensitive to the problem of rape and perhaps view it 
with less scepticism than previously. They may also realise that a 
"guilty" verdict does not mean life imprisonment, and this could 
affect their decision. It could also be that an increased 
proportion of accused persons are pleading guilty, so that while 
the acquittal rate among "not guilty" pleas remains the same, the 
overall conviction rate is higher. Another possibility is that 
because evidence of the complainant's previous sexual experience 
may be withheld or not given in the detail that was previously the 
norm, juries are less likely to be persuaded by evidence which only 
serves to reinforce strongly held prejudices. We have seen in 
previous chapters that there is in fact a clear association between 
the jury' knowledge of the complainant's sexual experience and the 
verdict.
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Thus, any change in the recorded number of rapes or in the 
disposition of rape offences reflected in published criminal 
statistics can be interpreted in a wide variety of ways. Changes 
which coincide with the passage of the 1976 Act can certainly not 
be attributed to new legislation without a good deal of caution. It 
is therefore with serious reservations that official statistics are 
being used as the basis of an assessment of the overall impact of 
the Act. Notwithstanding these reservations, if the Act has had any 
effect at all on the reporting and trial of rape offences, whatever 
the mechanics of such an effect, one would expect this to be 
reflected in official statistics. With this in mind, published 
statistics regarding rapes recorded by the police, and the outcome 
of court proceedings have been examined for a period of three years 
before and after the Act, in order to detect any trend pointing to 
a change. (53)
The Home Office recognizes that criminal statistics do not show the
total amount of crime committed in England and Wales, as
"some offences go unrecognised or undiscovered while 
others for a variety of reasons are not reported to the 
police", and "offences recorded by the police therefore 
form only a proportion - and for some offences possibly a 
small proportion of the total crimes committed". (54)
Rape undoubtedly belongs to that latter category of crimes.
American studies indicate that between one in ten and one in
twenty-five women report rape and sexual assault to the police
(55), and there is much anecdotal evidence in this country too that
rape is one of the most underreported serious crimes. The London
Rape Crisis Centre reports phat only 25% of the women they have
been contacted by made a complaint to the police, and that this
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percentage has remained constant since they started operating in 
1976 (56).
A complaint to the police does not automatically figure in official 
statistics: crimes are only recorded if the police decide that 
there is prima facie evidence that the law has been broken. There 
is no way of knowing how many rape complaints in this category do 
not receive a crime report at all, but the processing of recorded 
incidents is revealing. A recent study in Scotland analysed the 
outcome of 196 reported incidents of sexual assault on the basis of 
police records and of the procurator fiscal's case papers. 22.4% 
of the complaints were eventually classified as "no crime"; 24% 
were unsolved; and no proceedings were taken in 15.8% of the cases.
(57) The "no crime" rate found in that study for sexual assault is 
very much higher than that found by studies on crime in general
(58)._ For the purposes of the Scottish research, the term "no
crime" was used to describe the practice of
"amending initial crime reports to ensure that those 
which do not turn out to be criminal incidents after 
investigation are excluded, and do not appear in the 
records of official statistics concerning the number of 
crimes made known to the police", (59)
Statistics relating to the number of offences known to the police
in England and Wales show a slow but steady increase with minor
fluctuations of around 5% from year to year over the 1974-1979
period (60), The only exception to this trend was 1978, when a peak
number of 1243 rapes were recorded - this represents an increase of
22% on the previous year. In the light of what happened in
subsequent years, however, this increase cannot be conclusively
attributed to the 1976 Act if we assume that any effect of this
sort would be a lasting one. The number dropped by 6% in 1979, but
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was still at a higher level than in any earlier year.
Unfortunately, a change in counting rules means that figures from 
1980 onwards are not strictly comparable to previous years.
The clear-up rate (61) for rape offences was 77% in 1973. Although 
figures are not available for some crucial years after this (1974, 
1975, 1976), published statistics seem to indicate that it has 
actually dropped over this period. In 1977, the next year for which 
figures are available, it was down to 70% and has remained around 
that ever since.
TABLE 2. Rape offences cleared up as proportion of offences known 
to the police, 1973-1979 (62)
YEAR % OFFENCES
CLEARED UP
1973 77%
1974 n.a.
1975 n.a.
1976 n.a.
1977 70%
1978 69%
1979 70%
The clear-up rate for rape offences has been consistently lower 
than for other serious offences; in 1979, for example, the only 
indictable offence with a lower rate was indecent assault against a 
female, at 62%. The average for sexual offences was 75%, while 
assault reached 88% and homicide, 93%. Thus, the clear-up rate of 
rape offences has not been affected by the 1976 Act, although there 
is some indication that it may have been decreasing since before 
1976.
The proportion of persons committed for trial from Magistrates' 
Courts to Crown Courts has been steady around 90% of those who
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appear before Magistrates’ Courts;
TABLE 3. Persons committed for trial at Crown Courts, 1974-1979
(62)
YEAR PERSONS DEALT WITH PERSONS COMMITTED TOTAL
AT MAGISTRATES' FOR TRIAL AT
COURTS CROWN COURTS
1974 51 (9%) 489 (91%) 540 (100%)
1975 51 (9%) 495 (91%) 546 (100%)
1976 54 (10%) 475 (90%) 529 (100%)
1977 29 (6%) 430 (94%) 459 (100%)
1978 55 (9%) 537 (91%) 592 (100%)
1979 61 (9%) 596 (91%) 657 (100%)
There has, however, been a significant change in the way in which
persons are dealt with by Magistrates' Courts. The percentage of
cases not proceeded with, withdrawn or dismissed has increased from
51% in 1974 to 89% in 1979. Conversely, the proportion of persons
found guilty by Magistrates' Courts has fallen dramatically; the
conviction rate was at its peak of 49% (63) in 1974, but started to
decrease in 1977, to reach an all-time low of 11% in 1979;
TABLE 4. Outcome of cases dealt with by Magistrates' Courts, 
1974-1979 (62)
YEAR NOT PROCEEDED 
WITH*
FOUND GUILTY TOTAL
1974 26 (51%) 25 (49%) 51 (100%)
1975 36 (71%) 15 (29%) 51 (100%)
1976 30 (56%) 24 (44%) 54 (100%)
1977 22 (76%) 7 (24%) 29 (100%)
1978 46 (84%) 9 (16%) 55 (100%)
1979 54 (89%) 7 (11%) 61 (100%)
[* Includes proceedings discontinued, persons discharged under s.7 
of Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, and charges withdrawn or 
dismissed].
Although the downward trend for convictions may have begun before 
1977, it has been most marked and consistent since that date. It ts 
difficult to interpret this as an effect of the 1976 Act, and is
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taken merely to indicate that the downward trend in Magistrates’ 
Courts' convictions present before 1976 has not been reversed or 
even stabilised by the provisions of that Act.
The number of persons actually tried for rane offences at Crown
Courts falls far behind the number reported to the noli ce as having
allegedly committed the offence. As there is usually a long delay
in the trial of offences committed to Crown Courts, the number nf
parsons tried each vear has been looked at as a percentage of rane
offences recorded in the previous vear. This nronortion has be^n
fairly steady around 40% throughout the study neriod;
TABLE 5. Persons tried as a nronortion of offences recorded in the 
previous vear, 1974-1979 (62)
YEAR: PERCENTAGE TRIED:
1974 41%
1975 39%
1976 41%
1977 38%
1978 39%
1979 40%
The conviction rate for rape has been consistenly lower than that 
for other serious offences. However, the 1976 Act cannot be said to 
have influenced this in any significant way. The rate went from 77% 
in 1974 to its lowest of 71% in 1976 and has since gone back to 
near its pre-1976 level.
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TABLE 6. Outcome of trials at Crown Courts, 1974-1979
YEAR PERSONS NO TRIAL PERSONS PERSONS
FOR TRIAL ACQUITTED CONVICTED
1974 412 3 91 (22%) 318 (77%)
1975 409 1 87 (21%) 321 (78%)
1976 429 - 123 (29%) 306 (71%)
1977 421 2 113 (27%) 306 (73%)
1978 396 - 86 (22%) 310 (78%)
1979 491 3 117 (24%) 371 (76%)
There is no evidence to suggest that the 1976 Act has had anything 
to do with these yearly fluctuations: the observed differences are 
not marked, and the start of the fluctuations did not coincide with 
the passing of the Act.
It is not clear how far the low conviction rate for rape offences 
is a reflection of the fact persons accused of rape are far less 
likely to plead "guilty" than those accused of other serious 
offences. Figures relating to the relative proportion of "guilty" 
and "not guilty" pleas have only been published for 1976, but the 
figures are revealing. Of the indictable offences, rape had the 
highest "not guilty" plea rate at 60%. The corresponding figure was 
34% for homicide, 28% for all sexual offences, and 12% for 
burglary. (64)
Sentencing practice was not expected to be influenced by the 1976 
Act. The proportion of persons convicted sentenced to immediate 
imprisonment has steadily increased since well before 1976, and has 
gone on doing so since: it went from 71% in 1974 to 79% in 1979:
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TABLE 7. Persons sentenced to immediate imprisonment as a 
percentage of those convicted, 1974-1979 (62)
YEAR PERCENTAGE
IMPRISONED
1974 71%
1975 73%
1976 77%
1977 77%
1978 75%
1979 79%
The average length of imprisonment has been very steady over the 
years: the largest group, around a third of those imprisoned each 
year, receive sentences of 2-3 years, while between 2 and 3% are 
sentenced to life imprisonment. It is interesting to note that the 
yearly number of those receiving life sentences has to date always 
been in single figures:
TABLE 8. Length of sentence. 1974-1979 (62)
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SENTENCE: YEAR:
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 197Ç
6 mo + under 2 4 4 5 8 4
1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 1%
Over 6 mo, under 7 4 8 7 5 5
1 yr 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2%
Over l_yr, up to 28 35 27 17 27 41
2 yrs 12% 15% 11% 7% 11% 4%
Over 2 jyrs, up to 75 58 73 71 71 83
3 yrs 33% 24% 31% 30% 30% 28%
Over 3_yrs, up to 49 43 41 53 45 49
4 yrs 22% 18% 17% 22% 19% 16%
Over 4 yrs, up 28 50 38 47 39 51
to 5 yrs 12% 21% 16% 20% 16% 17%
Over 5 yrs, up 17 34 34 23 26 34
to 7 yrs 8% 14% 14% 10% 11% 11%
Over 7 yrs^ up 9 6 8 7 8 18
to 10 yrs 4% 2% 3% 3% 3% 6%
Over 10 yrs , 2 2 2 4 5
excl. life 1% 1% — 1% 2% 2%
Life 8 5 5 6 6 7
4% 2% 2% 3% 3% 2%
TOTAL NUMBER: 225 241 238 238 239 297
A recent editorial in the New Law Journal comments that
"Perhaps one of the most disturbing facts about rape is 
the large number of rapes that go unreported. That more 
than anything serves as an example of the appalling 
inability of the criminal justice system to deal with the 
problem." (65)
Despite high expectations in this regard, the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976 has had little impact on the reporting, 
processing and trial of rape offences. Although their anonymity is 
by and large protected, women have not been encouraged to come 
forward and report rapes. The dominant flavour of rape trials has
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remained unchanged in spite of evidential restrictions. Conviction 
rates are still considerably lower than for any other serious 
offence. This is partly due to the inadequate implementation of 
crucial parts of the 1976 Act, and partly to the fact that the new 
legislation was not sufficiently radical and comprehensive to bring 
about significant change.
Rape law reforms have been implemented in a number of other 
jurisdictions, in particular in the USA, Canada and Australia. Some 
of these reforms have been limited in scope and are similar to the 
1976 Act, while others went beyond procedural reform and brought 
about fundamental changes in the substantive law of rape. The 
following chapters will consider law reform and its impact in other 
jurisdictions, and the scope for future law reform in this country 
in the light of experience elsewhere and of the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee's recent Report on Sexual Offences.
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(63) This is as a percentage of cases dealt with by Magistrates’ 
Courts and not committed to a Crown Court for trial.
(64) Criminal Statistics for England and Wales, London, HMSO,
1976, p.45
(65) Editorial, New Law Journal, Vol. 132, No.6077, Nov. 4th,
1982, p.1017
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PART IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
2^0
fflAPTER EIGHT. LAW REFORM IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Over the last ten years or so, numerous legal and academic 
commentators in the U.S.A., Canada and Australia have drawn 
attention to the inadequacies of the legal system in its dealings 
with rape. (1) Most of the criticism has been directed at the 
admissibility of evidence of the alleged victim's sexual behaviour 
prior to the rape with persons other than the accused. It has 
invariably been argued that this is irrelevant to credit, rarely 
relevant to the issue, highly prejudicial for the prosecution's 
case and humiliating for the woman concerned. In many cases, the 
expression of such concern has been followed by the setting up of 
various groups and commissions to give the problem detailed 
consideration (2), and subsequently by legislative reform. The 
purpose of this chapter is to consider the types of legislative 
reform passed in the last decade in the U.S.A. and Australia (3), 
as well as their effectiveness in bringing about the intended 
changes.
Rape laws in the U.S.A.
The trend towards legal reform in the U.S.A. began in the early 
1970s. Legislative change there has been attributed to the efforts 
of the anti-rape movement, and described as one of its major 
achievements (4). Almost every state has now modified its rape laws 
in recognition of their prior inadequacy, and with a view to 
encouraging more victims to report the offence (5). Laws vary 
greatly from state to state, both in their substance and 
complexity, but one of the central provisions everywhere is to
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limit the defence attorney’s ability to enquire into the victim's 
past sexual conduct during the trial.
In a number of states, "rape shield" laws have been passed in the 
context of wider reforms. The Michigan Sexual Conduct Law (1975), 
often referred to as a model for legislative change in other 
states, has probably been most widely publicised (6). Having 
identified specific law reform aims in this area, Michigan 
legislation attempts to deal comprehensively with sexual assaults 
on the basis of a number of guiding principles.
It was felt that rape law should reflect a community consensus that
the offence should be criminalised and result in deprivation of
liberty and, furthermore, that the law should aim to establish a
scheme which ensures, as far as possible, the certainty of
conviction for offenders;
"Working within the present system, it is clear that the 
certainty of punishment is the key - the most significant 
deterrant". (7)
The new law also aimed to protect the victim of crime from further
victimization by the legal process itself. As the statute's
principal drafter commented,
"There is little a criminal statute can do to protect a 
victim who reports a crime from harrassment by the 
accused (if he is out on bail) or his friends, from 
suspicion and ostracism by the victim's family and 
friends, from curiosity seekers and muck-rakers. But a 
statute can protect a victim from harassment and invasion 
of privacy at the trial." (8)
The main provisions of Michigan reform aimed at achieving this
third goal were the redefinition of the resistance standard and
changes in the rules of evidence as to the admissibility of sexual
history. (9)
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In addition to this, the Michigan legislation brought in a number 
of other, sometimes controversial, reforms. It made sexual assault 
law sex—neutral, in other words, allowing for men and women both to 
be offenders and victims. It also defined degrees of sexual 
assault, thereby doing away with the previously confusing overlap 
between offences such as rape, gross indecency, etc. It no longer 
requires that the use of physical force be proved in order to 
secure a conviction. Michigan legislation withdraws the immunity of 
husbands from rape prosecution where the couple are living apart or
where one of them has filed for divorce. Finally, it does away with 
the need for corroboration which was previously required in rape 
cases.
Under its old law, Michigan was in the same position as most other 
jurisdictions at that date with regard to admitting evidence of the 
complainant's prior sexual activities with persons other than the 
defendant: the judge had unfettered discretion in whether and how 
far to allow this.
The reform removes that discretion and substitutes a statutory
prohibition which, the law's supporters argue,
"does not unduly prejudice the defendant, does not 
interfere with the defendant's rights, but merely assures 
that highly inflammatory and arguably irrelevant matters 
will not be injected. The reform does take away from 
defendants in rape cases an opportunity not available to 
defendants in any other case to escape punishment by the 
strategem of smearing the victim's reputation and making 
her previous personal life the key and deciding issue in 
the case. But the reform does not deny to rape defendants 
any opportunity now accorded persons charged with other 
crimes". (10)
The emphasis is thus in making rape law provisions similar to those
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of other criminal law, rather than singling out rape for special 
treatment. This is what the relevant section of the new law 
provides;
"(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's 
sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual 
conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual 
conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g 
unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that 
the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at 
issue in the case and that its inflammatory or 
prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value:
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the 
actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity 
showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or 
disease". (11)
In other words, the statute expressly prohibits evidence of sexual 
past with two very specific exceptions which are subject to the 
judge's decision in each case. The constitutionality of this change 
in the law has been challenged in the Michigan Court of Appeals, 
and no final statement has as yet been made of the implications of
such decisions. Critics have expressed concern that the new laws
infringe on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment rights 
of confrontation and cross-examination (12). One defendant at least 
has contended that his right to confront adverse witnesses was 
denied when evidence of the complainant's sexual activity with 
third persons was excluded (13). So far, the majority of judges 
faced with making the decision for the Michigan Court of Appeals 
seem to have upheld the constitutionality of the reform. However, 
as Nordby notes,
"opposing considerations are still surfacing and being 
mulled over by appellate judges, some cjf whom are surely 
postponing final judgment until they are presented with 
more varied fact situations... In sum, the law is still
in flux. In camera determination, with more flexibility
may be required. But courts are clearly committed to 
preserving the legislative policy except in extreme 
circumstances" (14).
254
The Michigan reforms have been subject to a major evaluation study 
carried out by the University of Chicago, with a grant from the US 
National Center for the Prevention and Control of Rape (15). The 
aims of the research were
(a) to describe procedures used to handle sexual assault cases in 
the criminal justice system in Michigan; and
(b) to examine the impact of Michigan's Criminal Sexual Conduct 
Statute.
A major component of this research was the analysis of statistical 
crime data, but in addition to this there were intensive interviews 
with those responsible for the implementation of the new law. The 
researchers wanted to identify changes in the report, arrest and 
conviction rates which could be attributed to the new law, as well 
as changes in the amount of discretion exercised by those in the 
criminal justice system, changes in the victim's experience, and in 
the types of individuals protected by the law. Structured 
interviews were carried out with a fairly large number of judges, 
prosecutors, defence attorneys, police officers and rape crisis 
centre staff with experience of sexual assault cases before and 
after the new law.
As far as statistical analyses of crime figures go, there was no 
significant difference in rape reports before and after law reform. 
There has been instead a continuing trend of increase over time, 
which respondents in the study attributed to social change rather 
than to the specific effects of law reform, or indeed to an 
absolute increase in violent crimes. The majority felt that a 
change in public attitudes towards rape was one of the most
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important influences on reporting trends. A significant finding was 
that arrests since law reform have been increasing at a faster rate 
than reports. Paradoxically, interviews with police and prosecutors 
reveal that there is still more doubt about victim credibility and 
false complaints for sexual assaults than there is for other 
violent crimes.
An increase in conviction rates also seems related to the new law. 
There has been a significant increase in convictions as charged 
and, correspondingly, a reduction in convictions for lesser 
offences after law reform. Respondents (who may or may not be 
correct about their perceptions relating to the role of legal 
change in influencing such outcomes of the criminal process) 
largely attributed increased convictions to the provision of the 
new law which prohibits sexual history evidence. Others, however, 
felt that these changes were due to other innovations, such as the 
increased clarity of the law and the degrees of sexual assault 
introduced by the new legislation.
The investigators were also interested in evaluating victims'
experiences with the law before and after reform. Somewhat
curiously, however, they sought their answers to this question in
interviews with the various professional groups mentioned above,
rather than with the victims themselves. The response was highly
positive. As Nordby reported,
"According to 77% of our respondents, the victim's 
experience in the criminal justice system is less 
traumatic under the new law. Forty-three percent of these 
cited the prohibition on evidence related to past sexual 
history as the most important factor; 19 percent felt 
that a change in attitudes towards women and the crime of 
rape contributed most importantly to the improvement; and 
13 percent said that crisis centre support was crucial in
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helping to make the experience less onerous. Only three 
percent of all respondents stated that the victim’s 
experience had actually deteriorated under the new law".
(16)
One area that this research has not addressed is the implementation
of the new law in the courtroom, even though some feeling emerges
from interviews that all is not well on this front. Respondents
report that many aspects of criminal justice processing are left
untouched by the law:
"Despite specific prohibitions on sexual history evidence 
written into the law, respondents report judges often 
rule this evidence admissible. They rarely take advantage 
of the provision of the law to hold in camera hearings to 
rule on the admissibility of this evidence." Furthermore,
"Although respondents report the law has limited the 
extent to which judge's discretion can control the 
outcome of a trial, a majority report that judges can 
still influence the outcome (through their demeanor or 
through rulings on admissibility of evidence)" (17).
In spite of these limitations, there are strong indications that
the Michigan law has brought about substantial improvements. As
Nordby commented,
"The law works, but possibly not as well as it could - or 
should". (18)
Much of its success is attributed to sexual history evidence 
restrictions which are more stringent than in most other 
jurisdictions and leave very little to the judge's discretion. 
However, it should be noted that the impact of law reform may, at 
least in part, be explained by one of the other major innovations 
embodied in the Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute.
In other states, law reform has been less comprehensive and rather 
more similar to the English legislation of 1976. It has sometimes 
taken place in the context of one or two of the changes brought 
about in Michigan, but more often, law makers have concentrated on
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the issue of restricting the admissibility of sexual history 
evidence alone.
The diversity of provisions enacted in this respect in the various 
states of the U.S.A. is somewhat bewildering. Some distinguish 
between the admissibility of sexual history evidence to impeach the 
complainant's credibility and to go to the issue at the trial. 
Different types of evidence are covered by different statutes, some 
referring to specific sexual acts and others, to evidence of 
reputation. One provision that most of them have in common is that, 
occasionally with minor restrictions, they allow evidence of the 
complainant's sexual experience with the accused. Another class of 
evidence which is almost invariably allowed is that introduced to 
prove the source of forensic evidence, or pregnancy, and similar 
matters, which may arise when the defendant denies having had 
intercourse with the complainant. Some states impose time limits, 
usually of one year, and bar any evidence of sexual character 
before that time. As one commentator observed,' some of these 
variations
"present practical or even constitutional problems.
Unhappily, many reform efforts, well-meant but
ill-conceived, pose more dilemmas than they resolve".
(19)
The most important differences in law reform efforts between the 
various states undoubtedly arise from the procedures adopted for 
the exclusion of sexual history evidence, which range from 
virtually total prohibition to unfettered judicial discretion. We 
have seen how strictly exclusionary Michigan's legislation is. 
Another example of that end of the spectrum is Louisiana, where 
the use of all evidence of the woman's prior sexual conduct or 
reputation for chastity is banned.
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"except for incidents arising out of the victim’s 
relationship with the accused". (20)
At the other extreme is Texas whose provisions are not dissimilar
to those of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, and where
sexual history evidence of any variety whatsoever is admitted if
and to the extent that the judge believes its probative value to
exceed its prejudice. (21)
Another popular version of the discretionary approach is that
adopted by New York, among others; this first states a general rule
of exclusion, then lists specific exemptions and ends with a
catch-all provision allowing in any evidence
"determined by the court...to be relevant and admissible 
in the interests of justice". (22)
In fact, the majority of the new statutes adopt this type of
formula which ensures that discretion remains firmly with the
judiciary. This may partly be due to the fact that when faced with
the task of forecasting every possible case where the admission of
sexual history evidence might be just and appropriate, legislators
have tended to take the easier option by deciding on discretion as
the best course. If the law does no more than advise the judge to
balance relevance against prejudice in making these decisions,
there can certainly be no suggestion that the defendant’s rights
are being eroded. But, as Berger rightly observes,
"there is a difference between the law in action and the 
law on the books. That is, although legislatures may 
enact statutes that make certain provisions, it does not 
necessarily follow that those specifications will be 
precisely followed by law enforcement agencies, the 
prosecutor's staff, or judges". (23)
It is somewhat surprising that the impact of the wide range of
reforms introduced in the U.S.A. in recent years has not been more
systematically monitored. As Deming and Eppy have argued.
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"The expectations of reformers can be developped into a 
series of testable hypotheses. First, the more restricted 
the admissibility of evidence on prior sexual conduct, 
the less likely are criminal justice agents to question 
the credibility or non-consent of the victim. Second, the 
formal sanctions of the law with respect to offenders 
will be more effective; a larger percentage of cases will 
involve guilty pleas; and a larger percentage of cases 
will result in conviction, and conviction on rape 
charges. Third, the certainty of punishment will 
increase, but the severity of sentences will depend on 
the penalty structure of the new laws".(24)
Apart from Michigan, California is the only state where a large
scale evaluation study has been carried out following law reform.
The Robbins Rape Evidence Law there expressly preserves the
defendant's right to attack the complainant's credibility. It is,
however, stringent in excluding proof of sexual behaviour to show
consent. It falls somewhere in the middle of what have been termed
"defendant oriented" and "victim oriented" reforms. At the same
time, California repealed the mandatory cautionary instruction to
the jury, the equivalent of our corroboration warning.
The new law adds a section to the Evidence Code which limits the 
conditions under which a victim's prior sexual history can be 
admitted in court to question her credibility as a witness. The 
defence must offer written proof of the relevance of prior sexual 
behaviour in a hearing out of the presence of the jury, and the 
court then determines what evidence may be admitted, the nature of 
the questions allowed, and other similar matters. The law is more 
restrictive with regard to such evidence when it is brought in to 
show consent; opinion evidence, and evidence of specific instances 
of sexual conduct are not admissible to prove consent, with the 
exception of previous sexual relations with the defendant. The jury 
is in effect no longer permitted to infer consent from prior sexual 
conduct with persons other than the defendant.
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The processing of rape cases before and after reform throughout the 
criminal justice system was compared, as well as the processing of 
rape and other criminal cases over the same period to identify 
changes which were not attributable to rape law reform. The authors 
were looking for statistically significant changes in the 
processing of cases after law reform, in terms of increased 
reporting, percentage proceeding to superior court trial, 
percentage plea-bargaining, percentage found guilty of the offence 
originally charged, penalties imposed and other such variables.
Their reasons for looking at the impact of law reform from this
perspective were based on their expectations regarding the
far-reaching potential effects of changes in the law of evidence;
"Although these changes relate to evidence of the 
victim’s consent and credibility in a rape trial, we 
hypothesize and test for ramifications of these changes 
throughout the criminal justice system. The number of 
arrests which result in court cases is inversely 
proportional to the costs involved in prosecution. For 
the victim, the psychological costs of prosecuting a rape 
case should be reduced after legal change; therefore, a 
larger percentage of victims are expected to prosecute.
As the victim's prior sexual conduct becomes less 
relevant for court proceedings, the formal sanctions of 
the law with respect to offenders will become more 
effective. It is expected that the disposition of rape 
cases will occur at a later point in the criminal justice 
system, that the charges at disposition will be more 
serious, and that sentences will be more severe". (25)
Rather disappointingly, no statistically significant changes were
found in rape case processing after the evidence law reform.
However, when both evidence law reform and the change in the
cautionary instructions were in force, the researchers’ hypotheses
that a higher proportion of offenders would plead guilty at the
Superior Court level, and that sentences would be higher, were
confirmed. A number of other hypotheses were not supported by the
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findings, A further complication was that changes in rape case 
processing varied between the four counties included in the study 
and all in all, the results were inconclusive.
In assessing directions for future research, the investigators make 
the crucial point that legal changes and the implementation of 
those changes by the criminal justice agencies should be clearly 
distinguished from one another. Even if this merely involved 
structured and unstructured interviews with relevant criminal 
justice personnel, as these researchers recommend, this would 
undoubtedly contribute to a better understanding of the interaction 
of law and its operationalization.
This particular piece of evaluative research, based as it is on 
complex statistical analyses of criminal justice data, may be 
criticised on two fronts; firstly, it fails to investigate the use 
of discretion by the courts, and consequently to shed any light on 
how the law is being implemented by judges and various other 
professionals at a lower level of case processing. Secondly, it 
seeks to analyse the impact of law reform by relying on a series of 
somewhat tenuous links which may or may not be empirically 
justified. The whole research is based on the assumption that the 
law is being adequately implemented. Evidence from other sources, 
as we shall see below, shows that discretionary legislation of the 
sort that exists in California is unlikely to be implemented in the 
impartial and uniform way that the spirit of the law assumes.
Several researchers concluded that there is little difference 
between conviction rates for rape in states with "traditional" rape
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legislation, and states where substantial reforms have been enacted
(26). But perhaps the biggest empirical blow to the effectiveness
of discretionary legislation comes from a study by Borgida and
White. They conducted a large scale jury simulation experiment in
order to examine the impact of legal reform on inferential
processes made by the jury, under "common law", "moderate reform"
and "radical reform" legislatures;
"As predicted, only the Radical Reform Rule, when applied 
to an Improbable Consent fact pattern [i.e. where various 
features of the facts of the case are unlikely to suggest 
victim consent or contributory behaviour to jurors] seems 
to restrict the inference of victim consent, enhance 
victim credibility, and increase the likelihood of 
conviction. A particularly distressing aspect of this 
pattern ..is that the impact of prior sexual history 
evidence with Moderate Reform and Common Law Rules in an 
otherwise Improbable Consent case is apparently 
detrimental to the prosecution's case." (27)
Thus, the effect of American reforms, with the possible exception
of Michigan, is unclear. Their impact has rarely been monitored,
and where it has, evaluation has been based on crime statistics
rather than on court proceedings and judicial decision-making.
Because many of the new statutes dealing with sexual history
evidence were passed at the same time as other related legal
reforms, it is also difficult to distinguish the effect of their
different components. Nevertheless, there is now increasing
agreement that discretionary legislation has not had the hoped for
effect in bringing about major changes in the criminal justice
system's dealings with rape. Even the supporters of discretionary
provisions concede that courts may be far too ready to assume that
any past sexual activity by a woman makes her more likely to
consent to any sexual activity. There is clearly a genuine problem
involved in charting a course between inflexible legislative rules
and totally unfettered judicial discretion, and it may be that
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reforms such as those implemented in Michigan, at least on paper, 
go too far. However, as Berger notes,
"Lack of empathy and understanding manifested by judges 
presents the strongest counterargument against making the 
conservative, largely male judiciary primarily 
responsible for reform. Moreover, shield laws not only 
serve to insulate victims against irrational or biased 
rulings; they also aim to increase uniformity and hence 
predictability in practice. For these reasons one may 
favour specific provisions that leave little to the 
courts’ predilections". (28)
Australian reforms
Most of the Australian states introduced very similar legislation 
to the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 around the same time.
By and large, the Australian statutes differ from the American ones 
insofar as, with the exception of New South Wales which will be 
discussed below, reforms of any significance were only introduced 
with respect to the rules of evidence about the complainant’s prior 
sexual experience.
The reports of the various commissions which looked into this area 
in a number of states differed markedly from the Heilbron 
Committee’s recommendations here. The Victorian report, for 
example, expressed a great deal of concern with false allegations 
of rape and the imperative need to protect defendants from these.
(29) It was also felt, in sharp contrast to Heilbron, that sexual 
experience with third parties was indeed relevant to a woman’s 
credibility. The Commissioners put forward the somewhat archaic 
argument that where a person’s behaviour goes against conventional 
norms, which they felt included abstention from extra-marital 
sexual intercourse, one is right to automatically question their 
credibility as they may be just as inclined to disregard other
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conventional norms such as telling the truth in a court of law. One 
wonders why they did not recommend that witnesses in all criminal 
cases should be questioned about their previous sexual experience 
on those grounds. The Tasmanian report also found that Heilbron 
went too far, and largely accepted the proposals of the Victorian 
Commission. They strongly favoured a scheme where "the discretion 
of the judge would not be unduly fettered". (30) As Temkin 
observed,
"Thus, the discretionary schemes proposed in Victoria,
Tasmania and New South Wales may be said to have been 
born out of a combination of suspicion, hostility and 
indifference towards women who complain of rape. The 
Heilbron committee, by contrast, which was unequivocal in 
its sympathy for the rape victim, favoured legislation 
which would have left the judges with very limited scope 
to admit sexual history evidence. The legislation which 
was to emerge from sources so disparate proved, however, 
to be remarkably similar". (31)
Legislation in various states is far from consistent, and its
actual terms vary considerably. This in itself has been criticised
by O'Connor who noted that while before reform, the common law
applied throughout Australia,
"there are now, in law, three different definitions of 
rape in Australia - the common law, the South Australian 
and the Victorian variations. The New South Wales Report 
proposes another variant. It is clearly arguable that 
reform of the substantive law is necessary but without 
some centralisation the result has been duplication of 
activity and a confused national picture." (32)
The types of offences to which the legislation applies vary from
state to state, as do the proceedings to which the legislation
applies. Evidence relating to the complainant's prior sexual
history with the acused remains unaffected by the new provisions.
Evidence of prior sexual conduct is controlled in very different
ways, although all but New South Wales adopt an essentially
discretionary approach. Tasmania and South Australia exclude such
evidence if it is only relevant to credibility but otherwise leave
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the question to the judge, who may rule it in if he finds it,
"in all the circumstances of the case, justified". (33)
The other four states exclude evidence of sexual reputation but not 
evidence relevant to credit. The Victorian legislation, for 
example, excludes without exception cross-examination or evidence 
about "the general reputation of the complainant with respect to 
chastity". (34) Sexual experience with men other than the defendant 
may be admitted if the court "is satisfied that the evidence has 
substantial relevance to facts in issue", or if it is a proper 
matter for cross-examination as to credit. Queensland requires that 
admission be "desirable in the interests of justice". (35) The 
criterion of admissibility in Western Australia, as in Victoria, is 
"substantial relevance" to the main issue or to credit, but the 
qualified prohibition is wide ranging and includes evidence of the 
complainant's reputation, disposition or indulgences in sexual 
matters. (36) New South Wales has totally prohibited the admission 
of sexual conduct evidence subject to a number of exceptions which 
relate to surrounding circumstances, a prior relationship with the 
accused, the issue of identity, a specific motive for false 
complaint (to explain pregnancy or sexual disease) and the rebuttal 
of prosecution evidence. (37) The following sections will discuss 
in more detail the various Australian provisions as well as their 
interpretation and impact in recent years.
South Australia
The shortcomings of the discretionary approach to sexual history 
legislation are clearly illustrated by the implementation of the 
Evidence Act Amendment Act of South Australia which was passed in
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1976, To begin with, this was far from being a particularly radical
piece of legislation, and has been criticised for being muddled and
confusing (38). It provides that in rape proceedings, evidence of
"(a) sexual experiences of the alleged victim of the 
offence prior to the date on which the offence is alleged 
to have been committed; or
(b) the sexual morality of the alleged victim of the 
offence,
shall not be adduced (whether by examination in chief, 
cross-examination or re-examination) except by leave of 
the judge.
Leave to adduce evidence under this section shall not be 
granted except where the judge is satisfied that -
(a) an allegation has been, or is to be, made by or on 
behalf of the prosecution or the defence, to which the 
evidence in question is directly relevant; and
(b) the introduction of the evidence is, in all the 
circumstances of the case, justified". (39)
The South Australian provision has been extensively analysed by the
courts, and the results of this analysis have been summarized by
Aronson, Raeburn and Weinberg (40) who found that there is a great
deal of judicial mistrust of the section, sometimes to the point of
hostility. (41) While the provision represents no more than a very
limited restriction on indiscriminate cross-examination, one judge
commented on it as follows;
"The section in its present form presents the rather 
disturbing prospect of an innocent man being in danger of 
being convicted because he is unable to practice the 
right given to him at common law to cross-examine the 
party who seeks to have him convicted of what is a very 
serious crime" (42)
In practice, it appears that the trial judge can seek an assurance
from defence counsel that he has reliable evidence of the truth of
the imputation he wishes to make against the complainant. However,
it is also noted that the spirit of the section can easily be
flouted by counsel simply alleging the complainant's immorality,
and then submitting evidence cogently relevant to the allegation.
There seems to be a consensus that the section would have been
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better drafted if it had referred to evidence relevant to the 
issue, rather than to counsel’s allegations. (43)
The scope of evidence which may be held admissible in South 
Australia is enormous. In R v Gun, ex parte Stephenson , the Chief 
Justice spoke of the "numerous situations in which evidence of 
sexual experiences or sexual morality may be relevant to one of the 
factual issues in the case" (44) and provided the following 
examples:
(1) Where the defendant alleges belief in consent on grounds which 
include his knowledge or belief of the complainant’s previous 
sexual behaviour. Technically, this refers to his state of mind, 
not her behaviour.
(2) Where the defendant alleges that the complainant is accusing 
him of rape because he refused to give her money: "It is relevant 
to inquire whether she was in the habit of obtaining or asking for 
money in return for intercourse". There is no indication that 
supporting evidence would be required before leave to put such a 
question is given.
(3) Where the defence is consent, previous sexual experiences 
between the complainant and the accused will almost always be 
relevant.
(4) Where the complainant is "experienced or sophisticated", and 
the defence is consent, it may be relevant to enquire into her past 
sexual experience as a test of the truth of her account of the
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details of the alleged crime. The reaction of such a woman in a 
sexual situation may be expected to differ from that of an 
unsophisticated and inexperienced girl.
5) Where medical evidence implies previous intercourse on the part 
of the complainant it is relevant to test this "since if she puts 
forward a false claim to virginity that will reflect adversely on 
her credibility".
The Chief Justice also stated that
"While in many cases it may be possible to restrict
evidence about previous sexual experiences to a
particular topic or a particular person or occasion it 
will, in my view, generally be found that it is 
impossible to restrict the questioning in this way and 
that once the gate is opened the whole field is liable to 
survey". (45)
Thus, the effect of restricting legislation has been very
disappointing; as one observer writes,
"Informal conversations with South Australian women who 
had hailed these new provisions as a great breakthrough 
and were monitoring the outcome in particular cases
indicate that in their opinion, the only thing that has
changed is that the cases are now longer because the 
defence must formally seek leave for what he previously 
did automatically and leave is being granted... The
legislation to date has had no practical effect at all".
(46)
A similar remark was made by the Director of the New South Wales
Criminal Law Review Division:
"The provision of a "general discretion" in South 
Australian legislation of 1976 has not satisfactorily 
changed the pre-existing law and practice in relation to 
’prior sexual behaviour’." (47)
0 ’Grady and Powell comment that "The old rule returns - if it ever
went anywhere else" (48), and Temkin argues that the "old rule" may
actually be expanded under the new legislation:
"...cross-examination which might once have been admitted
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as going to credit may now be admitted as relevant to the 
issue. Defending counsel is thereby given carte blanche 
to investigate the complainant's sexual past in order to 
show that so experienced a woman is unlikely to have 
found herself trapped in the situation she describes. We 
are back to the myth that sexually experienced women do 
not get raped or that a woman with experience is more 
likely to have consented, There can be few loopholes of 
judicial discretion to rival this one". (49)
The South Australian and Tasmanian reforms follow the same
"loophole" approach, where an exclusionary rule is adopted with a
catch-all at the conclusion, allowing the admission of just about
any evidence determined by the court to be "directly relevant" and
"justified". (50) Scutt argues that
"such laws go, in effect, no further than current rules 
of evidence and may in fact be more harmful to the rights
of the victim than of help" (51)
Victoria and Queensland
Victoria and Queensland follow an expanded "loophole" approach, 
with certain kinds of evidence, such as general reputation with 
respect to chastity, being totally excluded. (52) Evidence of the 
complainant's sexual experience with the defendant or with third 
parties is only admissible by leave of the judge. Applications, as 
elsewhere, are made in the absence of the jury but there is an 
added provision that the defendant may also request the absence of 
the complainant.
Evidence relating to the complainant's sexual activities, except
with the accused, is not regarded as
"having a substantial relevance to the facts in issue by 
virtue of any inferences it may raise as to general 
disposition"; neither is it
"a proper matter for cross-examination as to credit in 
the absence of special circumstances by reason of which 
it would be likely materially to impair confidence in the 
reliability of the evidence of the complainant." (53)
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The "loophole" is that the court may give leave to cross-examine 
provided
"it is satisfied that the evidence has substantial 
relevance to facts in issue or is proper matter for 
cross-examination as to credit" (54),
and it considers it is desirable "in the interests of justice" to 
do so.
The Queensland section is virtually identical, but has an added
provision which specifies what evidence may be regarded as being
substantially relevant:
"Without prejudice to the substantial relevance of other 
evidence, evidence of an act or event that is 
substantially contemporaneous with any offence with which 
the defendant is charged in an examination of witnesses 
or a trial or that is part of a sequence of acts or 
events that explains the circumstances in which such an 
offence was committed shall be regarded as having 
substantial relevance to the facts in issue," (55)
In Victoria, evidence of the victim's sexual past can also be
brought in to help the court determine an appropriate sentence
where the accused has pleaded guilty or been convicted of a rape
offence. This may not be as distressing to the complainant as
direct cross-examination, but certainly reflects a deeply held
belief that the seriousness of the offence is to be evaluated in
relation to the victim's prior sexual activities. The unspoken and
totally unsupported assumption is that rape is more damaging to a
virgin than to a woman with sexual experience. (56)
The impact of Victorian legislation has not been systematically 
evaluated, but some raw data about the frequency and success of 
formal applications is available. Applications were made by 13 
accused persons during the periods January to December 1978 and
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July to December 1979 for leave to cross-examine the complainant in 
trials for rape offences (rape, assault with intent to rape and 
attempted rape) about her prior sexual history with persons other 
than the accused. Leave was granted to nine accused persons, which 
represents approximately 70% of the applicants. (57)
Thus, discretionary legislation in Victoria has also failed to 
achieve any significant change in the conduct of rape trials, and 
sexual history evidence is still held to be relevant in the 
majority of cases, not only to the issue and to credit, but also to 
sentencing.
Western Australia
Western Australian amendments to the Evidence Act became law in May
1977, (58) They restrict evidence of any sexual experience of the
complainant with persons other than the defendant, her
"disposition" in sexual matters, and her sexual reputation with the
exception of any matter connected with the facts of the case.
Again, a "loophole" approach is adopted, prohibiting such evidence
in principle, but allowing the judge a discretion to admit it if he
is satisfied that it has
"substantial relevance to the facts in issue or the 
credit of the complainant" (59)
Assertions that piecemeal reforms such as these have not improved
the complainant’s negative experiences involved in giving evidence
and pursuing a rape complaint through the legal system are
supported by the findings of an empirical study examining rape
trials before and after the above mentioned law reforms.
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Newby studied transcripts from all rape trials heard in the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia from January 1974 to December 1979 in 
order to determine what type of evidence was admitted into court in 
cases prior to the Evidence Act amendments, and whether evidence 
was held inadmissible following the amendments. Out of a total of 
165 rape cases in that period, 113 involved pleas of "not guilty" 
and proceeded to trial. A preliminary report based on data 
collected from transcripts of 38 of these trials (21 before the 
amendment, and 17 afterwards) reveals that the operation of the 
Western Australian reforms is not dissimilar to that of the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. (60)
In each of the cases after amendment where the defence considered 
it necessary to introduce such evidence, permission was granted 
where requested, in some cases without any requirement on defence 
counsel to show "substantial relevance". Newby gives the example of 
a case where defence counsel got permission to introduce evidence 
that the 16 year old complainant was not a virgin, apparently to
"counteract the effect of her youthful and innocent
appearance". (61)
Elsewhere, evidence was introduced through the "back door" in terms 
of conversations the victim was alleged to have had with the 
defendant about her sexual experiences.
The failure of reform has been attributed to the "loophole" 
provision where, if application is made for leave to circumvent the 
prohibition, it is almost always granted. Newby also asserts, 
however, that restricted evidence within the Western Australian 
definition is not used as frequently as might be supposed. But 
another reason why reforms have not improved the lot of
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complainants in the courtroom is that their negative experiences 
also derive from other kinds of evidence used by the defence which 
are not caught by reforms.
Newby identifies four major strands of attack commonly used by 
defence counsel to undermine the complainant's evidence. These are 
continual questioning about the details of the rape, the 
relationship between the accused and the victim prior to the rape, 
her general character or reputation, and her sexual experience and 
reputation. Only one of these is covered, and inadequately at that, 
by the reforms.
On the basis of her study and her examination of typical defence
strategies in rape trials, Newby concludes that
"the problems for rape victims in court are far too 
complex to be amenable to simple solutions in the form of 
procedural "tinkering" with the laws of evidence". (62)
New South Wales
New South Wales has attempted to go beyond "procedural 
tinkering"and passed comprehensive rape legislation including, 
rather as Michigan, radical changes in the definition of the 
offence and severe restrictions on cross-examination about previous 
sexual behaviour at all court proceedings. (63)
There are new categories of sexual assault offences, each with its 
own maximum penalty. The law covers not only vaginal penetration, 
but also penetration with objects, anal penetration as well as 
oral-genital contact. Boys under 14 can now be charged with rape. 
Both men and women can be victims and offenders. Husbands can be
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charged with raping their wives. According to the New South Wales 
Attorney-General,
"under the new law it will be much less of an ordeal for
the victim to give evidence than under the old law". (64)
New South Wales has rejected the fundamental approach of reliance
on the trial judge which is the hallmark of the other states'
approaches. Rather than leaving it to the judge to decide whether
evidence is "substantially relevant", albeit with some specific
rules, it has adopted a more strictly exclusionary approach. It
lists specific types of evidence which may be admitted by the
courts, and prohibits reference to any other evidence. Evidence
relating to the sexual reputation of the complainant, for example,
is always inadmissible. (65)
Despite these restrictions, the New South Wales law is not as 
narrow in its scope as the Michigan legislation. Evidence may be 
admitted through the following "gates";
1. Where it relates to sexual experience, or lack of it, of the 
complainant around the time of the alleged offence, and to events 
which form part of the circumstances in which the alleged offence 
was committed;
2. Where it is evidence relating to an existing or recent 
relationship between the accused and the complainant;
3. Where the accused person denies having had sexual intercourse 
with the complainant, and it is evidence relevant to whether the 
presence of semen, pregnancy, disease or injury is attributable to 
the sexual intercourse alleged to have been had by him;
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4. Where it is evidence relevant to whether at the time of the 
alleged offence, the complainant had a disease which, at any 
relevant time, was absent in the accused person, or vice versa;
5. Where it is evidence relevant to whether the allegation that the 
offence was committed by the accused was first made following a 
discovery of the pregnancy or disease in the complainant. (66)
Evidence thus specified may be admitted only if
"its probative value outweighs any distress, humiliation 
or embarrassment which the complainant might suffer as a 
result of its admission". (67)
As in England and elsewhere, the judge is to consider the
admissibility of evidence in the absence of the jury, but of course
has very specific rules to follow in deciding on the admissibility
of particular pieces of evidence. The word discretion is
conspicuously absent from the relevant section. There is also a
further safeguard;
"Where a Court or Justice has decided that evidence is 
admissible under subsection (3), the Court or Justice 
shall, before the evidence is given, record or cause to 
be recorded in writing the nature and scope of the 
evidence that is so admissible and the reasons for that 
decision." (68)
The Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act was passed in 1981, and
since its inception, its impact on the Supreme Court of New South
Wales has been monitored by the Bureau of Crime Statistics and
Research of the New South Wales Government. As the principal
investigator in charge of that monitoring has observed,
"Ways can be found around the most stringent prohibitions 
and barristers in my country are demonstrating how adept 
they are in finding such ways". (69)
Nevertheless, early results of this ongoing study suggest that the
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legislation has had a considerable impact on conviction rates,
largely because defendants are now far more likely to plead guilty
than previously. (70) Nothing has yet been published on the impact
on the evidentiary restrictions, or indeed on the broader workings
of the Act, but there is widespread optimism that the comprehensive
law reforms in New South Wales will fare better than the limited
discretionary reforms introduced elsewhere. For example, it has
been observed that
"bv adopting a general exclusionary rule subject to 
certain inclusionary exceptions this approach achieves a 
fairly high degree of certainty, and will probably ensure 
increased protection of a complainant’s rights in a 
sexual offence trial." (71)
Conclusion
There is now overwhelming evidence to indicate that discretionary
controls on the introduction of sexual history evidence are
inadequate and unsatisfactory. Correspondingly, a number of
jurisdictions seem to be moving towards provisions which leave
little to the discretion of the judiciary. We have seen above the
approaches adopted in Michigan and New South Wales in particular.
In recent months, major changes have been made to the Criminal Code
of Canada which take away much of the judge's discretion. The new
law prohibits evidence of any sexual activity of the complainant
with anyone other than the accused unless
(a) it rebuts evidence previously adduced by the 
prosecution;
Cb) it is evidence of specific instances sexual activity 
which tends to establish the identity of the person who 
had sexual contact with her on the occasion of the 
alleged offence;
(c) it is evidence of sexual activity that took place on 
the same occasion as the alleged offence, and where it 
relates to the accused’s belief in her consent. (72)
Nearer to home, the recent report on evidence of the Scottish Law
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Commission goes some way towards setting down firm guidelines 
regarding the admissibility of sexual history evidence. The 
Scottish recommendations clearly seek to move away from the 
absolute discretion which characterizes the English legislation, 
but stop short of the kind of radical reforms that have been 
introduced in New South Wales for example. The Commissioners 
outlined their approach as follows;
"...although we subscribe to the principles of 
clarifying the law and of giving suitable protection to 
complainers, we do not think that this can be achieved, 
consistently with the interests of justice, simply by 
providing for a total prohibition of certain classes of 
evidence. At the same time, we do not consider that the 
interests of justice can best be served by leaving with 
the judges a wholly unfettered discretion in such 
matters." (73)
The proposals contained in this report are novel in two respects; 
firstly, all restrictions refer to any sexual behaviour between 
the complainant and the accused as well as the complainant and 
other persons; and secondly, they cover not only rape but also a 
variety of such related offences as indecent assault.
The Report recommends that as a general rule, the court should not 
admit questioning or evidence which shows that a complainant has at 
any time been of bad character, associated with prostitutes or 
engaged in prostitution, or engaged in sexual behaviour with any 
person so long as this does not form part of the subject-matter of 
the charge. There are exceptions to this general rule, if the 
evidence is required to rebut or explain evidence adduced by 
someone other than the defendant, where it refers to sexual 
behavior which took place on the same occasion as the sexual 
behaviour forming the subject-matter of the charge, and when it is 
relevant to the peculiarly Scottish defence of incrimination.
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However, these apparently stringent prohibitions also have a 
"loophole" provision, in the familiar format that all such evidence 
may also be admitted where "it would be contrary to the interests 
of justice" to exclude it. While the Scottish Commission only 
succeeds to a limited extent in moving away from discretion, it 
clearly acknowledges that legislation in the English mould is an 
unsatisfactory approach to this problem.
One of the most frequently voiced objections to the introduction of
total prohibition, even with a clear listing of exceptions, seems
to be the difficulty involved in drafting legislation to cater for
all the possible situations which might arise in a rape trial and
to anticipate all eventualities where various aspects of the
complainant's sexual experience might be relevant to the case. This
point is made by the Scottish Law Commissioners as follows:
"The precise circumstances of each case in which a sexual 
offence is charged will differ, and it is impossible to 
predict with any certainty the kinds of circumstances 
which may arise in future cases. Moreover, items of 
evidence which in one case may be objectionable or 
irrelevant may be highly relevant in the circumstances of 
another". (74)
This problem has now been considered in great detail in England and 
elsewhere and there are numerous reports and papers dealing with 
this very issue in some depth in various common law jurisdictions. 
There is also a fair amount of case law on these issues in these 
jurisdictions, as well as some evaluative research on the 
application of the relevant legislation. It is submitted that there 
is now sufficient knowledge and experience available to draft 
legislation which, while minimising the role of discretion, could 
also deal adequately with the contingencies of rape cases that are 
likely to arise.
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Legislation alone, however strict, can only have a limited effect
and is unlikely to solve all the problems involved in the social
construction of rape that is manifest in and out of court. The
process whereby the complainant’s character is under attack in rape
trials is both complicated and subtle. As Newby notes,
"In attempting to reinterpret events in favour of the 
defendant, counsel plays upon widely held sexual 
stereotypes and attitudes about appropriate female 
behaviour, to present the witness in a detrimental light.
This is done through employment of a combintion of the 
various strategies outlined, of which reference to the 
kinds of evidence precluded by special evidence laws, 
form only a small component". (75)
Nevertheless, it is crucial to get that small component right. In
some jurisdictions at least, the lesson has been learnt. In New
South Wales and .Canada, the discretionary approaches originally
adopted have been replaced by provisions which set firm limits on
the admission of this kind of evidence. It is essential here too to
ensure that legislation which was passed in 1976 works as the
Heilbron Group and Parliament intended and it is most unlikely to
do this if section 2 remains entirely discretionary. As Temkin has
argued,
"In England too, it is submitted, the time has come for a 
re-examination of section 2 and a reappraisal of the 
alternatives to discretionary legislation. The Criminal 
Law Revision Committee is currently considering the law 
relating to sexual offences. It is to be hoped that it
will now be persuaded to take this matter on board." (76)
The next chapter will consider other ways in which rape law in
England could be reformulated, in the light of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee’s Report on Sexual Offences.
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CHAPTER NINE. THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM
It is widely assumed that the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act has
done all that is practicable to deal with the most fundamental
problems involved in the legal treatment of rape. Professor Honore,
for example, writes that the Act is
"an important reform, which makes it clear that a woman 
is free to have sex outside marriage with Tom and Dick 
while refusing it to Harry and that her sex with Tom and 
Dick is no evidence that she consented to Harry’s 
advances" (1).
More recently, Elliott commented that
"The English Act and Court of Appeal do as much as can be 
done with a truly insoluble problem" (2).
However, we have seen that the provisions of the 1976 Act fail
adequately and uniformly to restrict evidence of the complainant’s
sexual history in a rape trial. The practical application of that
Act clearly flouts the intention of Parliament, and even more so,
the spirit of the Heilbron Report. The extension of the anonymity
provision to defendants has created a serious anomaly which is
still being questioned and, as argued in previous chapters, should
be done away with. Lastly, the decision in Morgan, which was said
to be uncontroversial from a strictly legal point of view, has also
remained a live issue. In the light of subsequent comment and case
law, that too should be reconsidered. It can no longer be assumed
either that the 1976 provisions are non-problematic in themselves,
or that they have been implemented properly.
This chapter considers the implications of the findings of this 
study for the law of rape in the future, as well as for broader 
reforms which may be necessary if the offence of rape is to be 
cleansed of its present strongly anti-female bias.
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Changes since 1976 and the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s Report
Since the 1976 Act was passed there have been a number of public 
outcries on rape. There was the Glasgow rape case, where the 
authorities refused to prosecute and which led to the resignation 
of Mr. Nicholas Fairbairn as Solicitor General of Scotland. The 
victim brought a private prosecution against a number of youths who 
viciously attacked and raped her, two of whom were eventually 
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment (3). Early in 1982, a 
television documentary showed the brutal interrogation by three 
police officers of a complainant which led her to withdraw her 
allegation of rape (4). But rape returned to serious public 
attention chiefly as a result of particularly inept judicial 
handling of a number of well reported cases.
In 1982, Judge Richards fined a man convicted of rape because he
thought that his hitchhiker victim was also to blame. The judge
deemed the case to be a tragedy for the defendant, a father of two
who had no previous record of sexual offences. He explained;
’’I am not saying that a girl hitching home late at night 
should not be protected by the law, but she was guilty of 
a great deal of contributory negligence" (5).
These comments received hearty support from Sir Melford Stevenson,
a retired High Court judge (6), who went on record as saying that
"It is the height of imprudence for any girl to
hitch-hike at night. That is so plain, it isn’t really
worth stating. She is in the true sense asking for it"
(7).
Everyone will agree that it is foolish for anybody, irrespective of 
sex, to expose themselves unnecessarily to the risk of muggings and
assaults of any kind. But the arguments used here go far beyond the
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statement of this precautionary view. They suggest that imprudent 
behaviour on the part of the victim, and the victim of rape is 
singled out in this respect, excuses or at least strongly mitigates 
the behaviour of the assailant. In fact, the concept of 
"contributory negligence" has no validity in the law of rape and 
although a handful of offenders each year receive a non-custodial 
sentence, a fine is not in line with the general level of 
sentencing.
The case led the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, to set out 
guidelines for sentencing in rape cases and to state that, other 
than in wholly exceptional circumstances, a conviction always calls 
for an immediate custodial sentence. Claims that a case was "wholly 
exceptional" should be rejected if any of eleven "aggravating 
circumstances" were present. These include the use of weapons; the 
infliction of serious injury; excessive violence; threats; 
perversions forced on victims; if the victim was very young or very 
old; if the rapist occupied a position of trust in relation to his 
victim; intrusion into the victim's home; kidnapping; if a group of 
men were engaged in the rape; and the number of rapes committed by 
the rapist, either on different women or on the same woman (8).
At the end of the same year. Judge Price imposed a 12 month prison 
sentence, with eight months suspended, on a man convicted of raping 
a six-year old girl. Taking into account two months in prison on 
remand and time off for good behaviour, the man only served 25 days 
after his conviction.
The Prime Minister took the unusual step of aligning herself in the
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Commons with those who regarded this sentence as "totally
incomprehensible". Within days, it was announced that rape would in
future only be tried by the most senior judges. As Professor
Michael Zander noted,
"Mrs. Thatcher was yesterday getting political credit for 
the new directive that only the most senior judges 
qualified to take murder cases will in future be able to 
take rape cases. But it seems that the initiative for the 
change came not from her but from the Lord Chancellor who 
was heartily fed up with the way he repeatedly found 
himself dealing with bizarre decisions of maverick 
circuit judges in these sensitive cases." (9)
This research suggests that promoting rape to the category of
murder for these purposes is unlikely to have much impact on rape
trials. The majority of rape cases were already being tried by the
most senior judges before this directive. There is no evidence that
these judges as a group are necessarily more sensitive to the
plight of the rape victim than others. Indeed, they are more likely
to be older and possibly more out of touch with the reality of
contemporary attitudes than their junior colleagues. They are also
unlikely to impose heavier sentences. This study and sporadic media
reports show that though there are occasionally considerable
differences in sentencing, these reflect individual idiosyncrasies
and personal bias of the judge rather than his status in the
judicial hierarchy.
While occasional cases picked up by the media serve to highlight 
the worst defects of the current system, piecemeal reforms made as 
concessions to public outrage will only create further anomalies. 
However, comprehensive reform of the law of rape has been delayed 
for years to await the report of the Criminal Law Revision
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Committee (CLRC) on Sexual Offences, even where relatively
uncontroversial matters are concerned. For example, there is an
"irrebuttable presumption" in English law that a boy under 14 is
incapable of having sexual intercourse, and thus he cannot be
convicted of rape or of any offence involving intercourse (10). He
can be convicted of aiding and abetting, but no more, even if he is
the principal perpetrator of the full offence. It has long been
thought that this provision was unjust and should be repealed. The
issue was raised during debates of the Sexual Offences (Amendment)
Bill in 1976, when Parliament thought it best to refer the matter
to the CLRC, despite the following rather sobering observation from
a member of the House of Lords;
"It does not seem to me that it requires the 
deliberations of a Committee, however distinguished, to 
establish that fact" (11).
The CLRC was asked, in consultation with the Policy Advisory
Committee on Sexual Offences, to review the law relating to and
penalties for sexual offences in July 1975. It was in the same
month that the Heilbron Group was appointed to give urgent
consideration to those aspects of rape law which were deemed to be
in need of early reform. On the face of it, the CLRC appear to have
accepted the model of law reform introduced by the Law Commission
after its establishment in 1966. The Commission’s procedure is to
publish a working paper which expounds the existing law that has
been selected for reform, examines the criticisms that have been
directed at it, and sets out the field of choice of reforms. Then
follows the widest possible consultation with interested parties
which
"may take a long time but it can, and usually does, mean 
a swift passage through Parliament of a non controversial 
Bill" (12).
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Lord Scarman is probably justified in his claim that this technique
"represents a major advance in legislative method. It is 
perhaps the greatest contribution to the public life of 
the nation made by the Commission" (13).
The CLRC appear to have followed this blue—print for law reform
insofar as they published a Working Paper in 1980 (14) and invited
comment on the provisional recommendations it contained. However,
there the similarity between the workings of the two bodies ends.
The final report published in 1984 (15) strongly suggests that the
CLRC has learnt little from the Law Commission with regard to
rational procedures of law reform. While in some areas, the final
Report reflects the consultation that has taken place, it is also
evident that full weight has not been given to the views of the
interest groups involved. In particular, representations by women's
groups are dismissed in a perfunctory manner, and the CLRC do not
seem to be prepared to take seriously views with which they
disagree. The substance of the Working Paper and of the final
Report will now be considered in some detail.
The future of Section 2
It may be useful at this stage to recall the Heilbron Group's 
approach to the issue of evidence relating to the complainant's 
sexual history. It was forcefully and cogently argued in their 
report that
"...in contemporary society sexual relationships outside 
marriage, both steady and of a more casual character, are 
fairly widespread, and it seems now to be agreed that a 
woman's sexual experiences with partners of her own 
choice are neither indicative of untruthfulness nor of a 
general willingness to consent. There exists, in our 
view, a gap between the assumptions underlying the law 
and those public views and attitudes which exist today 
which ought to influence today's law" (16).
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There are still some who argue that the Heilbron Group was unduly
stringent in its proposals to restrict evidence of the
complainant’s sexual history. In a recent article Elliott seems to
agree that Section 2 does not follow Heilbron, but also puts
forward the argument that the drafting and application of the 1976
Act are preferable to Heilbron's proposals. He goes on to say this;
"It is impossible to deny that prior sexual activity with 
third parties often has a strong relevance to the issues 
in rape trials. Granted, it has no relevance in certain 
types of case, e.g. a sudden assault by a complete 
stranger or rape by a violent burglar. But many typical 
cases involve a complainant who was, of her own free 
will, alone with the man involved. The fact of 
intercourse or even identity of her partner may be, and 
consent often is, a live question on which her sexual 
history may shed much light" (17).
It is acknowledged that there are cases where previous sexual
history may be relevant to the issues, and that a total ban on all
such evidence would work unfairly against the defendant. One
obvious example is where the defendant denies the occurrence of
sexual intercourse, yet there is evidence of semen or, at a later
stage, pregnancy in the complainant. The defendant must in such
cases be allowed to cross-examine her to establish the source of
the semen or pregnancy. There is nothing in Section 2 that prevents
the introduction of evidence in such a case, and indeed the
American states which have far more stringent prohibitions about
sexual history evidence invariably make an exception for this
category of case.
However, Elliott goes on to give a series of hypothetical cases 
where, according to him, the complainant’s sexual experience would 
be highly relevant to consent without the evidence in question 
amounting to showing promiscuity or even "striking similarity" in 
the Heilbron mould. He gives, among others, the following example;
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"...D, a senior boy pupil, was kept behind after school 
by the schoolteacher C, and on their being interrupted by 
the school caretaker, C screamed and cried "Rape". D must 
be allowed to prove that she had before had consensual 
relations with another pupil after school" (18).
Such evidence may be relevant to credit in certain circumstances.
If, for instance, the complainant were to claim in her evidence
that she would never consent to intercourse with a pupil by virtue
of her position as a schoolteacher, then the question of previous
intercourse with a pupil would indeed be relevant to her
credibility. We have seen in Chapter 4. that where credibility
happens to involve sexual history in this sense, applications under
3.2 are almost a formality and, rightly, the evidence is always
admitted.
However, what Elliott is arguing in the above example is that this 
evidence is relevant to the issue of consent. It is submitted that 
this is precisely the kind of evidence that Heilbron and Parliament 
intended to restrict. One of the main problems with Elliott’s 
approach is that he does not justify his belief that the 
complainant’s past sexual history will "shed much light" on the 
issues in the trial. Instead of making his assumptions explicit, he 
simply postulates that "surely her sexual history is relevant" in a 
whole series of cases, relying on some dubious notion that if a 
woman has engaged in consensual sexual activity with someone, 
perhaps in slightly similar circumstances to the alleged rape 
incident, this has substantial bearing on whether she consented to 
the defendant. In fact, it is difficult to see why her consent to 
sexual intercourse with others should be deemed to have any 
relevance to the likelihood of her consent to the defendant in 
question; after all, the identity of the partner is a crucial
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element in sexual intercourse and consent.
In any event, Parliament accepted several years ago now that in 
principle the Heilbron approach was right and made a commitment to 
its implementation by passing the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976. The important thing now is to ensure that the spirit of that 
legislation is adhered to in practice. There is evidence from a 
variety of sources that Section 2 is not operating as intended.
Cohen examined the application and interpretation of Section 2
after the case of Lawrence, with regard to two main questions.
Firstly, he considered when evidence of prostitution or of
promiscuity could be admissible in rape trials, and secondly, what
would be the nature of the burden on the defendant who wished to
introduce such evidence. He concluded that if the criterion is, as
stated in Lawrence, that the jury would be likely to take a
different view of the complainant’s evidence by virtue of the
introduction of such facts or allegations, then, strictly, this
should always be admissible;
’’The relevant question according to Lawrence and Mills is 
’when would evidence of prostitution be more likely than 
not to lead a jury to take a different view of the 
complainant’s evidence?' The answer, it is submitted, is 
’always’. If this is the case then the law before the Act 
has not been altered by S.2, even though, arguably,
Heilbron intended it to be altered’’ (19).
Anecdotal evidence too suggests that all is not well with the
implementation of this part of the law. The chairman of the
Criminal Bar Association was recently reported as saying that in
his experience,
’’judges now always allowed that cross-examination to take 
place - always is too strong a word, but very frequently’’ 
(20).
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It must be remembered, however, that the worst misuses of judicial 
discretion are unlikely to come to public notice because, partly as 
a result of the introduction of evidence of sexual experience, 
these cases are more likely than not to result in an acquittal. In 
any event, the different criteria used by judges in deciding 
whether to admit such evidence and the ensuing uneven 
implementation of the Act mean that women are still frequently 
exposed to detailed and humiliating questioning about their 
previous sexual experience.
Following the publication of the early results of the present
study, the Attorney General acknowledged that the 1976 Act,
although designed to protect women from unnecessary
cross-examination about their sexual past, was not always properly
observed in court. He took rather an optimistic view though of
judges' willingness to start operating more in line with the letter
of the law as a result of public concern;
"The judges are just like any other human beings. Some 
will be seeing this programme, they read the newspapers, 
they react to the climate of public opinion just like 
anyone else. I would suspect that a lot of them, when 
they are faced with the problem, are going to look at it 
in a new light in the future" (21).
My empirial study of 50 trials for rape at the Old Bailey in
1978-79 establishes that there are striking differences among trial
judges in their interpretation and application of the law; in
particular, in their willingness to exercise their discretion to
exclude evidence of the complainant's sexual biography. I have
shown that the majority of applications to introduce evidence of a
complainant's sexual experience are successful. Most women who
complain of rape are still subjected to distressing questioning
about their intimate lives. Inevitably, the portrayal of the
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alleged victim as experienced or promiscuous tends to correlate 
with the defendant’s acquittal. Differences among judges result in 
large part from the absence of legislative guidelines. One means of 
changing what now happens would be to assist judges by laying down 
guiding principles. A clear indication of the circumstances in 
which a woman's sexual experience with A or B may be relevant to 
establish whether she was raped by C would undoubtedly help to 
remedy the worst problems which have arisen in applying the 1976 
Act.
There had been some hint that the case of R v Viola (22) might 
provide an opportunity for the Court of Appeal to establish some 
guidelines of this sort. The date of the hearing was fixed with 
remarkable speed, within less than three months of conviction, and 
an amicus curiae had also been appointed.
The amicus commented that the 1976 Act was operating well, and in 
all six previous appeals, the Court of Appeal and trial judges 
seemingly used the same test in deciding what evidence could 
rightly be excluded. The Act, he said, had not worked unfairly 
against the defendant. The amicus was right to insist that fairness 
to the defendant is one essential criterion for judging the success 
of legislative reform but wrong, in this case, to regard it as the 
only criterion. There is more than a touch of irony in the 
conclusion that a law which was specifically designed to protect 
the complainant works well because it is not unfair to the 
defendant. Acquittals, of course, do not come to the attention of 
the Court of Appeal, but if more women are to be persuaded that it 
is worth reporting rape, then the impact of the law on them must
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also be given serious consideration.
Viola establishes that it is judgment rather than discretion that
is involved in the application of Section 2:
"...it was perhaps wrong to speak of a judge’s 
’discretion’ in the case. He had to make a ’judgment’ 
whether he was satisfied or not in the terms of Section 
2". (23)
This is correct to the extent that once the judge has decided that 
the proposed evidence has relevance to the case, he has no option 
but to allow it in as any other course of action would be unfair to 
the defendant. But Viola begs the main question, which is how 
judges are to arrive at a sensible decision as to relevance. As we 
have seen earlier, the Court of Appeal felt it "improper and 
unwise" to lay down strict criteria for judges to adhere to in 
applying Section 2. It did not explore or deal with the grey area 
between what is becoming increasingly obvious in this debate, 
namely that the distinction betwen the legal categories of credit 
and isssue, where the issue is consent, is largely spurious as far 
as rape is concerned. As the situation stands now, judges will have 
to continue to rely on their own individual notions of the nature 
of rape and of appropriate female behaviour in interpreting this 
part of the law.
The role of the judge in a rape trial is crucial. He brings to it 
his beliefs, experience and knowledge about sex, with all its 
emotional and often unsettling implications. He cannot free himself 
from the influences and attitudes which family life, or its lack, 
have given him in childhood and as an adult. Like the rest of us, 
most judges remain creatures of their time and circumstances, their 
social opinions largely shaped by education, class and occupation.
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Their view of the proper sexual roles of men and women, and the 
social status and situation of women reflect, by acceptance or 
sometimes by rejection, the values of the generation to which they 
belong. Such are the components of judges’ decisions whether to 
grant leave to a defendant’s counsel to cross-examine about a 
complainant’s sexual experience in many cases of rape under the 
present law. No doubt, judicial technique and professional 
experience can help to suppress the merely personal judgment but, 
nevertheless, the findings of this empirical study show the 
inescapable significance of what Mr. Justice Holmes called the 
’’instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions" of judges in 
this branch of the law (24). There are large differences among them 
in their practice in respect of Section 2 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976, and this has important consequences for the 
protection that the law affords to complainants and the willingness 
of juries to acquit defendants.
There is nothing novel in the English experience. The same problem 
has been encountered in a number of other jurisdictions, some of 
which, as we have seen, have moved away from discretionary schemes. 
The results of this study indicate that the whole issue should be 
reconsidered here too, and that serious thought should be given to 
replacing Section 2 with stronger legislation (25), The publication 
in 1984 of the long-awaited CLRC Report on Sexual Offences is 
intended to form the basis of legislative reform in this area, and 
press reports indicate that the Home Secretary is expected to act 
on it. Any changes in the law which result from the Report are 
likely to be the last for the forseeable future and the document is 
therefore important.
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The approach of the CRLC's Fifteenth Report on Sexual Offences to
the working of the present law of rape is instructive. The
Committee notes that television programmes and articles in the
press and legal journals suggest that some people, in particular
some women's organisations, think that complainants are
inadequately protected because many judges too readily grant leave
to cross-examine about sexual experience. At the time when the
Report was written, the only empirical data about the working of
the jurisdiction was part of the material reported in this thesis
which had been published in an article in the Modern Law Review
(26). This evidence is dismissed in the Report in four sentences;
"Critics do not seem to appreciate that a complainant's 
previous sexual experience may be relevant to the issue 
of consent... The frequency with which leave is granted 
is no indication of the strength of the applications. 
Experienced advocates do not make applications unless 
they are reasonably sure that they will be granted. It is 
bad forensic practice to make applications which are 
likely to be refused." (27)
The first sentence is inaccurate; the other three are irrelevant to
the conclusion reached from the findings of this study upon the
consequences of the present unfettered discretion of trial judges.
The current law, effectively, is that evidence of sexual history is 
relevant if the judge thinks that it is relevant. The CLRC assume 
that there is general consensus about the concept of relevance. 
However, the operation of the law as well as common sense indicate 
that this is a misconception. The present state of affairs is bound 
to lead to uneven implementation and has important implications for 
the legal process.
Nevertheless, the Policy Advisory Committee and the Criminal Law
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Revision Committee decided to "discover what the practice of the 
courts actually was". (28) To this end, they
"invited the Recorder of London to discuss this problem 
of giving leave to cross-examine with the circuit judges 
who sit regularly at the Central Criminal Court, because 
it had been suggested in the Press and in a television 
programme that leave to cross-examine had been given too 
freely at that court. The Policy Advisory Committee asked 
the Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, who is now 
one of our members, to make enquiries amongst members of 
the Bar practising both in London and on the circuits as 
to the way section 2 was applied". (29)
These investigations
"did not disclose any grounds for concern that either the 
letter or the spirit of section 2 of the 1976 Act was 
being disregarded. This is what we would have expected.."
(30)
This conclusion was inherent in the type of inquiry made by the 
Committees, and the reader is bound to assume that it was adopted 
in order to produce the result desired by the CLRC. What, one must 
ask, would the CLRC think of the confident finding that there was 
nothing to worry about by a Committee which sought to discover if 
public houses were habitually staying open after closing time by 
addressing inquiries as to whether the law was being properly 
observed to the Chairman of the Licensed Victuallers’ Association 
and to the brewers' Trade Association?
It has been impossible to secure uniformity in the exercise of the 
wide discretion inherent in Section 2, and the present study as 
well as other observations show that the law is being applied 
arbitrarily and unequally. There is now overwhelming evidence from 
this and other jurisdictions that broad discretionary schemes are, 
by definition, almost bound to fail. Elsewhere, legislation in the
S.2 mould has now been tightened up while here the CLRC proposes to 
rely on judges to follow the rules in future, "even if they have
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not done so in the past" (31). But the crux of the problem is that 
there are no clear rules, and judges must in the end fall back on 
their own beliefs and values in making these decisions. It is 
unlikely that the will of Parliament will prevail when trial judges 
have totally unfettered discretion in such a controversial area, 
and when members of the CLRC, themselves largely senior members of 
the legal profession, assume that practitioners are the only 
reliable judges of how the law is working. If legislative reform is 
to have any bite in this area, strong guidelines in accord with 
contemporary thinking and behaviour must replace the rag-bag of 
"human experience in the courts" that currently governs the 
interpretation of the 1976 Act.
Definition of the offence
The CLRC examined the possibilities of redefining rape from a 
number of perspectives. They looked at sexual intercourse obtained 
by fraud and fear; at the creation of two degrees of rape with 
separate penalty structures; at the mental element in rape; and at 
the possibility of extending rape to cover other forms of 
non-consensual sexual activity. The Committee’s recommendations for 
these areas will now be considered in turn.
1. Sexual intercourse by fraud
Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 creates a special offence 
of sexual intercourse procured by fraud. The courts and Parliament 
have intervened over the years in a number of cases to interpret 
the notion of absence of consent in such a way as to extend the law
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of rape to what would otherwise have been cases of intercourse 
procured by fraud.
For example, a man who induces a married woman to have sexual 
intercourse with him by impersonating her husband commits rape
(32). There is also some case law to establish that, if a woman 
submits to intercourse because of ignorance or mistake as to the 
nature of the act and this is induced by the fraud of the 
defendant, she does not consent and his behaviour amounts to rape. 
An example of this is the case of Flattery, where the victim 
allowed intercourse in the belief induced by the defendant that he 
was performing a surgical operation. (33)
The CLRC notes that criticism of this situation centres around the 
question of why one form of fraud should provide a defence to rape 
and another not. For example there seems to be no good reason to 
argue that impersonating a husband is rape, but impersonating a 
lover is not. Thus, the CLRC start from the assumption that the law 
in this area should either be extended or narrowed.
In the Working Paper, the majority of the CLRC argue that no 
satisfactory line can be drawn between one sort of deception and 
another:
"Most of us are of the opinion that the distinctions 
drawn in the cases cannot bear the weight they have been 
made to carry..." (34).
Accordingly, they then proposed removing fraud altogether from the
law of rape. This recommendation was for the notion of absence of
consent to be given a more limited interpretation, and for the
offence of rape not to apply when the woman has consented to the
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defendant putting his penis into her vagina. Mistake as to identity 
or the purpose of the act, they argued, should be irrelevant.
Critics have put forward persuasive arguments for the law to remain
as it is. Temkin, for example, disputes the difficulty in drawing
the line between one sort of fraud and another and points to
parallels in other areas of the law;
"It is submitted that the distinction which prevails in 
the law of rape between frauds as to identity and the 
nature of the act and other types of fraud is a perfectly 
tenable one. Moreover... it has its counterpart in, for 
example, the law of contract and the law relating to the 
nullity of marriage" (35).
Another reason why the majority of the Committee in the Working
Paper preferred a narrower definition of rape was the perceived
damage suffered by victims of fraudulently obtained intercourse
which they assumed to be less severe than in cases where fraud was
not involved:
"We consider that the distress which the victim of such 
frauds or threats may suffer is, though a serious matter, 
not really comparable with the fear and shock that often 
accompanies "true" (sic) rape" (36).
This assertion, for which the Working Paper produced no
justification, is surprising in view of the pertinent case law. The
girl who is deceived into intercourse by the defendant’s pretence
that the act is a surgical operation or a way of improving her
singing ability is bound to be young, naive and inexperienced, and
no less likely to suffer great psychological damage, become
pregnant or catch VD as one who is raped without this element of
fraudulence.
However, in the final Report, the CLRC reject the Working Paper's 
approach and recognise that there is no true consent in the fraud 
cases; the victim would not have consented to sexual intercourse if
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she had known the defendant's true purpose or his true identity. 
Agreement to the act of penetration alone does not constitute 
consent; the identity of the person, after all, is of crucial 
importance in sexual intercourse. The CLRC further propose that 
sexual intercourse obtained by impersonating anybody, as well as 
fraud as to the nature of the act should constitute rape. They 
recommend that the dividing line between rape and fraudulent 
intercourse should be clearly drawn by legislation, but without 
narrowing the current definition of rape (37).
2. Intercourse obtained by fear
This question was not considered in the Working Paper, but in the
final Report, the CLRC do make a majority recommendation.
Where consent is obtained by inducing fear, this is not expressly 
defined as rape in the 1976 Act. Juries, it is thought, may not 
consider that a woman has been raped when she gives in to sexual 
intercourse through fear and this may lead to considerable 
injustice. The recommendation is to work out some statutory 
provision to make a man liable for rape if he obtains consent by 
implied or explicit threats of force against the woman or another 
person, eg. her child, provided that those threats are capable of 
being carried out immediately (38). It may be difficult to find the
right formula to express this in legislation. However, the proposal
to give statutory recognition to the fact that intercourse obtained 
by threats rather than physical violence is still rape is welcome 
and may help to dispel existing prejudice against victims who have 
no physical injuries.
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3. Degrees of rape
One objection to the present law of rape which is sometimes voiced
is that juries may be reluctant to convict men known to be of
previous good character because of the severe penalties the offence
may attract. This is said to be particularly true when juries feel
that the alleged victim was partly responsible, and
"willingly allowed herself to get into a situation of a
kind in which a sensible woman would have appreciated the 
possibility that sexual intercourse might be expected"
(39).
There is no evidence that the maximum sentence deters juries from
convicting. Indeed, thanks to extensive media coverage in recent
years of the range of likely sentences for rape, most people are
probably well aware by now that life sentences are only given to a
handful of offenders each year. Nevertheless, the CLRC's Working
Paper considered a possible remedy to this situation in the
creation of two degrees of rape, one of which would only carry a
maximum penalty of about three years’ imprisonment;
"The first category should apply to rapists who inflict 
violence on their victims or who are strangers to them 
and use threats of violence to induce submission. All 
other cases of rape should go into the second category"
(40).
Such a reform would result in the creation of a "lesser" category
of rape, and effectively in narrowing the current definition of the
offence. That the distinction between degrees of rape exists in the
public mind is unquestionable. Sir Michael Havers has referred to
"minor" rapes, having in mind a case
"where a man persisted (sic) with a woman who had perhaps 
gone off him after a long relationship (41).
The law should not endorse the myth that only violent, brutal rapes
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committed by men who are unknown to the victim constitute "real" 
rape and that other non-consensual intercourse is a lesser offence. 
Instead, it should work to eradicate this myth and to recognise 
fully the gravity of such behaviour, whoever its perpetrator and 
whatever his relationship to the victim. The creation of two 
degrees of rape would undoubtedly be a step backward and the 
rejection of this measure by "almost all commentators" (42) as well 
as by the CLRC in their final Report must therefore be welcome.
4. Intent in rape
The old Morgan decision, somewhat confused by recent decisions on 
recklessness and the meaning of that concept in rape, was also 
considered in the CLRC’s final Report. They recommend that the 
mental element in rape should cover the man who knew that the woman 
was not consenting, as well as the man who either was aware that 
she might not be consenting or did not believe that she was 
consenting (43). The concept of recklessness may or may not be 
retained. This recommendation does not do justice to the 
complexities surrounding this issue. For example, it has been 
suggested that the definition of the mental element should vary 
between offences. Thus, the requirement for an objective or 
subjective test should depend on the sort of behaviour that is 
involved. After all, when it comes to sexual intercourse, it is not 
unduly complicated for a man to find out whether a woman is 
consenting or not. The law should protect a woman’s right to say 
no, rather than give support to the blatantly sexist notion 
expressed by Mr. Nicholas Fairbairn among others that
"a woman frequently refuses or delays consent because she
wants to be seduced" (44).
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Similarly, nothing stops a man from saying that he believed that 
the alleged victim was consenting because, although she protested, 
he knew that she had had intercourse with others in the past and on 
that basis, he had formed an idea of her general willingness to 
consent. By effectively retaining the Morgan decision, the CLRC 
fails to come to grips with the issues involved here and it is to 
be hoped that any attempt at legislation will be broader in its 
approach.
5. Extending the definition of rape
For the purpose of rape law, sexual intercourse is defined as
penetration of the vagina by the penis. However, cases which have
the non-consent element essential for rape but do not involve such
penetration also come before the courts. These may involve
oral-genital contact, penetration of the anus or penetration by
various objects. Currently such offences amount to buggery or
indecent assault. The range of acts covered by the category of
indecent assault is enormous, from the
"most gross such as forcible oral intercourse to the 
relatively minor such as bottom-pinching" (45).
There are occasions where the trauma and injury inflicted in such
assaults is just as severe than those inflicted in vaginal
intercourse. In one case of indecent assault, the police surgeon's
evidence was that the victim's genital injuries
"caused extreme pain which he had only seen in cases of 
recent childbirth" (46).
It may well be that the only factor that distinguishes rape from
indecent assault is the object of penetration. There is no logic in
keeping as totally separate the treatment by the law of offences
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which are all on a continuum of sexual violence committed by men
against women. The CLRC considered whether the definition of rape
should be extended to cover non-consensual oral intercourse, anal
intercourse (whether on a man or woman) and any form of vaginal
penetration. In their Working Paper, they declined to follow this
course and recommended, with some apparent hesitation, that the
present definition of rape should continue;
"At this stage we confirm that we provisionally favour 
confining rape to non-consensual sexual intercourse with 
a woman and we invite comment on that decision" (47).
This proposal is based on two main grounds. Firstly, the CLRC
endorse the Heilbron Group's view that
"The concept of rape as a distinct form of criminal 
misconduct is well established in popular thought and 
corresponds to a distinctive form of wrongdoing" (48).
The first argument has been challenged by a number of commentators.
Temkin, for example, has pointed out that
"if the views of the public are of any significance at 
all in this context, then it must be its views of what 
the law ought to be rather than what it is. Furthermore, 
the committee does not in fact know how the public 
perceives the ambit of the law of rape, nor did it 
attempt to find out" (49).
Card also noted that, contrary to Heilbron's view, the concept of
rape is now popularly understood to include behaviour other than
that covered by the legal definition. He cites as an illustration
that
"terms such as "oral rape" and "homosexual rape" are 
frequently encountered in the press" (50).
Further support for his view comes from the recent case of Rai (51)
who received a partly suspended sentence for the rape of a girl of
six. When the transcript of the case became available, it turned
out that the judge in fact sentenced Rai for indecent assault
because he did not technically achieve penetration. The niceties of
this legal distinction were probably lost on the general public and
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indeed on the press, which continued to be outraged by the leniency 
of the sentence despite this new piece of information. One may well 
speculate that many people would be surprised to learn just how 
limited the legal definition of rape is.
Secondly, the CLRC argue that the risk of pregnancy is a further
characteristic of rape, and that this too sets it apart from other
forms of non-consensual sexual activity. However, although the risk
of pregnancy is much reduced, it cannot be excluded in anal
intercourse. Furthermore, the prevention of unwanted pregnancy does
not seem a major reason for criminalising rape. As Temkin put it,
"The fact that pre-pubertal, menopausal, sterilised and 
infertile women as well as those who practice 
contraception are all covered by the law of rape suggests 
that this distinction is not of overriding significance"
( 5 2 ) .
An important feature of rape law reform in the USA and some
Australian states has been the broadening of the legal definition
of rape so that it is not limited to sexual intercourse but covers
a range of coercive sexual acts. The trend has been towards such
reform after experimenting with minor procedural alterations in
rules of evidence, not unlike Section 2 of the 1976 Act in England.
A number of commentators would like to see a similar trend in this
country. The NCCL, for example, believe that rape law should be
widened to include other forms of sexual penetration and serious
sexual assault (53). Card has also argued that the CLRC were wrong
not to propose the merging of various types of non-consensual
sexual penetration into a single offence:
"It is submitted that if the CLRC's view is accepted, a
golden opportunity will have been missed not only to
simplify the law but also to make it accord with popular 
opinion" (54).
There are two major problems which could lead to injustice under
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the present situation. Firstly, the maximum penalty is much too low 
for the gravity of some of the offences which come into the 
category of indecent assault. Currently, the maximum penalty for 
indecent assault on a female is 2 years, and 5 years if the victim 
is under 13 years of age, whilst the maximum penalty for indecent 
assault against males is 10 years.
The CLRC’s final Report proposes to do away with this distinction 
and to increase the maximum penalty for indecent assault to make it 
"adequate to deal with the worst cases" (55). In principle, this is 
a step in the right direction. However, in practice it falls short 
of what is required. The maximum penalty which the CLRC recommend 
is ten years, which implies that indecent assault can never be as 
severe an offence as rape. There is clearly no significant 
difference between one sort of non-consensual sexual penetration 
and another, and no logic in fixing the maximum penalty at life for 
one, and at ten years for the other.
The second important injustice which arises from the current 
distinction between the legal categories of rape, indecent assault 
and buggery is that the various provisions which apply to protect 
alleged victims of rape under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976 do not apply to these related offences. There is no equivalent 
to Section 2 to safeguard them from cross-examination as to their 
sexual experience to show that they were likely to consent to the 
incident which constitutes the subject matter of the charge. This 
means that a complainant in a case of buggery or indecent assault 
can be freely questioned about her previous sexual experience, 
without defence counsel having to show the relevance of his
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cross-examination to the case. In a case included in the present
study, a man was charged with several counts of buggery and
indecent assault, as well as with one count of rape on the same
woman. Defence counsel began by questioning her as to her past
experience of buggery, and eventually made an application under
Section 2 in respect of the rape charge. In giving him leave for
further cross-examination, the judge wrily remarked that
"it was only the existence of the rape count which posed 
the difficulty" (Case 35)
The CLRC’s final Report aims to remedy this situation and to bring
in line the law relating to rape and indecent assault. They
recommend that Section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act
1976 should be extended to cover cases of indecent assault.
Notwithstanding the criticisms made of the operation of Section 2,
this again is a welcome and logical recommendation.
The same argument goes for extending the anonymity provision
accorded to rape victims in the 1976 Act to victims of indecent
assault and buggery. It is no less distressing for a victim of
non-consensual sexual penetration than for a victim of rape to have
personal details published in the local press. Interestingly, the
only area where rape and indecent assault have so far been treated
on a par is in relation to the question of intent. The decision in
DPP V Morgan was recently applied in an offence of indecent assault
on the following grounds:
"In analysing the issue in this way we have followed what 
was said by the majority in Reg. v Morgan...If, as we 
adjudge, the prohibited act in indecent asssault is the 
use of personal violence to a woman without her consent, 
then the guilty state of mind is the intent to do it 
without her consent. Then, as in rape at common law, the 
inexorable logic, to which Lord Hailsham referred in Reg.
V Morgan, takes over and there is no room either for a 
"defence" of honest belief or mistake, or of a "defence"
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of honest and reasonable belief or mistake" (56).
Whether acts of non-consensual oral intercourse or vaginal 
penetration by various objects are included within the legal 
category of rape is probably not the main issue. What is of crucial 
importance, however, is that the gravity of these behaviours should 
be fully recognised by the law, and that the protection extended to 
alleged victims of rape is also extended to victims of other forms 
of non-consensual sexual acts.
Marital rape
As we have noted above, the law of rape has many features which are 
not shared by the criminal law as it relates to other offences. One 
of its greatest anomalies is probably the exclusion of married 
women from its protection against rape by their husbands. The 
rationale for providing husbands with immunity from the charge of 
raping their wives is said to date from Hale’s famous dictum that 
by the marriage contract,
"the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract" (57).
In fact, since Hale the courts have recognised that a wife can
retract her consent in cases where there is some legally endorsed 
step towards separation or divorce. A husband can be convicted of 
rape if there is a decree nisi (58), an injunction or an 
undertaking not to molest his wife (59) or a separation order (60). 
When a married couple are living apart without a court order, the 
law does not protect the woman from rape by her husband, although 
it has been established that the husband has no right to use force
in obtaining intercourse. If he is violent, he may be liable for an
offence of wounding or assault, but not for rape (61). Another
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anomaly of the current position is that if a woman who is 
cohabiting without marriage is forced to have sexual intercourse by 
the man involved, his behaviour will come within the scope of the 
law of rape.
There is some evidence that where a man is convicted of raping his
ex—wife the courts do not always view the offence very seriously,
and that the harm and injury inflicted in such situations are not
fully recognised. In a recent case, for example, a man was
sentenced to three years' imprisonment for raping his wife after
their separation. On appeal, the sentence was considered
"excessive" and reduced to 18 months because, according to the
Court of Appeal,
"the victim suffered no physical or psychological harm as 
a result of the rape,' although it was an unpleasant and 
unwelcome experience" (62).
There is no empirical evidence in this country as to the
psychological harm caused by rape, but it as been forcefully argued
elsewhere that there is no reason to assume that a woman suffers
"less pain, humiliation or fear from forcible sexual 
penetration by her husband, a boyfriend or a stranger"
(63).
Despite some sporadic criticism, the archaic law remains. There has 
been no serious challenge to it, even though some of the most 
recent causes célébrés in this area were rape offences 
significantly initiated and effectively committed by husbands 
against their wives (64). It has also been pointed out that the 
marriage "contract" is unlike any other in legal terms. Weitzman 
commented that
"its provisions are unwritten, its penalties unspecified, 
and the terms of the contract are typically unknown to 
the 'contracting' parties" (65).
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Thus, as Mitra argues,
"It seems to be totally unreasonable to infer from such 
vague promises that a wife intends to make her body 
accessible at all times. By marrying, she indicates no 
more than that she will usually consent to intercourse 
and it is fanciful in the extreme for the law to imply 
that by her vow she has deprived herself of the right to 
decline the act at any given time". (66)
During the debates of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill in 1976
a clause was introduced to extend the criminal law to cover marital
rape. This had a less than welcoming reception in the House of
Commons. Among others, Mr. Rees-Davis commented that
"It would be going far beyond the bounds of anything 
hitherto imagined to allow this serious crime to come 
into the matrimonial bed" (67).
Fears were also expressed that such a provision would encourage
married women frivolously and maliciously to complain of rape after
a mere domestic disagreement:
"There are some women who are so unscrupulous that if 
they were given the encouragement of a statutory 
provision... they might well be prepared to commit 
perjury and bring their husbands into a criminal court 
for the sole purpose of breaking up the marriage" (68).
Finally, it was argued that successful prosecution for such
offences would be very rare because of the difficulty of proof, and
uncertainty about whether wives would ultimately be prepared to
give evidence against their husbands:
"...complaints of rape by a wife against her husband 
could lead to a great many complaints which, while not 
frivolous, are not maintained to the point of trial"
(69).
The clause was talked out in 1976, but another attempt was made to 
extend rape law to cover married couples in 1983. As seems to be 
the fate of amendments to rape law, this was through a Private 
Member’s Bill, which did not proceed because of the early election.
The CLRC also considered whether or not marital rape ought to
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become an offence. In their Working Paper, they were split over
this issue, but a majority favoured radical reform following the
advice of the Policy Advisory Committee, which did not believe that
an extension of the law to all married couples would lead to any
substantial number of
"improperly motivated threats to bring charges of rape 
against husbands" (70).
The concession to the opponents of reform was the proposal that no
marital rape prosecution should be brought without the consent of
the Director of Public Prosecutions. This would give the DPP
discretion in an area where, as the CLRC recognises, there are no
guidelines apart from the question of whether there is evidence to
warrant prosecution, and whether "the public interest points to
prosecution" (71). Thus, despite a move in the right direction,
even the majority of theXLRC did not propose to give married women
quite the same rights as others and this is clearly acknowledged in
their Working Paper:
"...If wives were to be treated in relation to rape in 
the same way as other women, that might lead to 
prosecutions which some would think were not desirable in 
the interest of the family or the public" (72).
In the CLRC's final Report, the discussion of marital rape starts
with a statement that there is wide divergence of opinion both in
the CLRC and outside on the question of whether rape law should
apply between spouses. The CLRC are agreed that the offence should
apply when the parties are effectively separated, whether with or
without legal endorsement. However, they are divided on whether to
also extend it to couples who are living together. By a majority,
they reommend that only married couples who are not cohabiting
should be covered, although they acknowledge that there may be
considerable difficulties in defining cohabitation. If it proves
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impossible to find an adequate working definition, the majority 
would prefer to leave the law as it is rather than to extend it to 
all married couples (73).
The CLRC’s final report sets out the arguments on both sides.
First, opponents of radical reform feel that forced intercourse
within marriage is not the "grave and unique" offence that rape is
outside marriage. It involves people who have had regular
consensual intercourse in the past, which is believed to mitigate
the gravity of the sexual aspect of the offence:
"Where the husband goes so far as to cause injury, there 
are available a number of offences against the person 
with which he may be charged, but the gravamen of the
husband’s conduct is the injury he has caused not the
sexual intercourse he has forced" (74).
Those in favour of reform feel that a woman is entitled to decide
whether or not to have intercourse on any particular occasion, and
that her right to choose within marriage should be protected by the
law. This would also be a development in the removal of
discrimination against women:
"If an extension of the law of rape to all married 
couples brought about a re-assessment of the sexual 
rights and duties in marriage, the law would ... have 
performed a valuable educative function" (75).
A second argument put forward against extending the law is that
because imprisonment would be unlikely in cases involving husbands
and wives, unless there were severe injuries, this might lead to
all rape cases being regarded less seriously (76). Related to this
is the argument that investigating the offence would be
particularly difficult unless there was corroborating evidence, for
example in the form of physical injury (77). Those in favour of
reform say that the above arguments could also apply to offences
other than rape where they are committed within marriage, but have
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never been held to do so (78),
Problems of proof are considerable in any rape complaint, 
particularly where the issue is consent and where there is some 
relationship, however distant, between the defendant and the 
complainant before the alleged offence. In the present study there 
was not a single conviction without some corroborative evidence. 
Forensic evidence of sexual intercourse is generally of no 
probative value where the defence is consent. Recent complaint or 
evidence of distress, save in exceptional circumstances, do not 
amount to corroboration. Without injury or admissions by the 
accused, and preferably both, a conviction in any rape case is 
extremely unlikely. Those in favour of reform assert that
"...it is wrong that the law should turn a blind eye to
criminal acts merely because they are difficult to prove" 
(79).
Thirdly, it is argued that the creation of an offence of marital 
rape would be detrimental to the institution of marriage. Once a 
wife had made a complaint, she would be unable to withdraw it. 
Police intervention would drive the couple even further apart, and 
lessen their chances of reconciliation which in turn would have 
detrimental consequences for the children (80). This position 
assumes that reconciliation is always desirable, which is 
questionable. It is hard to see whose interests would be served by 
the perpetuation of marriages where one partner continually and 
severely abuses the other.
It is interesting that the CLRC takes a somewhat different line 
when it considers the effect on the family of prosecutions for 
incest. There, they
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"recognise that the institution of criminal proceedings, 
and the punishment of those involved, may cause added 
distress to and even harm the very persons whom the law 
is seeking to protect". (81) "A sentence of imprisonment, 
for instance, which will commonly be visited upon a 
father guilty of incest with a young daughter, may serve 
to break up the family in a damaging and distressing 
manner". (82)
This, however, is not used to suggest that father-daughter incest
should no longer be a criminal offence. The protection of the
victims is given priority, rightly, over considerations of the
"sanctity" of the family. The CLRC’s minority on this issue state,
"The intervention of the police when the violence takes 
the form of forcible sexual intercourse may sometimes be 
in the wife’s best interests and those of any children of 
the marriage." (83)
Lastly, the majority fear that an offence of marital rape would be
open to abuse by unscrupulous women:
"an allegation of the serious and emotive offence of rape 
might be used by a wife as a bargaining counter in 
negotiations for maintenance or custody, or as a basis of 
a charge of unreasonable behaviour in a divorce petition"
(84).
The response of the minority is to point out that at present, wives 
might use allegations of buggery as a bargaining counter in 
matrimonial proceedings, but such accusations against husbands are 
rarely made (85).
It is unlikely that a change in the law to cover all married 
couples would precipitate vast numbers of complaints by wives 
against husbands. Certainly this has not been the experience of 
other jurisdictions where the marital immunity from rape 
prosecution has, to varying degrees, been repealed. And, as 
Williams comments,
"The primary purpose of the criminal law should not be to 
secure the maximum number of convictions, rather it is to 
educate people as to standards of behaviour which society 
expects of them" (86).
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The immediate practical impact of such law reform may be minimal, 
but the archaic principle that husbands are immune from liability 
for rape should be repealed. The law in this area, as Temkin 
argues,
"is of crucial symbolic significance. For the law must be 
seen to uphold the principles of freedom of choice to 
sexual intercourse and equality betwen husbands and 
wives" (87).
Corroboration
Another element in the law of rape which many regard as antiquated
and blatantly sexist is the practice of warning juries of the
danger of convicting on the complainant’s evidence alone:
"In cases of rape and other sexual offences, the jury may 
convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of the alleged 
victim, but the trial judge must warn the jury that it is 
dangerous to do so. Tn such cases it is the duty of the 
trial judge to convey the warning in plain terms, and the 
warning must be given whether the issue is one of 
consent, identification or anything else" (88).
This rule is said to date from Hale’s assertion that rape is
"an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, 
and harder to be defended by the party accused, though 
never so innocent" (89).
Although it is still widely believed that rape is an offence
particularly prone to false complaints (90), there is no evidence
to substantiate this. Despite serious challenge, the law continues
to require judges to warn juries against the dangers of convicting
on the complainant’s uncorroborated evidence. "Human experience in
the courts" and "long judicial experience" are said to conform with
Hale’s view and to justify continuation"of this practice. However,
as a recent NCCL publication comments,
"Those who believe that rape victims lie might look at 
the report of the New York City Rape Analysis Squad which 
found that only two per cent of rape charges reported 
were false and that these figures were not out of step
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with false charges made for other serious crimes" (91).
The recent Scottish study of police handling of sexual assault
cases does not set out to estimate the percentage of false
complaints, but seeks police officers’ views on the matter. The
authors conclude that
"despite a certain amount of rhetoric from police 
officers about the frequency of false complaining, 
individual officers were unable to document many 
individual cases which fitted into the category of false 
complaints" (92).
As far as speculation goes, it would be equally easy to think of
reasons why women and young girls, as well as men and young boys,
might make false complaints of other criminal offences, either for
financial gain or as a result of interpersonal relationships and
tensions. None of this has been reflected in a corroboration
requirement in other areas of the criminal law.
The CLRC’s final Report does not discuss the question of
corroboration. Presumably, it was felt to have been adequately
dealt with in the past. While the Working Paper recognises that it
may be "offensive" for a rape victim to hear the judge directing
the jury as to corroboration, it remains firm in the position it
had adopted by a majority in its 1972 Report on Evidence that
special caution is needed in sexual cases because, it is said,
"women and girls... sometimes allege that they have been 
raped in order to explain away evidence leading to the 
inference that they have recently had sexual 
intercourse." (93)
The proposal in the Working Paper was to leave things more or less
as they are. The principle that a corroboration warning is
essential is endorsed but slightly toned down insofar as juries
would in future be warned of "special need for caution rather than
of the "danger" of convicting. The precise form of the warning was
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a matter for the judge to decide "according to the circumstances"
(94).
There are already more than adequate safeguards to counter the 
effect of possible false complaints in the criminal law in general 
(e.g. cross-examination of the victim, defence speech to the jury) 
and in rape in particular where the barriers to successful 
prosecution are known to be enormous from deterrents early on in 
the system (police questioning, medical examination) and right 
through to the trial stage where cross-examination is far wider in 
scope than in other trials. There is no logic in arguing that, in 
such circumstances, the corroboration warning is needed as a 
safeguard against false complaints.
It is not always appreciated that judges often make comments in the
guise of a corroboration warning to the jury which are nothing less
than a fundamental insult to women. The following extracts are
taken from trials in this study to provide some illustrations;
"Experience has shown that it is very dangerous to 
convict a man of an offence of this nature on the 
unsupported evidence of a woman. These offences are very 
easy to allege - some people may have strange motives and 
reasons for alleging them, the imagination can play 
tricks. It is dangerous to convict on the evidence of the 
complainant alone. For this reason, it has become a 
healthy practice in law to warn juries about that". (Case
5)
"It is easy to make an allegation of rape; only the girl 
and the man are present - how on earth is the man to 
disprove it? Women do make false accusations out of 
fantasy or spite. That’s why doctors always have a nurse 
present. Juries are warned that they shouldn’t convict if 
they’re not aware of this. They should look for 
corroboration, for example, doctor’s evidence of injury 
or admissions to the police". (Case 7)
"The experience of these courts is that sometimes women 
make up such charges - I ask you to accept that. It is 
dangerous to convict in a sexual case on the word of a
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woman." (Case 4)
'In sex cases, whatever the sex of the complainant, it is 
dangerous to convict on the girl's (sic) evidence unless 
there is corroboration of it against the defendant".
(Case 8)
These extracts show how the corroboration warning can serve to
reinforce for the jury the stereotype of the malicious, vindictive,
and sometimes unbalanced rape victim which pervades the legal
system. As the New South Wales Attorney General commented in
introducing sexual assault law reforms there,
"It is stressed that the present practice (of 
corroboration warning) is regarded as being grossly 
offensive to women, and discriminatory." "Under Section 
405C the judge will not be compelled to utilize the 
traditional formula of denigration which identifies women 
as especially untrustworthy". (95)
The elimination of the corroboration rule has been a major feature
of rape law reforms in Australia and the USA. One function of the
law should be to challenge assumptions about culturally acceptable
behaviour towards women, and thus to contribute to more enlightened
attitudes towards the offence. It is regrettable that the CLRC's
final report missed the opportunity to recommend long overdue
change in this area. As with marital rape, the effect of repealing
the corroboration requirement may have little practical impact.
Nevertheless, a matter of principle is at stake. If the law is to
be widely respected by women, it is essential that it should get
rid of its inherited view of the rape victim as a neurotic female,
particularly prone to lying and to sexual hysteria. One crucial
step would be to drop the practice of a judicial warning about the
danger of accepting the complainant's uncorroborated evidence that
gives a ritual public reinforcement of this image at every rape
trial.
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Conclusion
When the CLRC produced its final Report in 1984, the media showed 
some optimism that its recommendations would be followed by 
legislative reform. Unfortunately, however, even if the political 
climate were favourable to change, the proposals contained in the 
CLRC's Report are insufficient to bring rape law into line with 
contemporary needs, attitudes and behaviour. There is a marked 
contrast between the tone and approach of the CLRC and of the 
Advisory Group on the Law of Rape towards the plight of the rape 
victim. One wonders to what extent this is explained by the 
composition of the two committees. Only two of the seventeen 
members of the CLRC, drawn mainly from the legal profession, were 
women. It is puzzling that a committee which considered sexual 
offences, an area which affects women so profoundly, was composed 
almost exclusively of men. The membership of the Advisory Group on 
the Law of Rape, on the other hand, was more evenly divided between 
the sexes and was also chaired by a woman High Court judge, Mrs. 
Justice Heilbron. It also produced a more sympathetic, balanced 
and sensitive report than the CLRC.
There is considerable ambiguity in society and in the legal system 
towards the plight of the rape victim. On the one hand, recent 
years have seen a growing awareness that rape victims are getting a 
rough deal from the various institutions they come into contact 
with when they report the offence. Measures like the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 have gone some way towards attempting 
to remedy this situation. On the other hand, there is convincing 
evidence that legislative reform has not gone far enough. Not only
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is the scope of the Act very limited, but each of its provisions 
designed to help the alleged victim is matched with a provision to 
favour the defendant. Furthermore, the essentially discretionary 
nature of the legislation, a male judiciary and a conservative 
criminal bar have meant that its practical impact has been minimal. 
During the debates of the Bill, one M.P. opposed to it expressed 
his hope that the judges would
"have sufficient ingenuity to whittle it down." (96)
The findings of the present study suggest that his hopes were not 
misplaced.
If we are to have a rape law that meets the essential need of being 
fair to the defendant but also affords adequate protection for the 
complainant, which is essential if our society is not to 
decriminalise the offence by continuing to discourage the reporting 
of rape, some vital changes are urgently required. The first 
priority must be to ensure that the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976 works as intended by Parliament, and this involves the 
strengthening of Section 2. Anonymity for defendants, which was 
introduced to pacify those who felt that anonymity for complainants 
alone would give rise to an upsurge in malicious accusations, and 
which has had certain unforeseen and unfortunate consequences, 
should be repealed as the CLRC’s Fifteenth Report recommends (97). 
The Morgan decision which, in the light of subsequent case law, has 
turned out to be more controversial than was first presumed, should 
also be reconsidered with regard to its application to rape.
In addition to strengthening the 1976 Act, a number of other 
reforms are urgently needed. The gravity of other forms of
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non-consensual sexual penetration and contact must be recognised by 
the law, whether through the creation of an extended category of 
rape, or simply through an increase of maximum penalties for such 
offences. As has been argued, victims of indecent assault should 
also be entitled to the same protection vis a vis their sexual 
history and anonymity as victims of rape. Husbands should be 
brought within the compass of rape law, and it is high time to get 
rid of the anachronistic assumption that on marriage women 
relinquish their right to refuse sexual intercourse. Finally, the 
corroboration requirement which serves to perpetuate the myth that 
women are particularly untrustworthy witnesses and prone to lying 
on oath should be repealed. It is also important that future 
reforms leave as little as possible to judicial discretion.
Further research in this area is also of crucial importance. Both 
the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape and, more recently, the CLRC, 
have clearly been greatly hampered in their work by the fact that 
so little reliable information exists in this country about the 
nature of the offence, its effect on victims, the motivations of 
offenders, and the role of societal institutions in compounding its 
impact on victims. Both bodies have had to rely almost exclusively 
on assumptions and empirical data predominantly from the USA 
regarding various aspects of the problem. Unhappily, the Fifteenth 
Report of the CLRC in 1984 gives little confidence that it would 
use empirical data if it had them, or that it would be capable of 
distinguishing reliable from unreliable data.
A recent Law Commission Report on divorce and maintenance 
recommends that provision be made for the
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continuous monitoring of the operation of any amending 
legislation dealing with the financial consequences of 
divorce". (98)
A similar case could well be made out for setting up machinery for
the systematic monitoring of the law relating to rape, partly to
identify potential areas for future reform, and partly to ensure 
that the operation of current legislation is in line with the 
intentions of Parliament.
Finally, it must be remembered that law reform, however
comprehensive and well implemented, is only part of the solution.
There are clearly limits to how much can be achieved by procedural
change. In an adversarial system some attack on the chief
prosecution witness’s evidence is standard strategy, and any
defence lawyer will capitalise on information which, however
prejudicial from the complainant’s point of view, is in favour of
his client. As Wood has argued from American experience,
"Temporary measures, such as crisis centres or
legislative reforms, may be able to alleviate current
atrocities, but until the time when the rape victim is no 
longer looked upon with suspicion and distrust, most 
rapists are likely to commit the crime with impunity. The 
bias against the rape victim... can only be dispelled if 
people become aware of the quandry in which she has been 
placed by a society which tends to adopt a male 
perspective. Exposing the defects in the present system 
is the first step in curing them". (99)
The present position of the rape complainant is partly the result
of legal definitions of rape, and of an essential and proper
concern to afford maximum protection for accused persons in an
adversarial system. But the legal system is an integral part of
society, and subject to the same values. Thus, the experience of
rape victims in court is also a product of current social attitudes
towards sexuality and the "proper" nature of male and female
relationships.
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The ambivalence towards the rape victim which has characterised 
both the substance and the application of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976 has to be resolved without further delay if 
this area of the criminal law is to recover credibility. It is 
imperative to get away from the attitudes embodied in the current 
legal process, attitudes which are not only insulting and degrading 
to women, but which also hamper the administration of justice in 
the broadest sense of the term.
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APPENDIX I.
THE SEXUAL OFFENCES (AMENDMENT) ACT 1976 
1976 CHAPTER 82
An Act to amend the law relating to rape [22nd November, 1976]
Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and 
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority 
of the same, as follows;-
1.-(l) For the purposes of section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 
1956 (which relates to rape) a man commits rape if-
(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the 
time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and
(b) at that time he knows that she does not consent to the 
intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she consents to it:
and references to rape in other enactments (including the following 
provisions of this Act) shall be construed accordinglv.
(2) It is hereby declared that if at a trial for a rape offence 
the jury has to consider whether a man believed that a woman was 
consenting to sexual intercourse, the presence or absence of 
reasonable grounds for such a belief is a matter to which the jury 
is to haye regard, in conjunction with any other relevant matters, 
in considering whether he so believed.
2.-(l) If at a trial any person is for the time being charged with 
a rape offence to which he pleads not guilty, then, except with the 
leave of the judge, no evidence and no question in 
cross-examination shall be adduced or asked at the trial, by or on 
behalf of any defendant at the trial, about any sexual experience 
of a complainant- with a person other than the defendant.
(2) The judge shall not giye leaye in pursuance of the preceding 
subsection for any eyidence or question except on an application 
made to him in the absence of the jury by or on behalf of a 
defendant; and on such an application the judge shall give leave if 
and only if he is satisfied that it would be unfair to that 
defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced or the 
Question to be asked.
(3) In subsection (1) of this section ’’complainant’’ means a 
woman upon whom, in a charge for a rape offence to which the trial 
in question relates, it is alleged that rape was committed, 
attempted or proposed.
(4) Nothing in this section authorises evidence to be adduced or 
a question to be asked which cannot be adduced or asked apart from 
this section.
3.—(1) Where a magistrates’ court inquires into a rape offence as 
examining justices, then, except with the consent of the court, 
evidence shall not be adduced and a question shall not be asked at 
the inquiry which, if the inquiry were a trial at which a person is
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charged as mentioned in subsection (1) of the preceding section and 
each of the accused at the inquiry were charged at the trial with 
the offences of which he is accused at the inquiry, could not be
adduced or asked without leave in pursuance of that section.
(2) On an application for consent in pursuance of the preceding 
subsection for any evidence or question the court shall-
(a) refuse the consent unless the court is satisfied that leave 
in respect of the evidence or question would be likely to be given 
at a relevant trial; and
(b) give consent if the court is so satisfied.
(3) Where a person charged with a rape offence is trded for that 
offence either by court-martial or summarily before a magistrates' 
court in pursuance of section 6(1) of the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1969 (which provides for the summary trial in certain 
cases of persons under the age of 17 who are charged with 
indictable offences) the preceding section shall have effect in 
relation to the trial as if-
(a) the words "in the absence of the jury" in subsection (2)
were omitted; and
(b) for any reference to the judge there were substituted-
(i) in the case of a trial by court-martial for which a 
judge advocate is appointed, a reference to the judge advocate, and
(ii) in any other case, a reference to the court.
4.-(l) Subject to subsection (7)(a) of this section, after a person 
is accused of a rape offence no matter likely to lead members of 
the public to identify a woman as the complainant in relation to 
that accusation shall either be published in England and Wales in a 
written publication available to the public or be broadcast in 
England and Wales except as authorised by a direction given in 
pursuance of this section.
(2) If, before the commencement of a trial at which a person is 
charged with a rape offence, he or another person against whom the 
complainant may be expected to give evidence at the trial applies 
to a judge of the Crown Court for a direction in pursuance of this 
subsection and satisfies the judge-
(a) that the direction is required for the purpose of inducing 
persons to come forward who are likely to be needed as witnesses at 
the trial; and
(b) that the conduct of the applicant's defence at the trial is 
likely to be substantially prejudiced if the direction is not 
given,
the judge shall direct that the preceding subsection shall not, by 
virtue of the accusation alleging the offence aforesaid, apply in 
relation to the complainant.
(3) If at a trial before the Crown Court at which a person is 
charged with a rape offence the judge is satisfied that the effect 
of subsection (1) of this section is to impose a substantial and 
unreasonable restriction upon the reporting of proceedings at the 
trial and that it is in the public interest to remove or relax the 
restriction, he shall direct that that subsection shall not apply
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to such matter relating to the complainant as is specified in the 
direction; but a direction shall not be given in pursuance of this 
subsection by reason only of an acquittal of a defendant at the 
trial.
(4) If a person who has been convicted of an offence and given 
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal against the conviction, or 
notice of an application for leave so to appeal, applies to the 
Court of Appeal for a direction in pursuance of this subsection and 
satisfies the Court-
(a) that the direction is required for the purpose of obtaining 
evidence in support of the appeal; and
(b) that the applicant is likely to suffer substantial injustice 
if the direction is not given,
the Court shall direct that subsection (1) of this section shall 
not, by virtue of an accusation which alleges a rape offence and is 
specified in the direction, apply in relation to a complainant so 
specified.
(5) If any matter is published or broadcast in contravention of 
subsection (1) of this section, the following persons, namely-
(a) in the case of a publication in a newspaper or periodical, 
any proprietor, any editor and any publisher of the newspaper or 
periodical ;
(b) in the case of any other publication, the person who 
publishes it, and
(c) in the case of a broadcast, any body corporate which 
transmits or provides the programme in which the broadcast is made 
and any person having functions in relation to the programme 
corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper,
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a
fine not exceeding £500.
(6) For the purposes of this section a person is accused of a 
rape offence if-
(a) an information is laid alleging that he has committed a rape 
offence; or
(b) he appears before a court charged with a rape offence; or
(c) a court before which he is appearing commits him for trial
on a new charge alleging a rape offence; or
(d) a bill of indictment charging him with a rape offence is
preferred before a court in which he may lawfully be indicted for
the offence,
and references in this section and section 7(5) of this Act to an 
accusation alleging a rape offence shall be construed accordingly; 
and in this section­
na broadcast" means a broadcast by wireless telegraphy of sound
or visual images intended for general reception, and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly;
"complainant", in relation to a person accused of a rape offence 
or an accusation alleging a rape offence, means the woman against
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whom the offence is alleged to have been committed; and
written publication" includes a film, a sound track and any
other record in permanent form but does not include an indictment 
or other document prepared for use in particular legal proceedings.
(7) Nothing in this section-
(a) prohibits the publication or broadcasting, in consequence of 
an accusation alleging a rape offence, of matter consisting only of 
a report of legal proceedings other than proceedings at, or
intended to lead to, or on an appeal arising out of, a trial at
which the accused is charged with that offence; or
(b) affects any prohibition or restriction imposed by virtue of 
any other enactment upon a publication or broadcast;
and a direction in pursuance of this section does not affect the 
operation of subsection (1) of this section at any time before the 
direction is given.
5.-(l) In relation to a person charged with a rape offence in 
pursuance of any provision of the Naval Discipline Act 1957, the 
Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955, the preceding section 
shall have effect with the following modifications, namely-
(a) any reference to a trial or a trial before the Crown Court 
shall be construed as a reference to a trial by court-martial;
(b) in subsection (1) after the word "Wales" in both places 
there shall be inserted "the words "or Northern Ireland";
(c) for any reference in subsection (2) to a judge of the Crown
Court there shall be substituted a reference to the officer who is 
authorised to convene or has convened a court-martial for the trial 
of the offence (or, if after convening it he has ceased to hold the 
appointment by virtue of which he convened it, the officer holding 
that appointment) and for any reference in subsection (3) to such a 
judge there shall be substituted a reference to the court;
(d) for any reference in subsection (4) to the Court of Appeal
there shall be substituted a reference to the Courts-Martial Appeal
Court; and
(e) in subsection (6) for paragraphs (a) to (d) there shall be 
substituted the words "he is charged with a rape offence in 
pursuance of any provision of the Naval Discipline Act 1957, the 
Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955".
(2) If after the commencement of a trial at which a person is 
charged with a rape offence a new trial of the person for that 
offence is ordered, the commencement of any previous trial at which 
he was charged with that offence shall be disregarded for the 
purposes of subsection (2) of the preceding section.
(3) In relation to a conviction of an offence tried summarily as 
mentioned in section 3(3) of this Act, for references to the Court 
of Appeal in subsection (4) of the preceding section there shall be 
substituted references to the Crown Court and the reference to 
notice of an application for leave to appeal shall be omitted.
(4) When an offence under subsection (5) of the preceding 
section which has been committed by a body corporate is proved to 
have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be
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attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, 
secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate or any 
person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well 
as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and be liable 
to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Where the affairs of a body corporate are managed by its members 
the preceding provisions of this subsection shall apply in relation 
to the acts and defaults of a member in connection with his 
functions of management as if he were a director of the body 
corporate.
(5) Proceedings for an offence under subsection (5) of the 
preceding section (including such an offence which is alleged to 
haye been committed by yirtue of the preceding subsection) shall 
not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Attorney 
General or, if the offence is alleged to haye been committed in 
Northern Ireland, of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland; and 
where a person is charged with such an offence it shall be a 
defence to proye that at the time of the alleged offence he was not 
aware, and neither suspected nor had reason to suspect, that the 
publication or broadcast in question was of such matter as is 
mentioned in subsection (1) of that section.
(6) In section 31(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (which 
proyides that certain powers of the Court of Appeal may be 
exercised by a single judge) after the word "1973" there shall be 
inserted the words "and fhe power to giye directions under section 
4(4) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976"; and in section 
36(1) of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1968 (which provides that 
certain powers of the Courts-Martial Appeal Court may be exercised 
by a single judge) after paragraph (g) there shall be inserted the 
words "and the power to give directions under section 4(4) of the 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 as adapted by section 5(l)(d) 
of that Act".
6.-(l) After a person is accused of a rape offence no matter likely 
to lead members of the public to identify him as the person against 
whom the accusation is made shall either be published in England 
and Wales in a written publication available to the public or be 
broadcast in England and Wales except-
(a) as authorised by a direction given in pursuance of this 
section or by section 4(7)(a) of this Act as applied by subsection
(6) of this section; or
(b) after he has been convicted of the offence at a trial before 
the Crown Court.
(2) If a person accused of a rape offence applies to a 
magistrates’ court, before the commencement of his trial for that 
offence, for a direction in pursuance of this subsection, the court 
shall direct that the preceding subsection shall not apply to him 
in consequence of the accusation; and if at a trial before the 
Crown Court at which a person is charged with a rape offence in 
respect of which he has not obtained such a direction-
(a) the judge is satisfied that the effect of the preceding 
subsection is to impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction
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on the reporting of proceedings at the trial and that it is in the 
public interest to remove the restriction in respect of that 
person; or
(b) that person applies to the judge for a direction in 
pursuance of this subsection,
the judge shall direct that the preceding subsection shall not 
apply to that person in consequence of the accusation alleging that 
offence.
(3) If, before the commencement of a trial at which a person is 
charged with a rape offence, another person who is to be charged 
with a rape offence at the trial applies to a judge of the Crown 
Court for a direction in pursuance of this subsection and satisfies 
the judge-
(a) that the direction is required for the purpose of inducing 
persons to come forward who are likely to be needed as witnesses at 
the trial; and
(b) that the conduct of the applicant’s defence at the trial is 
likely to be substantially prejudiced if the direction is not 
given,
the judge shall direct that subsection (1) of this section shall 
not, by virtue of the accusation alleging the offence with which 
the first-mentioned person is charged, apply to him.
(4) In relation to a person charged with a rape offence in 
pursuance of any provision of the Naval Discipline Act 1957, the 
Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955, the preceding provisions 
of this section shall have effect with the following modifications, 
namely-
(a) any reference to a trial or a trial before the Crown Court 
shall be construed as a reference to a trial by court-martial;
(b) after the word ’’Wales’’ in both places there shall be 
inserted the words ’’or Northern Ireland’’;
(c) in subsection (2) for any reference to a judge of the Crown 
Court there shall be substituted a reference to the court-martial; 
and
(d) in subsection (2) for any reference to a magistrates’ court 
and in subsection (3) for any reference to a judge of the Crown 
Court there shall be substituted a reference to the officer who is 
authorised to convene or has convened a court-martial for the trial 
of the offence or, if after convening it he has ceased to hold the 
appointment by virtue of which he convened it, the officer holding 
that appointment.
(5) An order in pursuance of section 49 of the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933 (which among other things imposes 
restrictions on reports of certain court proceedings concerning 
juveniles but authorises the court and the Secretary of State to 
make orders lifting the restrictions for the purpose of avoiding 
injustice to a juvenile) may include a direction that subsection
(1) of this section shall not apply to a person in respect of whom 
the order is made.
(6) Subsections (5) to (7) of section 4 of this Act shall have
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effect for the purposes of this section as if for references to 
that section there were substituted references to this section; 
and-
(a) in relation to a person charged as mentioned in subsection
(4) of this section, section 4(6) of this Act, as applied by this 
subsection, shall have effect as if for paragraphs (a) to (d) there 
were substituted the words "he is charged with a rape offence in 
pursuance of any provision of the Naval Discipline Act 1957, the 
Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955";
(b) in section 5(2) of this Act the reference to the purposes of 
section 4(2) of this Act shall be construed as including a 
reference to the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section; and
(c) in relation to a person charged by virtue of this subsection 
with such an offence as is mentioned in subsection (5) of section 5 
of this Act, that subsection shall have effect as if for the 
reference to section 4(1) of this Act there were substituted a 
reference to subsection (1) of this section,
7,-(l) This Act may be cited as the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976, and this Act and the Sexual Offences Acts 1956 and 1967 may 
be cited together as the Sexual Offences Acts 1956 to 1976.
(2) In this Act-
"a rape offence" means any of the following, namely rape, 
attempted rape, aiding, a.betting, counselling and procuring rape or 
attempted rape, and incitement to rape; and
references to sexual intercourse shall be construed in 
accordance with section 44 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 so far 
as it relates to natural intercourse (under which such intercourse 
is deemed complete on proof of penetration only);
and section 46 of that Act (which relates to the meaning of
"man" and "woman" in that Act) shall have effect as if the
reference to that Act included a reference to this Act.
(3) In relation to such a trial as is mentioned in subsection
(2) of section 1 of this Act which is a trial by court-martial or a 
summary trial by a magistratres’ court, references to the jury in 
that subsection shall be construed as references to the court.
(4) This Act shall come into force on the expiration of the 
period of one month beginning with the date on which it is passed, 
except that sections 5(1)(b) and 6(4)(b) shall come into force on
such a day as the Secretary of State may appoint by order made by
statutory instrument.
(5) Sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall not have effect in 
relation to a trial or inquiry which begins before the expiration 
of that period and sections 4 and 6 of this Act shall not have 
effect in relation to an accusation alleging a rape offence which 
is made before the expiration of that period.
(6) This Act, except so far as it relates to courts-martial and 
the Courts—Martial Appeal Court, shall not extend to Scotland and 
this Act, except so far as it relates to courts-martial and the 
Courts-Martial Appeal Court (including such a publication or 
broadcast in Northern Ireland as is mentioned in section 4(1) as
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adapted by section 5(l)(b) and section 6(1) as adapted by section 
6(4)(b), shall not extend to Northern Ireland.
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APPENDIX II.
SCHEDULE FOR "GUILTY" PLEAS
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE CASE
R V.
1. Number
2. Was there more than one defendant? 
Yes / No
If yes, how many?
3. Dates of trial
4. Judge
5. Prosecution counsel
a. Sex: Male / Female
b. Whether Q.C.: Yes / No
c. Whether Treasury Counsel: Yes / No
B. THE DEFENDANT (One section to be completed for each defendant 
at the trial)
1_. Name (D/No....)
2. Defence counsel
a. Sex: Male / Female
b. Whether Q.C.: Yes / No
3. Indictment and pleas
Charges: Pleas:
a
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4. Verdict (on charges other than rape)
Charges: Acquittal: Conviction: Other:
(Specify)
a
b
c
d
e
f
5. Sentence (all offences) (To be recorded separately, where 
relevant)
6. Previous convictions
Did the defendant have any previous convictions? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
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Charge: Year: Sentence:
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
7. Age at the time of the offence
8. Relationship to victim
9. Occupation 
Usual occupation:
Was he unemployed at the time of the offence?
Yes / No
10. Marital status
11. Did the defendant make any threats of violence in committing 
the offence? (verbal threats, gestures, etc.)
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
12. Did the defendant have a weapon on him at the time of the 
offence?
Yes / No
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If ves, give details:
13. Did the defendant use any physical violence in committing the 
offence?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
14. Had the defendant been taking any drugs other than alcohol? 
Yes / No / Not known 
If yes, give details:
Was there any suggestion that his behaviour was influenced by this? 
Yes A  No
If yes, give details:
15. Had the defendant been drinking alcohol before committing the 
offence?
Yes / No / Not known 
If yes, give details: ,
Was there any suggestion that his behaviour was influenced by this? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
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16. Was he, in his own submission, a heavy drinker/alcoholic/drug 
addict? " '
Yes / No
If yes, give details;
Had he been receiving any treatment at the time of the offence? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details;
If not.
Was treatment a condition of his sentence?
C. THE VICTIM (One section to be completed for each victim 
involved in the trial)
1. Age at the time of the offence
2. Occupation
3. Marital status
4. Was there evidence of the victim's virginity? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
5. Police
Did the victim report the offence to the police? 
Yes / No
If no, who did? (Give details)
How soon after the offence was it reported?
6. What was her behaviour during the attack?
7. Did she suffer any physical injuries? 
Yes / No
If ves, give details:
D. THE RAPE OFFENCE
1. What was (were) the rape offence(s)?
2. Brief description
3. Date
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4. Time
5. Location
In which borough did it occur? 
Where precisely did it occur?
E. MITIGATION (Record main points)
F. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
346
G. APPEAL (Record details of any appeal against sentence)
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SCHEDULE FOR "NOT GUILTY" PLEAS
A...........................IDENTIFICATION OF THE CASE 
R V........................
1. Number
2. Was there more than one defendant? 
Yes / No
If ves, how many?
3. Dates of trial 
Number of days;
4. Judge
5. Prosecution counsel
a. Sex; Male / Female
b. Whether Q.C.: Yes / No
c. Whether Treasury Counsel: Yes / No
B . THE DEFENDANT (One section to be completed for each defendant 
at the trial)
1. Name (D/No....)
Does the anonymity restriction apply? (Give details)
2. Indictment and pleas
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Charges; Pleas:
3. Verdict on rape charges (Give details)
Charges; Acquittal: Conviction Conviction Other:
as charged: lesser (Specify)
offence:
4. Verdict on other charges (Give details)
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Charges; Acquittal: Conviction Conviction Other
as charged: lesser (specify):
offence:
5. Sentence (all offences) (To be recorded separately, where 
relevant)
6. Previous convictions
Was information on previous convictions available? 
Yes / No
If yes, how did it become available?
Did the defendant have any previous convictions? 
Yes / No / Not known 
If yes, give details:
Charge: Year: Sentence;
a
b
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c
d
e
f
e
h
7. Age at the time of the offence
8. Relationship to complainant
9. Occupation 
Usual occupation:
Was he unemployed at the time of the offence? 
Yes / No
10. Marital status
11. Did the defendant make any threats of violence in committing 
the offence? (verbal threats, gestures, etc.)
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
12. Did the defendant have a weapon on him at the time of the 
offence?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
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13. Did the defendant use any physical violence in committing the 
offence?
Yes / No
If ves, give details:
14. Had the defendant been taking any drugs other than alcohol? 
Yes / No / Not known 
If yes, give details:
Was there any suggestion that his behaviour was influenced by this? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
15. Had the defendant been drinking alcohol before committing the 
offence?
Yes / No / Not known 
If yes, give details:
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Was there any suggestion that his behaviour was influenced by this? 
Yes / No
If ves, give details:
16. Was he, in his own submission, a heavy drinker/alcoholic/drug 
addict?
Yes / No
If ves, give details:
Had he been receiving any treatment or help for this at the time of 
the offence?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
If not.
Was treatment a condition of his sentence?
17. Defence counsel
a. Sex: Male / Female
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b. Whether Q.C.: Yes / No 
18, Police
What evidence was given by the police regarding initial 
interview(s) with the defendant? (Record in detail)
If a statement under caution was made, what evidence was given 
about that?
How far was the defendant's evidence at the trial consistent with 
his admissions and/or statement to the police? (Give details of any 
"attacks" on the police in this connection)
C . THE COMPLAINANT (One section to be completed for each 
complainant involved in the trial)
(C/No )
1. Was the anonymity restriction lifted on the complainant? 
Yes / No
If ves, give details;
2. Age at the time of the offence
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3. Occupation
4. Marital status
5. Was there evidence of the complainant *s virginity? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
6. Police
Did the complainant report the offence to the police? 
Yes / No .
If no, who did? (Give details)
How soon after the offence was it reported?
7. Did she suffer any physical injuries?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
8. Had she been drinking alcohol/using drugs before the alleged 
offence was committed?
Yes / No / Not known
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If yes, give details:
Was there any suggestion that this influenced her behaviour? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
9. How long was she in the witness box? 
For the prosecution:
In cross-examination:
10. Demeanour in witness box (Describe briefly)
D. THE RAPE OFFENCE
1. What was (were) the rape offence(s) charged?
2. Brief description
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3. Date
4. Time
5. Location
In which borough did it occur? 
Where precisely did it occur?
E. ISSUES IN THE TRIAL 
Medical evidence
1. Was the occurrence of sexual intercourse or attempted 
intercourse at issue?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
2. What evidence was given regarding the occurrence of sexual 
intercourse or attempted intercourse? (Record details)
3, When was the complainant first examined by a doctor?
4. What evidence of victim injury was there? (Give details)
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5. Did the medical evidence for the prosecution indicate that 
injuries should have been apparent if the complainant's story were 
true?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
6. Did the defence indicate that the victim's injuries were not 
consistent with her version of events? (Give details)
7. Was any medical evidence given to^clarify the identity of 
parties involved?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
8. Was any aspect of the prosecution medical evidence disputed by 
the defence?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
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Identity
9. Was the identity of the defendant(s) at issue? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
Consent
10. Was consent at issue?
Yes / No
If yes, complete the rest of this section
11. What was the complainant *s behaviour at the time of the alleged 
offence
(a) according to her?
If submission: Was lack of resistance interpreted as implied
consent by the defendant?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
(b) according to the defendant(s)?
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12. Why was such behaviour interpreted as consent?
13. Did the defence try to set some absolute standard of consent? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
Sexual history of the complainant
14. Was there any suggestion or evidence that the complainant has 
previously had consensual intercourse with the defendant, or any 
relationship short of sexual intercourse?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
Was this agreed by the complainant? 
Yes / No
If no, give her version of the facts:
15. Was an application made to cross-examine the complainant about 
her previous sexual experience with any man other than the 
defendant?
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Yes / No
If yes, What were the grounds of the application?
What was the judge's ruling?
What reasons, if any, did the judge give for his ruling?
16. Was evidence of the complainant's previous sexual history 
introduced during the trial?
Yes / No
If yes, via which route? (i.e. medical evidence, application under 
s.2., etc.)
What were the main points of the evidence?
How far was this agreed by the complainant?
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Complainant’s character
17. Was there any suggestion that the complainant provoked the 
incident?
Yes / No
If yes, give details (particularly of grounds on which such a 
suggestion was made):
18. Did the defence make any indirect references to the reputation 
or character of the complainant with the purpose of undermining her 
credibility?
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
Intent
19. Was the defendant's intent at issue?
Yes / No
If yes: What aspects of the complainant's behaviour were 
interpreted as consent by the defendant?
G. DIRECTIONS AND VERDICT
1. What evidence, in the judge's summing up, was capable of
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constituting corroboration? Give details:
2. What was said about the danger of convicting on the 
complainant's evidence alone? (Record as near verbatim as 
possible):
3. How did the judge deal with reasonable/unreasonable mistake in 
believing in consent, where applicable?
4. Judge's attitude to complainant (as compared to other witnesses) 
(Describe briefly):
The jury
5. Sex composition of the jury 
No, of men:
No. of women:
6. Were the jury directed to acquit? 
Yes / No
If yes, give details:
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7. Were the jury aware, before retiring, of any previous 
convictions of the defendant(s)?
Yes / No
If yes, give details;
8. Deliberations
How long were the jury out before returning a verdict?
Were they directed on a majority verdict?
Yes / No
If yes. Did they return a majority verdict?
Yes / No / Not known 
If yes, give details;
H. MITIGATION (Record main points)
I. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
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J. APPEAL (Record details of any appeal against conviction and/or 
sentence)
APPENDIX III.
ADDITIONAL RESULTS
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Guilty pleas; Not guilty pleas:
Number of defendants 
per trial
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Six
Total trials;
30 (97%)
1 (3%)
31 (100%)
34 (68%)
8 (16%) 
4 (8%)
2 (4%)
1 (2%) 
1 (2%) 
50 (100%)
Number of complainants 
per trial
One
Two
Three
Four
Total trials;
20 (65%)
8 (26%)
1 (3%)
2 (6%)
31 (100%)
44 (88%) 
6 (12%)
50 (100%)
Judge
High Court judge 
Circuit judge 
Recorder of London 
Total trials;
14 (45%)
11 (36%)
6 (19%) 
31 (100%)
13 (26%)
28 (56%)
9 (18%)
50 (100%)
Length of trial
1 to 4 days 
5 to 8 days 
9 to 12 days 
13 to 16 days 
17 days and over 
Total trials;
31 (100%)
31 (100%)
28 (56%)
15 (30%)
4 (8%)
2 (4%)
1 (2%) 
50 (100%)
Main rape offences 
charged
Rape
Attempted rape 
Aiding and abetting rape 
Indecent assault 
Total defendants;
26 (81%) 
6 (19%)
32 (100%)
65 (81%)
6 (8%) 
6 (8%) 
3 (4%)
80 (101%)
366
Guilty pleas: Not guilty pleas;
Other offences charged
No other offences charged 9 (28%) 41 (51%)
Additional sexual offence 13 (41%) 19 (24%)
Property offence 12 (38%) 12 (15%)
Offence of violence against
the person 9 (28%) 23 (29%)
Other offence 5 (16%) 5 (6%)
Total defendants: [32*] [80*]
*These categories are not mutually 
exclusive, and some defendants were charged 
with more than one group of offences in 
addition to rape.
Plea to rape charge,
"guilty" plea group
-Guilty of rape as charged 
-Not guilty of rape,
a. guilty of attempt
b. guilty of unlawful sexual
intercourse
c. guilty of indecent assault
d. guilty of other offences
-Guilty of attempted rape 
as charged
Total defendants;
17 (53%)
1 (3%)
4 (13%)
5 (16%)
2 (6%)
3 (9%)
32 (100%)
Verdict on rape charge,
'not guilty pleas
Convicted of rape as charged 
Convicted of attempt as charged 
Convicted of aiding and abetting 
as charged
Convicted of lesser offence
Acquitted by jury
Acquitted on judge's direction
Acquitted because prosecution
offered no evidence
Retrial ordered
Total defendants:
30 (38%)
3 (4%)
1 (1%)
7 (9%)
24 (30%)
5 (6%)
8 (10%) 
2 (2%)
80 (100%)
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Guilty pleas: Not guilty pleas;
Main offence sentenced for 
(convictions only)
Rape
More than one count of rape 
Attempted rape 
Aiding and abetting rape 
Indecent assault 
Other sexual offences 
Total defendants:
15 (47%)
2 (6%) 
4 (12%)
4 (12%)
7 (22%)
32 (99%)
30 (73%)
3 (7%)
2 (5%)
6 (15%)
41 (100%)
Sentence
Probation 
Borstal 
Suspended 
Immediate 
up to and 
up to and 
up to and 
up to and 
up to and 
up to and
sentence 
imprisonment, 
incl. 1 year 
incl. 2 years 
incl. 3 years 
incl, 4 years 
incl. 5 years 
incl. 10 years
over 10 years, excl. life 
Life
Total defendants:
2 (6%) 
1 (3%)
1 (3%)
(6%)
(13%)
(13%)
(15%)
(6%)
(13%)
3 (9%)
4 (13%)
32 (100%)
4 (10%)
2 (5%)
4 (10%)
13 (32%)
6 (14%)
6 (14%)
6 (14%)
41 (99%)
Defendants' previous 
convictions
None 5 (16%)
Rape offences 4 (12%)
Other sexual offences 6 (19%)
Offences against property 15 (47%)
Offences of violence against 
the person 8 (25%)
Other offences 12 (38%)
Total defendants: [32*]
* These categories are not mutually 
exclusive, and some defendants had more 
than one type of previous conviction.
26 (32%)
10 (12%) 
6 (7%)
44 (55%)
32 (40%)
22 (27%)
[80*]
Defendants' age at the time 
of the offence
368
Guilty pleas; Not guilty pleas:
Under 17 
17 and under 21 
21 and under 25 
25 and under 30 
30 and under 35 
35 and under 40 
40 and under 50 
50 and over 
Total defendants:
3 (9%) 
6 (19%)
4 (13%)
8 (25%)
2 (6%)
5 (16%)
3 (9%)
1 (3%)
32 (100%)
8 (10%) 
13 (16%)
19 (24%)
12 (15%)
11 (14%)
10 (13%)
5 (6%)
2 (3%)
80 (101%)
Complainants' age at the 
time of the offence
Under 10 1 (2%) 2 (3%)
10 and under 16 12 (26%) 6 (11%)
16 and under 20 3 (7%) 19 (34%)
20 and under 25 12 (26%) 19 (34%)
25 and under 30 7 (15%) 5 (9%)
30 and under 35 5 (11%) 1 (2%)
35 and under 40 1 (2%) —
40 and under 50 - 2 (3%)
50 and over 3 (7%) 1 (2%)
Not known 2 (4%) 1 (2%)
Total complainants: 46 (100%) 56 (100%)
Defendants' marital status
Single
Married or cohabiting 
Separated or divorced 
Not known 
Total defendants:
20 (63%) 41 (51%)
10 (31%) 21 (26%)
1 (3%) 15 (19%)
1 (3%) 3 (4%)
32 (100%) 80 (100%)
Complainants* marital status
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Guilty pleas; Not guilty pleas:
Single 31 (67%) 37 (66%)
Married or cohabiting 9 (19%) 6 (11%)
Separated or divorced 1 (2%) 12 (21%)
Widowed 1 (2%) -
Not known 4 (9%) 1 (2%)
Total complainants: 46 (99%) 56 (100%)
Complainants' injuries
None 30 (65%) 19 (34%)
Minimal 1 (2%) 21 (37%)
Moderate 10 (22%) 10 (18%)
Severe 4 (9%) 3 (5%)
Not known 1 (2%) 3 (5%)
Total complainants: 46 (100%) 56 (99%)
Where offence was
committed - police area
SW London 5 (16%) 8 (16%)
SE London 5 (16%) 10 (20%)
Central London and West End 4 (13%) 5 (10%)
NW London 2 (6%) 7 (14%)
N and E London 3 (10%) • 13 (26%)
Outside London 5 (16%) 4 (8%)
Not known 7 (23%) 3 (6%)
Total trials: 31 (100%) 50 (100%)
Where offence was
committed - location
Defendant's premises 4 (13%) 18 (36%)
Complainant's premises 10 (32%) 11 (22%)
Home shared by defendant
and complainant 4 (13%) 4 (8%)
Car/van 2 (6%) 3 (6%)
Public place - outdoors 8 (26%) 9 (18%)
Public place - indoors 3 (10%) 4 (8%)
Not known - 1 (2%)
Total trials: 31 (100) 50 (100%)
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Guilty pleas; Not guilty pleas;
Who reported the offence
Complainant 22 (48%) 19 (34%)
Parent 12 (26%) 7 (12%)
Relative/friend/neighbour 3 (7%) 13 (23%)
Passer-by 5 (11%) 15 (27%)
Not known 4 (9%) 2 (4%)
Total complainants: 46 (101%) 56 (100%)
Number of women on the iury
1-2 3 (6%)
3-4 13 (26%)
5-6 23 (46%)
7-8 7 (14%)
9-10 -
11-12 -
No jury sworn 4 (8%)
Total trials: 50 (100%)
Length of jury deliberations
Under 1 hour 8 (16%)
1 to 2 hours 8 (16%)
2 to 3 hours 8 (16%)
3 to 4 hours 6 (12%)
4 to 5 hours 4 (8%)
More than 5 hours 5 (10%)
Not decided by jury 7 (14%)
Not known 4 (8%)
Total trials: 50 (100%)
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